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Defences to Murder: A Woman-Centred Analysis
Anna Catheryn Gausden
Material Abstract
This thesis has developed a woman-centred analytical framework and accompanying 
court room strategy to critically evaluate the legal construction of abused women who 
kill and their reactions to abuse in the context of the defences to homicide. This builds 
upon the existence of extensive empirical evidence which explains the defensive 
nature of female perpetrated intimate partner homicides. Despite such information, the 
recognition of abused women’s reactions as reasonable within the context of domestic 
violence is not reflected within the defences to homicide. Instead, abused women 
must fall within masculine constructions of appropriate reaction, or else be 
constructed within a psychological framework premised upon the existence of a 
mental abnormality. 
In order to challenge the legal construction of abused women who kill, this thesis 
evaluated the strategic possibilities apparent within the admissibility of expert 
testimony concerning domestic violence. It used abused women’s narratives and 
social contexts to demonstrate the reasonable nature of their reaction. The potential of 
such testimony was explored when the strategy was applied to the current partial and 
complete defences to homicide. Upon application, it became clear that the defences to 
homicide are implicitly gender biased, making the admissibility of such testimony 
insufficient to challenge prevailing and masculine notions of appropriate behaviour.  
Therefore, this thesis has argued that it is necessary to implement a partial defence of 
excessive force in self defence. This would recognise the defensive nature of abused 
women’s reactions to abuse whilst enabling abused women’s narratives and social 
contexts to be used as a means of challenging the current legal constructions of 
abused women who kill. It is hoped that these narratives will be used to facilitate 
further legal reform until abused women’s reactions to abuse can appropriately be 
incorporated into the complete defence of self defence.  
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8Introduction
1. Domestic Violence and Intimate Partner Homicide
Domestic violence exists within society as a pattern of controlling behaviour, which 
includes physical, emotional, sexual, financial and psychological abuse of one person 
by another.
1
Government statistics indicate that around twenty eight percent of 
women have experienced some form of domestic violence since the age of sixteen. 
This is the equivalent of four and a half million women.
2
  Statistics also indicate that 
seventy seven percent of the victims of domestic violence are women, and that repeat 
victimisation occurs in sixty six percent of these incidents.
3
Domestic violence has a 
detrimental impact on an abused woman’s physical health and wellbeing, as the 
effects of domestic violence include acute and chronic pain, bruises, broken bones, 
facial trauma and skeletal injuries.
4
Domestic violence can also cause a loss of 
appetite, eating binges, self induced vomiting, headaches, and fainting.
5
There are also 
physical symptoms from sexual violence, including menstrual problems, urinary tract 
infections and sexual dysfunction.
6
Sexual abuse also leads to pregnancy. In certain 
cases, pregnancy can escalate the severity of abuse, as it is estimated that women are 
four times more likely to experience heightened abuse as the result of an unplanned 
pregnancy.  Consequently, any of the abuser’s stress or frustration is directed back at 
the mother and her unborn child, as they are perceived to be the source of the tension.
7
Despite the severe effects of domestic violence, some abused women still find it very 
difficult to terminate an abusive relationship, as some women are held in abusive 
relationships by a network of interrelated behaviours, including social and economic 
                                                          
1
K.M. Digirolamo, ‘Myths and Misconceptions about Domestic Violence’ (1995-1996) 16 Pace 
L.Rev. 41, 44
2
A. Walker, J. Flatley, C. Kershaw and D. Moon, ‘Crime in England and Wales 2008/09: Findings 
from the British Crime Survey and Police Recorded Crime’ (Volume 1). Home Office Statistical 
Bulletin, No. 11/09. (Home Office, London, 2009)
3
A. Walker, J. Flatley, C.  Kershaw and D. Moon (n2)
4
Grisso et al, ‘A Population-Based Study of Injuries of Inner City Women’. (1991) 143 (1) American 
Journal of Epidemiology 59, 63 
5
P.W. Sharps and J. Campbell, ‘ Health Consequences for Victims of Violence in Intimate 
Relationships’ in X.B. Arriaga and  S. Oskamp (eds) ‘Violence in Intimate Relationships’ (Sage 
Publications 1999) 167 
6
B. Bergman et al, ‘Utilization of Medical Care by Abused Women.’ (1992) 81 American Journal of 
Public Health 1486, 1488 
7
L. Heise, ‘Reproductive Freedom and Violence Against Women: What are the Intersections?’ (1993) 
27 The Journal of Law, Medicine and Ethics 206, 212 
9deprivation.
8
These behaviours reinforce a level of dependency upon the abuser and 
render the abused woman unable to leave. According to the Psychologist Lenore 
Walker, remaining in an abusive relationship is further encouraged by the 
psychological effects of domestic abuse, which she likens to symptoms similar to 
those of Post Traumatic Stress Disorder, (PTSD).
9
These symptoms include, 
flashbacks, difficulty sleeping, nightmares and blackouts. The implications of such 
symptomology on the ability to terminate an abusive relationship were investigated by 
Arias. From a study of sixty eight abused women residing in a shelter, it was found 
that the relationship between psychological abuse and the intention to leave the 
relationship would be stronger among women who did not suffer from PTSD 
symptomology than among those who did.
10
Therefore, when a woman is subjected to 
extreme emotional abuse, she may feel as though she cannot leave the relationship. 
She is effectively controlled by her abusive partner, keeping her sufficiently low, 
isolated and unable to seek help. 
It is estimated that two women per week are killed by their current or former 
partners,
11
which accounts for forty percent of all female homicide victims.
12
Brown 
and Aldridge claim that the link between domestic violence and intimate partner 
homicide is well established with these links being consistent over the past ten 
years.
13
Research conducted on intimate partner homicide suggests that men often kill 
their intimate partners after subjecting them to lengthy periods of coercive abuse and 
assaults.
14
A key feature of male perpetrated spousal homicide methodology is 
overkill. This involves inflicting much more injury to the victim than is needed to kill 
them. Although it can be present in both male on female and female on male intimate 
partner homicides, Cazenave and Zahn found that men were more violent when they 
                                                          
8
H. Abrahams, Supporting Women after Domestic Violence: Loss, Trauma and Recovery. (Jessica 
Kingsley Publishers 2007) 20 
9
L. Walker, The Battered Woman Syndrome (Springer 1984) 111
10
I. Arias, ‘Women’s Reponses to Physical and Psychological Abuse’ in Arriaga X. B and Oskamp, S. 
(eds) ‘Violence in Intimate Relationships’ (Sage Publications 1999) 150
11
D. Povey (Ed) (2004). Crime in England and Wales 2002/3: Supplementary Volume 1 - Homicide 
and gun crime. Home Office Statistical Bulletin. Home Office: London. D. Povey (Ed) (2005). Crime 
in England and Wales 2003/2004: Supplementary Volume 1: Homicide and Gun Crime. Home Office 
Statistical Bulletin, No. 02/05. Home Office: London. Home Office (1999). Criminal statistics, 
England and Wales. Home Office: London. Department of Health ‘Responding to domestic abuse: A 
handbook for health professionals.’ (Department of Health 2005) 
12
D.Povey (2005) (n11).
13
M.L. Aldridge and K.D. Browne,‘Perpetrators of Spousal Homicide. A Review.’ (2003) 4 Trauma, 
Violence & Abuse 265, 266 
10
killed their spouse than when they killed any one else, whether known or unknown to 
them.
15
Crawford and Gartner found that in sixty percent of cases of male perpetrated 
intimate partner homicide, men strangled or beat their victims using violence that 
went far beyond what was needed to kill them.
16
The methodologies of male perpetrated intimate partner homicide can be contrasted 
against cases of female perpetrated intimate partner homicide, as data obtained by 
Swatt and He demonstrates that when women commit intimate partner homicide two 
key variables are engaged. These are evidence of prehomicide injury and the use of a 
knife,
17
demonstrating that when women kill, they usually do so in response to 
violence and with a weapon to alleviate the power imbalance between themselves and 
their abuser.
18
The prehomicide injury variable was further evidenced in Trotman’s 
study of thirty women who were incarcerated in a California prison for killing their 
partners. Of the thirty women studied, twenty nine had been battered and exposed to 
other types of physical and mental prehomicide injury, and twenty said that when the 
homicide occurred, they were trying to protect either themselves or their children.
19
In contrast to the motivations underpinning many female perpetrated intimate partner 
homicides, research on male perpetrated intimate partner homicide motivation finds 
that the two most commonly stated intentions for men killing their female partners are 
to punish her for ending the relationship, or to stop her from leaving.
20
Research 
conducted by Hart indicates that women who leave their abuser are seventy five 
percent more likely to be killed than those who stay with their abuser,
21
as the act of 
leaving serves as a form of emotional abandonment and killing the woman for leaving 
                                                                                                                                                                     
14
M.L. Aldridge and K.D. Browne, ‘Perpetrators of Spousal Homicide: A Review’ (n 13) 266.
15
N.A. Cazenave and M.A. Zahn, ‘Women, Murder and Male Domination: Police Reports of Domestic 
Violence in Chicago and Philadelphia’ in E.C. Viano (Ed) Intimate Violence: Interdisciplinary 
Perspectives ( Hemisphere Publishing Group 1992) 83-97 
16
M. Crawford and R. Gartner, Women Killing: Intimate Femicide in Ontario 1974-1990 (Government 
of Ontario Ministry of Social Services, Women’s Directorate, Toronto, 1992) 
17
M. Swatt and N. He,‘ Exploring the Difference Between Male and Female Intimate Partner 
Homicides: Revisting the Concept of Situated Transactions’ (2006) 10 Homicide Studies 279, 286 
18
C. R. Silver and D. B. Kates. ‘Self- Defense, Handgun Ownership, and the Independence of Women 
in Violent Sexist Society’  in D. B Kates (Ed) Restricting Handguns: The Liberal Sceptics Speak Out 
(Croton-on-the-Hudson 1979) 75-90
19
J. Trotman, The Murderess: A Psychological Study of Criminal Homicide (R and E Research 
Associates, 1978) 
20
D. Adams, Why Do They Kill? Men Who Murder Their Intimate Partners (Vanderbilt University 
Press 2007) 728
21
B. Hart,‘National Estimates and Facts about Domestic Violence’ (1989) NCADV Voice 12, 12  
11
is a way of regaining control. When control is lost, the risk of femicide can increase 
nine-fold by the ‘combination of a highly controlling abuser and the couples’
separation after living together.’
22
The implication of separation is further reflected in 
Wilson and Daly’s research findings, which demonstrate that men will often track 
down their partners and kill them as punishment for trying to terminate the 
relationship,
23
demonstrating that this sense of proprietariness renders women unsafe 
in violent relationships, but more so upon termination due to the fundamental belief 
that one partner is entitled to possess and control the other. 
24
1.1 Abused Women Who Kill and the Defences to Homicide
Despite the defensive motivation, and the need for self preservation underpinning the 
commission of female perpetrated intimate partner homicides,
25
abused women who 
have killed their abusers have found it very difficult to fall within the ambit of the 
complete defence of self defence. Abused women who kill have been expected to 
conform with the rigidly proscribed legal requirements of imminence, necessity, 
reasonableness and proportionality in order to satisfy the defence.  Although these are 
prima facie gender neutral legal requirements,
26
upon application, they are better 
suited to situations in which two adversaries of equal size and strength have fought.
27
This ignores the substantive differences in the commission of male perpetrated and 
female perpetrated intimate partner homicides, demonstrating that the complete 
defence of self defence is not structured in a way which reflects the experiences of 
battered women who kill.
28
It adopts the experiences of men and does not consider 
                                                          
22
Campbell, J, et al. ‘Risk Factors for Femicide in Abusive Relationships: Results from a Multisite 
Case Control Study’ in Mangai Natarajam (Ed) Domestic Violence: The Five Big Questions (Ashgate 
2007) 136 
23
M. Wilson and M. Daly, ‘Till Death do us Part’ in Radord, J, and Russel D (eds) ‘Femicide: The 
Politics of Woman Killing’ (Oxford University Press 1992) 97 
24
C. R. Silver and D.B. Kates, ‘Self- Defense, Handgun Ownership, and the Independence of Women 
in Violent Sexist Society’  in D. B Kates (Ed) Restricting Handguns: The Liberal Sceptics Speak Out 
(Croton-on-the-Hudson 1979) 75-90
25
see E. Pizzey, Scream Quietly or the Neighbours Will Hear (Penguin 1974) 
26
C. Ewing, Battered Women Who Kill: Psychological Self Defence as Legal Justification (Lextington 
Books 1987) 61 
27
see E. Kenny, ‘Battered Women Who Kill: The Fight Against Patriarchy’ (2007) UCL Jurisprudence 
Review 17, 30
28
S. Cubbon, ‘The Dismantling of Patriarchy’ (2000) UCL Jurisprudence Review 253, 271 
12
experiences which depart from these standards as reasonable.
29
By requiring both men 
and women to adhere to the same standard in the context of self defence, the law 
seeks to treat equally those whose positions are fundamentally unequal, thus 
furthering inequality.
30
   
In addition to the difficulties abused women face in pleading self defence, the partial 
defences to homicide have also posed problems for abused women who kill. Before 
the partial defences to homicide were modified by the Coroners and Justice Act 2009, 
abused women had to satisfy the requirements of the partial defences of provocation 
and diminished responsibility as set out in the Homicide Act 1957. The partial 
defence of provocation as it existed under s3 of the Homicide Act 1957, required 
abused women to demonstrate that they had been provoked by things said or done to 
lose their self control, and that a reasonable man might have responded in the same 
way to the provocation faced by the accused. However, the manifestation of a loss of 
self control became synonymous with the angry and violent responses typical of male 
perpetrated intimate partner homicides.
31
Reactions of this nature were recognised as 
legally and socially reasonable.
32
This left many abused women who killed their 
abusers outside of the understanding of the legal system, despite empirical evidence 
demonstrating that abused women do not necessarily suddenly lose control and will 
often delay the fatal strike and wait until their abuser is off guard before using a 
weapon to commit the homicide.
33
Consequently, the legal construction of the partial defence of provocation under the 
Homicide Act 1957 and the pivotal legal concept of loss of self control, 
misrepresented abused women who killed their abusers. This enabled misconceptions 
that abused women actually like violence, provoke violence,
34
are equally as violent 
and are free to leave the relationship at any time,
35
free to permeate both the social 
                                                          
29
P.L. Crocker, ‘The Meaning of Equality for Battered Women who Kill Men in Self Defense’ (1985) 
8 Harv. Women’s L.J. 121, 123 
30
H. Kennedy, Eve Was Framed (Chatto and Windus 1992) 212-213 
31
E. Kenny, ‘Battered Women Who Kill: The Fight Against Patriarchy’ (n27) 21.
32
S. Edwards,  Sex and Gender in the Legal Process (Blackstone, 1996) Chapters 6, 8, 9
33
see J. Horder, ‘Sex Violence and Sentencing in Provocation Cases’ (1989) Crim LR 546
34
E. Gondolf and E. Fisher, Battered Women as Survivors: An Alternative to Treating Learned 
Helplessness (Lexington Books 1988) 13-15
35
M.M Dempsey, ‘The Use of Expert Witness Testimony in the Prosecution of Domestic Violence’
(Crown Prosecution Service 2004) 9
13
and legal conscious and act as a foundation for understanding abused women who 
kill. Therefore, social myths have been able to legitimatise legal views about the 
appropriate nature of women’s reactions, resulting in the abused woman and her 
response to violence being detached from social and legal understanding. 
36
   
Accordingly, abused women who kill have been able to fall within the legal ambit of 
the partial defences to homicide if their actions can be excused, as opposed to being 
recognised as justifiable responses to violence.
37
In order to be excused, abused 
women have pleaded diminished responsibility. This partial defence requires abused 
women who kill to demonstrate that their reaction to abuse was the consequence of a 
mental abnormality.
38
This is achieved through the use of expert testimony on 
psychological syndromes such as Battered Women’s Syndrome (BWS), which exists 
as a sub-category of PTSD.
39
BWS seeks to demonstrate that many abused women 
respond to abuse in the same way as others who have been ‘repeatedly exposed to 
different kinds of trauma.’
40
It is applied to help the jury understand the psychological 
impact of abuse, and explain why the abused woman may have reacted in the manner 
that she did.
41
  
Although BWS aims to explain the reasonable nature of the abused woman’s reaction 
through psychology, the syndrome is highly controversial. BWS constructs abused 
women who kill according to a pathological interpretation,
42
rather than focusing on 
the actual abuse sustained and how this shaped the abused woman’s eventual reaction 
to abuse. This further compliments social myths concerning abused women who kill, 
legitimising the perception that women must be weak, passive and dysfunctional for 
staying with their abuser and responding the way that they did.
43
                                                          
36
M.J. Mossman, ‘Feminism and Legal Method: The Difference in Makes’ (1987), 3 Wisc. Women's 
L.J. 147, 158 
37
see D.R. Loseke and S.E. Cahill, ‘The Social Construction of Deviance: Experts on Battered 
Women’ (1984) 31(3) Social Problems 296 
38
see The Homicide Act 1957, s2(1) which required the defendant to be suffering from an ‘abnormality 
of mind’ and The Coroners and Justice Act 2009, s52(1) which requires the defendant to be suffering 
from an ‘abnormality of mental functioning.’ 
39
L. Walker ‘Battered Women and Self Defense’ (1992) 6 Notre Dame J.L.Ethics & pub.pol’y 321, 
326 
40
L. Walker ‘Battered Women and Self Defense’ (n39) 326. 
41
L. Walker, ‘Battered Women and Self Defense’ (n39) 327.
42
H. Kennedy, (n30) 200.
43
M.R. Mahoney, ‘Legal Images of Battered Women: Redefining the Issue of Separation’ (1991) 90(1) 
Michigan Law Review 1, 64 
14
Consequently, the inability of both the complete and partial defences to homicide to 
incorporate the experiences and realities of abused women who kill has lead to 
feminist claims that the law is masculine,
44
as it creates, constructs and reinforces 
patriarchal assumptions about women.
45
  The legal system functions as both a source 
and reflection of men’s patriarchal power by reinforcing patterns of male domination
and thus subordinating women.
46
Any deviation from the prescribed masculine 
behavioural categories is perceived as a disease.
47
This renders abnormal women’s 
reactions to violence as they do not fall within masculine constructed legal categories 
and ensures that the law plays a continued role in women’s subordination, as law 
shapes societal attitudes as to whether a problem exists.
48
This ensures that the law 
operates as a form of power with an undisputed claim to truth, which has the effect of 
disqualifying other discourses.
49
The powerful nature of law and legal knowledge 
disqualifies abused women’s alternative social realities,
50
rendering irrelevant 
experiences which do not fall within its relevant context. This legal legitimacy 
claimed by the law extends to every issue in social life and ensures that feminist 
considerations become discounted.
51
This enables stereotypes concerning abused 
women who kill to continue to influence legal and social decision making, as society 
accepts the resulting structure which appears to value men more than women.
52
1.2 The Coroners and Justice Act 2009
In order to try and counter the prevailing gender bias within the defences to homicide, 
the Coroners and Justice Act 2009 was implemented,
53
abolishing the partial defence 
                                                          
44
L.M. Finley, ‘Breaking Women’s Silence on Law: The Dilemma of the Gendered Nature of Legal 
Reasoning’ (1989) 64 Notre Dame L. Rev 886, 887
45
J. Rifkin, ‘Toward a Theory of Law and Patriarchy’ (1980) 3 Harvard Women’s L.J 83, 85
46
V. Bryson, Feminist Debates. Issues of Theory and Political Practice. (Macmillan 1999) 72 , N. 
Levit  and  R.R.M. Verchick, Feminist Legal Theory (New York University Press 2006) 22
47
G.T. Kaplan and L.J. Rogers, ‘ The Definition of Male and Female. Biological Reductionism and the 
Sanctions of Normality’ in Sneja Gunew(ed) Feminist Knowledge. Critique and Construct’ (Routledge 
1990) 222 
48
L.M. Finley, (n44) 887. 
49
C. Smart, Feminism and the Power of the Law (Routledge 1989) 26 
50
C. Smart, (n49) 4. 
51
C. Smart, (n49) 13. 
52
S.H. Pillsbury, ‘Crimes Against the Heart: Recognizing the Wrongs of Forced Sex’ (2002) 35 
Loy.L.A.L.Rev 845, 848 
53
The Coroners and Justice Act 2009 was implemented in October 2010 
15
of provocation and reforming the partial defence of diminished responsibility.
54
In 
doing so, it was hoped that abused women who killed their abusers would be able to 
fall within the ambit of the partial defences to homicide,
55
as the Coroners and Justice 
Act 2009 recognises that women often commit intimate partner homicide because of 
fear. The legislation therefore includes fear as well as anger as a justifiable basis for a 
loss of self control.
56
Despite the intentions of the Coroners and Justice Act 2009 to better reflect the
circumstances in which abused women kill their abusers, this thesis will argue that the 
retention of the concept of loss of self control ensures that the legislation privileges 
angry and masculine responses to violence, without being able to fully accommodate 
the reactions of abused women who kill. Although the recognition of fear is a positive 
step for abused women, the retention of loss of self control continues to force abused 
women who kill to explain themselves in accordance with pathological syndromes. 
This continues to portray those who remain in battering relationships as more 
pathological and troubled than the men who batter them.
57
Consequently, the legal framework of the defences to homicide and the relative 
exclusion of abused women who kill continues to reinforce the belief that what is 
acceptable for men, is not acceptable for women and vice versa.
58
Therefore, men and 
masculinity continue to inform the appropriate standard and the legal norm, creating 
the perception that certain behaviours and responses are more desirable and highly 
valued.
59
The legal system’s treatment of abused women who kill in response to 
domestic violence reinforces traditional patriarchal attitudes, such as the notion of 
masculine ownership, control and dominance.
60
  The law reflects and subsequently 
reinforces the unequal power relations within society, and men’s comparative 
                                                          
54
The Coroners and Justice Act 2009, s54 abolishes the partial defence of provocation as it existed 
under the Homicide Act 1957, S3, and the Coroners and Justice Act 2009, s52, reforms the partial 
defence of Diminished Responsibility as it existed under the Homicide Act 1957, s2. 
55
see S. Yeo, ‘English Reform of the Partial Defences to Murder: Lessons for New South Wales’ 
(2010) 22(1) Current Issues in Criminal Justice 1
56
The Coroners and Justice Act 2009, s55(3) ‘This subsection applies if D's loss of self-control was 
attributable to D's fear of serious violence from V against D or another identified person.’
57
E. Schneider, Battered Women and Feminist Law Making (Yale University Press 2000) 23
58
S.L. Bem, The Lenses of Gender: Transforming the Debate on Sexual Inequality (Yale University 
Press 1993) 12 
59
A. S. Wharton, The Sociology of Gender: An Introduction to Theory and Research (Blackwell 
Publishing 2005) 34 
16
economic and physical power, which facilitates the use violence as a means of 
controlling the powerless.
61
It will be argued that despite the intentions of the legislation to incorporate the social 
realities of abused women who kill, that the Coroners and Justice Act 2009 leaves 
abused women who kill in much the same position as before. Abused women’s 
reactions to abuse and behaviours render them unable to fall within the complete 
defence of self defence. Further, the retention of loss of self control ensures that 
although the Coroners and Justice Act 2009 recognises that abused women kill out of 
fear, any gains for abused women who kill have been taken away by the retention of 
such a legal concept.
62
This leaves abused women with a partial defence of 
diminished responsibility, which continues to construct reactions to abuse through a 
narrow psychological lens.
The implementation of the Coroners and Justice Act 2009 and the resulting situation 
for abused women who kill strengthens feminist claims that the complete defence of 
self defence is more appropriate for abused women who kill, and that battered 
women’s actions should be understood as justifiable acts of self defence, rather than 
excusable acts resulting from a mental abnormality.
63
In order to challenge the current 
defensive framework, feminists have developed numerous strategies to explain why 
abused women may reasonably perceive danger and use a deadly weapon under 
circumstances in which a man or a woman who has not been abused might not.
64
  This 
would help the jury to understand that the abused woman’s actions are reasonable, 
rather than abnormal,
65
and demonstrate that the Coroners and Justice Act 2009 is not 
the only means of reforming the defences to homicide. 
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1.3 Chapter Outlines
In response to the implementation of the Coroners and Justice Act 2009 and the 
development of feminist strategies for reforming the complete defence of self defence, 
this thesis will further explore the ways in which the complete and partial defences to 
homicide are structured, and how the resulting structure fails to accommodate the 
reactions of abused women who kill. The defences neglect to acknowledge the 
empirical evidence which demonstrates that women and men respond to violence in 
different ways, and are driven by different motivations. Instead, when women do not 
fall within masculine constructions of appropriate behaviour and wait until their 
abuser is off guard before acting, their reactions are perceived as calm, deliberate,
66
and legally abnormal.
67
  This ignores abused women’s social realities,
68
and neglects 
to consider the reasons why the abused woman may have responded in such a way.
69
Therefore, this thesis will argue that the defences to homicide must accommodate a 
better conception of the reactions of abused women who kill in cases of intimate 
partner homicide by considering how domestic violence and the relationships between 
the abuser and the abused
70
shape reactions to violence in cases of intimate partner 
homicide. A greater recognition of the defendant’s factual context is required, 
ensuring that the courts consider the circumstances of abuse and recognise responses 
which do not fall within normative masculine constructions as reasonable responses.
71
Consequently, this thesis will argue that a woman-centred understanding of reaction 
in domestic violence is required to challenge the current construction of abused 
women who kill within the defences to homicide. Woman-centred for the purposes of 
this thesis, requires defences to homicide which are capable of reflecting the gender 
sensitive social realities of abused women who kill and an incorporation of an 
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awareness of women’s experiences of abuse within the gender discriminate context of 
domestic violence.
72
In order to substantiate the above position, chapter one will critique the current legal 
construction of abused women who kill through the framework of BWS. It seeks to 
demonstrate that the current legal framework used to understand the reactions of 
abused women who kill serves as a means of reinforcing stereotypical assumptions 
about abused women’s social realities and reactions to abuse. The legal reliance upon 
BWS as a mechanism for interpreting the reactions of abused women who kill has 
developed from a masculine point of view, and therefore reiterates masculine 
standpoints and interests to the exclusion of the recognition of abused women’s 
experiences and narratives and how these shape reactions to domestic violence.
73
In order to challenge the adoption of masculinity as the prevailing legal standpoint, 
chapter one will develop a woman-centred analytical framework for understanding 
abused women who kill. It will draw upon existing feminist epistemologies to identify 
the gendered implications of apparently neutral and objective legal requirements and 
establish how the law fails to take into account the experiences of abused women who 
kill.
74
The analytical framework will also be used to develop a sufficiently woman-
centred court room strategy, which utilises expert testimony concerning abused 
women’s experiences of abuse. It uses these experiences as a central category upon 
which to build and dispel existing stereotypes concerning abused women who kill. 
In order to build upon the development of a woman-centred analytical framework, it 
is necessary to apply the resulting woman-centred court room strategy to the current 
partial defences to homicide in order to critically evaluate the exclusion of abused 
women’s experiences from the ambit of the defences. Chapter two will therefore use 
the woman-centred analytical framework to critique the way in which legal 
                                                                                                                                                                     
71
D. Nicolson and  R. Sanghvi, ‘Battered Women and Provocation: The Implications of R v 
Ahluwalia’ (1993) Crim. L Rev 728, 737-738  
72
J. Goodey, ‘Sex Trafficking in Women from Central and Eastern European Countries: Promoting a 
‘Victim-Centred’ and ‘Woman-Centred’ Approach to Criminal Justice Intervention’. (2004) 76 
Feminist Review 26, 44
73
D.E. Smith, The Everyday World as Problematic: A Feminist Sociology (Northeastern University 
Press 1987) 200  
74
K.T. Bartlett, ‘Feminist Legal Methods’ in Katharine T Bartlett and Rosanne Kennedy (ed) Feminist 
Legal Theory: Readings in Law and Gender ( Westview Press 1991) 371 
19
knowledge concerning abused women who kill is reinforced through the partial 
defences and how this approach encourages and facilitates the continuation of social 
myths and constructions of abused women’s reactions to abuse as abnormal. 
Chapter two will argue that the experiences of abused women who kill are incapable 
of being reflected as reasonable within the current partially defensive framework, due 
to the legislative affirmation and approval of a legal focus upon objective and 
apparently gender neutral legal criteria. The retention of the masculine legal concept 
of loss of self control distorts the experiences and social realities of abused women 
who kill,
75
confining women who kill to masculine standards of behaviour and 
expectation and constructions of mental abnormality.
76
In order to transcend the inadequate construction of abused women who kill within 
the partial defences to homicide, it is necessary to move towards a woman-centred 
critique of a complete defence to homicide, that of self defence. Should an abused 
woman fall within its ambit, then she will be acquitted for the homicide.  Chapter 
three will ascertain whether abused women’s experiences and subsequent reactions to 
abuse can be recognised as reasonable within the complete defence of self defence.  It 
seeks to apply a standard of contextual reasoning to the complete defence to 
determine why abused women are excluded from its ambit by the objective and 
justificatory requirements of imminence, reasonableness, necessity and 
proportionality, despite the defensive nature of their reactions.
However, despite the defensive motivation underpinning female perpetrated intimate 
partner homicides, the application of a woman-centred analytical framework and 
accompanying expert testimony are significantly constrained by the complete nature 
of the defence. Self defence is strongly linked to societal conceptions of appropriate 
behaviour, which already accept the exclusion of abused women and their reactions 
from a partially defensive framework, further demonstrating how societal attitudes 
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towards abused women who kill are able to shape legal practice. Therefore, in the 
context of the complete defence, the application of a woman-centred analytical 
framework is unable to change deep rooted and widespread societal perceptions of 
appropriate behaviour and modify the construction of the defence. 
Consequently, chapter four will advocate the introduction of a partial defence of 
excessive force in self defence. This seeks to pragmatically incorporate the defensive 
reactions of abused women who kill into a partially defensive framework. This aims 
to overcome societal resistance to the claims of abused women who kill, and through 
the partial nature of the defence, modified concepts of self defence are capable of 
incorporation. This would allow for the gradual recognition and acceptance of the 
reactions of abused women who kill as reasonable in both a social and legal context, 
and would encourage the law to move away from objective and context limiting 
considerations of the defendant’s circumstances. A partial defence of excessive force 
in self defence will be used to argue that the law can move away from traditional 
defence constructions, whilst still ensuring that the defences to homicide are tightly 
constructed and regulated. 
Chapter four will therefore argue that in order to ensure legal recognition of the 
reasonable reactions of abused women who kill, it is necessary to adopt a pragmatic 
stance. Even small legal changes should be embraced if they facilitate the legal and 
social recognition of abused women who kill as reasonable, provided that these small
changes do not end there.
77
It is hoped that the adoption of a partial defence of 
excessive force in self defence would pave the way for further legislative 
development, until abused women’s claims are seen as legitimate and reasonable in 
self defence.
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Chapter One
Abused Women Who Kill and the Legal Construction of a Reasonable Reaction.
2. Introduction
This chapter builds upon the existence of extensive empirical evidence, which already 
explains why abused women stay in abusive relationships and further demonstrates 
the increased risk abused women face of becoming a homicide victim themselves 
should they try and terminate the relationship. Despite the existence of such evidence, 
abused women are still legally and socially presented as unreasonable when they 
cannot leave. Further, in cases of intimate partner homicide, should the abused 
woman commit the homicide in line with evidentiary findings, and kill with a weapon 
whilst her partner is off guard, then this eventual reaction to abuse is perceived as 
legally unreasonable. 
In response to the current legal framework’s exclusion of the typical reactions of 
abused women who kill from being recognised as reasonable within both the partial 
and complete defences to homicide, this chapter will develop an alternative legal 
framework for understanding abused women’s reactions to abuse.
78
The framework 
will critique the current construction of abused women who kill and demonstrate how 
abused women’s reactions can be legally recognised as reasonable reactions in light of 
the abused woman’s social context. 
For the development of such a legal framework, this chapter will consider the existing 
gender bias within the current legal construction of abused women who kill and the 
legal rules that are currently applied and understood in the context of masculine social 
norms. In order to fully engage with, and critique the existing gender bias within the 
criminal justice system, this chapter will draw upon existing feminist epistemologies, 
which explain why abused women are disadvantaged within the criminal justice 
system and how gender bias is reinforced and maintained. To move beyond 
identifying the denial of abused women’s social realities within a masculine 
orientated legal framework, the epistemologies will be used as the basis for an 
analytical framework for understanding the reactions of abused women who kill as 
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reasonable. The analytical framework will be used as a means of further explaining 
abused women’s reactions to abuse without using and creating confining 
stereotypes.
79
Feminist legal theory is therefore applied to the law as a means of 
analysis,
80
in an attempt to challenge the existing legal construction of abused women 
who kill and articulate new ways of understanding the realities of domestic violence 
and intimate partner homicide.
81
To further challenge the current legal construction of abused women who kill, the 
analytical framework will be used to facilitate the development of a woman-centred 
court room strategy, which can reflect the reasonable nature of abused women’s 
reactions in cases of intimate partner homicide. The strategy will be applied to both 
the partial and complete defences to homicide in subsequent chapters in order to 
ascertain whether the current defences to homicide can be adapted to incorporate the 
reactions of abused women who kill. It will be used to argue that although ‘systematic 
and institutional remedies’ can be developed,
82
the creation of new homicide defences 
are required to sufficiently incorporate the experiences of abused women who kill and 
their reactions to abuse.  
2.1 Abused Women who Kill, Gender Bias and Alternative Feminist 
Epistemologies.
In order to challenge the legal exclusion of abused women’s typical reactions in cases 
of intimate partner homicide from both the complete and partial defences to homicide, 
it is necessary to consider alternative feminist epistemologies which can address the 
gender biased nature of these defences. Existing feminist epistemologies recognise the 
need to legally acknowledge and consider the abused woman’s social context and 
individual narrative when legally evaluating cases of female perpetrated intimate 
partner homicide. Consequently, feminist epistemologies can be used as ‘transitional 
mediations,’
83
which form the foundation upon which to construct an analytical 
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framework of understanding and challenge the current legal construction of abused 
women who kill.
The evaluation of alternative means of constructing and understanding abused women 
who kill recognises the importance of an active and critical engagement with existing 
structures and aims to produce a powerful critique of current practices and 
institutions.
84
The epistemologies are premised upon the position that any social and 
legal constructions of appropriate behaviour are currently bound with the ruling 
elite,
85
requiring a subsequent analytical framework to be used as a means of 
displacing existing structures through the application of feminism as a mode of 
analysis.
86
This ensures that any ensuing analytical framework is able to go beyond 
identifying the gender imbalance within the current defences to homicide and can 
offer effective alternatives capable of challenging the existing homicide defences, 
rather than existing as an abstract commentary of empirical events.
87
In order to overcome the gender biased nature of the defences to homicide, it is 
necessary to draw upon dominance feminism, which can both expose and address the 
role of domination within society and the legal system. Dominance feminism 
recognises that the maintenance of masculine privilege and power within society has 
enabled men to maintain power over the women that they abuse, enabling masculine 
dominance to filter into structures, such as law, which regulate social life.
88
This 
results in a failure to link sexual violence in this way to wider issues of gender 
discrimination and means that the dominance within abusive relationships is ignored
and kept in place by the legal adoption of a standard of formal or procedural 
equality.
89
This reinforces gender inequality within the defences to homicide by 
appearing as though individuals are treated equally through the adoption of objective 
and seemingly neutral standards. The defences to homicide therefore assume that the 
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individuals concerned are in comparative positions and ignore women’s social 
subordination due to dominance. 
This position is supported by a feminist standpoint epistemology, which builds upon 
the work of materialist feminists who recognise that the positions of women are 
structurally different from those of men. Consequently, women’s social realities are 
inconsistent from those of men.
90
The adoption of a standpoint epistemology assumes 
that in certain contexts, the relationships between humans are not completely visible 
due to the material conditions governing a particular society.
91
This recognises that in 
certain situations, surface appearances distort deeper social realities. This allows male 
domination to govern the defences to homicide by excluding the recognition of non -
conforming narratives as reasonable, keeping abused women’s reactions to abuse 
legally subordinate. 
Therefore, in order to challenge gender bias within the defences to homicide, it is 
necessary to counter male dominance through the recognition of women’s social 
realities and alternative contexts. Such an approach draws heavily upon feminist 
postmodern epistemology, recognising that due to the unique nature of experience, 
there can be no single narrative capable of dominating the legal understanding of what 
constitutes a reasonable reaction to abuse within the defences to homicide.
92
Such a 
strategy rejects the meta narratives governing legal constructions of appropriate 
behaviour,
93
and requires the legal acknowledgement of the importance of the 
individual context. 
A feminist postmodernist approach seeks to displace the current epistemological 
construction of knowledge by finding a different way of understanding.
94
This is 
achieved through deconstruction,
95
involving the active use of feminism and women’s 
experiences of violence to critique the way in which legal knowledge is constructed. 
The outright rejection of the means of legal knowledge production and the way in 
which abused women are legally and socially constructed would enable abused 
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women to reconstruct their own legal and social identities based on their unique 
narratives and experiences. The realities of abused women who kill their abusers 
would become the centre of the strategy, enabling the abused woman to demonstrate 
the reasonable nature of her behaviour in light of her social context. This would 
enable abused women who kill to resist their pre-given gender identities and use their 
narrative as a means of social resistance to reject the stereotypical assumptions that 
have been generated and subsequently applied in legal proceedings.
96
To further ensure the legal recognition of alternative narratives, abused women who 
kill must be able to speak about their experiences. This is referred to by feminists as 
‘Consciousness Raising,’ and involves groups of women exploring the social world 
by articulating their experiences. Pamela Allen refers to this as ‘free space,’
97
in 
which women’s social realities and contexts can inform points of view.
98
The 
meanings of women’s social experiences can be critically reconstructed with 
reference to women’s social realities and lived experiences,
99
ensuring that women 
become aware, through debate about their own and one another’s situations of the 
disabilities imposed upon them by legal and social structures.
100
Consciousness raising would recognise the shared realities which often exist between 
victims of domestic violence and how these realities can provide a basis for 
identification.
101
This is achieved by unpacking the everyday lives and experiences of 
women in abusive relationships and recognising that they exist as part of a collective 
experience of oppression.
102
Such oppression is caused by male domination, 
facilitating the identification of the gender based consequences that the law creates
through the discussion of abused women’s social realities.
103
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The exclusion of abused women’s reactions from the defences to homicide is thereby 
challenged through the reordering of what women know, as women’s experiences 
reform and change the meaning of a pre-given social problem.
104
Feminist 
epistemologies challenge what law and society claim to know, through women’s 
experiences and social realities to move the epistemological issue away from 
stereotypical constructions of abused women who kill and towards the experiences of 
the social being.
105
After considering alternative epistemologies, it becomes clear that in order to 
transcend the gender bias within the current defences to homicide, masculine 
dominance must be realised and deconstructed through the standpoint of the 
subordinate. Therefore, abused women’s experiences, narratives and social contexts 
must be used to draw knowledge out and facilitate subsequent legal change. Abused 
women's experiences must be recognised as a legitimate body of knowledge with 
perspective transforming capabilities,
106
which can significantly revise the legally 
conceived notions of what constitutes an acceptable reaction to domestic violence. 
2.2 Towards a Woman-Centred Analytical Framework and Court Room 
Strategy
In order to develop a sufficiently woman-centred analytical framework and court 
room strategy underpinned by the experiences and narratives of abused women who 
kill, the analytical framework must be capable of confronting the competing standards 
of sameness and difference. These standards represent the conflicts in feminist 
positions and the development of a woman-centred strategy. Under standards of 
sameness, equal treatment within the legal system pivots upon treating likes alike. The 
adoption of a position of sameness implies that women are capable of being treated as 
though they were men,
107
and are able to fall within the ambit of existing structures 
and frameworks. The advantage of sameness is that it enables feminist strategy to 
work within existing legal structures, lessening any resistance to incorporating the 
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claims of abused women who kill into the legal framework, as women are shown to 
be the same as men.
108
Difference on the other hand, requires women to be given special treatment by the law 
because of ‘uniquely female capacities,’
109
which render women unable to adhere to 
masculine standards. This recognises that to treat women as though they were the 
same as men, severely disadvantages women in the context of the law. Mackinnon 
argues that sameness and difference standards only open up ‘two alternate paths to 
equality for women.’
110
  The first path, requires women to be the same as men. This 
enables normative legal rules to be extended and applied to women. The second path 
requires women to be different from men, enabling sex to become a recognised legal 
difference.
111
Although both approaches have advantages, neither approach is able to fully address 
the apparent gender neutrality within the defences to homicide, which adopts 
masculinity as the normative standard.
112
Consequently, neither standard fully 
accounts for, or deconstructs dominance. This allows the gender hierarchy,
113
which 
exists within the defences to homicide and constructs women’s reactions as 
subordinate to men’s reactions, to remain unchallenged.  Therefore, standards of 
sameness and difference are not sufficient to tackle the gender identity that is imposed 
upon women,
114
as women are either required to be the same as, or so very different 
to, men. 
Despite being unable to fully challenge dominance, issues of sameness and difference 
must be confronted by the analytical framework in order to avoid what Minow has 
labelled ‘the difference dilemma’.
115
This recognises that either focusing on, or 
ignoring difference between men and women can risk recreating it, as gender 
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difference becomes either exaggerated or denied.
116
In order to avoid this, the 
analytical framework will acknowledge the problems inherent within sameness and 
difference standards, but will focus less on gender difference and sameness and more 
on gender disadvantage,
117
and how this is facilitated within socially constructed 
unequal power relationships that are subsequently endorsed by the legal system.
118
2.2.1. Sameness
In order to avoid reproducing standards of sameness within a woman-centred court 
room strategy, the analytical framework must address the pitfalls within this standard. 
The adoption of a standard of sameness can attempt to squeeze the experiences of 
abused women who kill into masculine orientated legal defences which simply 
incorporate feminism into the law’s own paradigm,
119
as the defences to homicide 
remain unchanged and men and masculinity remain the normative legal standard.  The 
adoption of such an approach assumes that the institutions themselves are capable of 
recognising women’s interests and by exposing gender bias, reform will become 
possible.
120
Using women’s experiences as the foundation for an analytical framework in the 
context of sameness, must be treated with caution, as these experiences can be used to 
create a false homogeneity about abused women’s realities.
121
This has the effect of 
treating some experiences as core realities which abused women are supposed to share 
and others as less significant. This can lead to attempts to develop sufficiently 
woman-centred practice or to shape a woman-centred agenda, which has the aim of 
getting as many women as possible to fall within a particular framework. However, if 
this is the methodological approach taken, then it becomes ill equipped to deal with 
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difference as it incapable of recognising any kind of multiplicity within the reactions
of abused women who kill.
122
2.2.2 Difference
Alternatively, by ascribing a notion of difference to the reactions of abused women 
who kill, it can be recognised that women’s reactions are often so very different from 
men’s reactions and that without this explicit acknowledgement, any accompanying 
analysis or legal development will continue to take masculine reactions as the 
normative standard and will offer little prospect of legal change.
123
However, if women are presented as so very different from men, then an emphasis on 
sexual difference can prevail. This enables the continuation of gender stereotypes to 
inform legal theory and can be especially dangerous for abused women who kill, as 
any evidence of violent behaviour contradicts prevailing societal perceptions of 
feminine passivity.
124
An emphasis on difference enables sexual difference to be used 
as a means of essentialising women and their experiences, expecting women to 
conform to typical constructions of appropriate feminine behaviour, while masculinity
remains the prevailing legal standard as little is done to challenge it. 
This can create a false legal abstraction of sexual difference, which presents a 
homogenised construction of masculinity and femininity. This can make it even 
harder for abused women who kill to have their reactions legally recognised as 
reasonable and appropriate as they are not comparable to men and notions of 
masculinity, or with constructions of femininity. This allows sex characteristics to 
become a means of ascribing socially constructed gender stereotypes to models of 
biological difference,
125
resulting in abused women who kill being even further 
removed from societal and legal understanding, and further constructed as deviant and 
abnormal. 
2.2.3 Gender Disadvantage
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Consequently, the analytical framework must be capable of recognising the wider 
structures and processes of inequality, which exclude the legal recognition of abused 
women’s reactions as reasonable, rather than focusing on the perceived similarities 
and differences between women’s experiences and subsequent reactions.
126
The 
analytical framework adopts the position that abused women who kill face a common 
problem, rather than a common outlook.
127
The common problem refers to the 
exclusion of abused women’s reactions as reasonable within the defences to homicide, 
due to the failure of abused women’s typical reactions to abuse to ascribe to 
masculine legal standards. The analytical framework seeks to avoid the psychological 
reproduction of gender in the subjective identity,
128
by recognising that many women 
will react to domestic violence in a similar way, but also recognises that reactions 
amongst abused women are not always the same. The framework follows Braidotti’s 
‘essentialism with a difference’,
129
focusing less on reactionary differences and more 
upon the failure to legally accommodate abused women’s reactions into the defences 
to homicide and making this of paramount concern.
130
The incorporation of ‘essentialism with a difference’ into the framework is achieved 
by recognising the unequal position of women, both in violent relationships and in 
relation to the criminal justice system. This position acknowledges that for women, 
inequality exists as a ‘myriad of interlocking forms,’
131
which must be eliminated to 
ensure that masculine standards do not continue to function as normative legal 
standards. The framework aims to be less dualistic and more contextual, shifting the 
focus away from sexual difference,
132
issues of sameness or gender neutrality and 
onto the legal processes which assign significance to constructions of appropriate 
masculine and feminine reaction. 
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The framework moves beyond issues of sameness and difference to ensure that gender 
bias is tackled at a conceptual level by recognising that masculine dominance came 
first.
133
Gender differences were subsequently established as a means of maintaining 
such bias.
134
Following this approach, issues of sameness and difference give way to 
an understanding that the differences between men and women in abusive 
relationships are defined by relationships of power.
135
It is this power imbalance 
which causes the gender inequality within the relationship and the belief that one 
partner is entitled to control the other. Unchallenged, such dominance has been able to 
influence legal structures which regulate social life, as issues concerning sameness 
and difference have been accorded more worth than their social consequences.
136
This 
has reinforced gender disadvantage through feminine subordination, as the role played 
by institutional structures in the maintenance of such power imbalances has been 
overlooked.
137
The analytical framework can be used to challenge abstract assumptions about women 
and their social realities by analysing power within the context of oppression and 
domination within intimate relationships. This operates as part of a double process. It 
reverses the masculine/feminine dichotomy so prevalent within legal theory by 
displacing the system within which it functions.
138
Reversal guarantees that the 
dominant masculine term is not simply substituted for the weaker feminine term, but 
that the negative term moves from its oppositional role and into the heart of the 
dominant term through a critique of the institutional hierarchy and accompanying 
institutions which reinforce gender stereotypes and masculine privilege.
139
This ensures that women’s experiences of abuse and how these experiences shape 
their behaviour moves from the periphery of social and legal understanding and into 
the centre. The adoption of such an approach leads to the rejection of certain legal 
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constructions of reaction which attempt to limit women to masculine standards of 
behaviour and expectation. This is followed by a reconstruction of the homicide 
defences, taking women’s reactions in cases of intimate partner homicide as the 
central category upon which to build,
140
demonstrating that the existing legal structure 
and the resulting defences to homicide are capable of being replaced by other modes 
of conceptualisation, which do not reinforce gender discriminate practice.
141
2.3 The Current Legal Construction of Abused Women Who Kill and the Use of 
Battered Women’s Syndrome
In order to develop a sufficiently woman-centred court room strategy, the analytical 
framework must engage with the current legal understanding of abused women who 
kill. Currently, abused women who kill are constructed according to BWS, a 
psychological theory developed by the American Psychologist Lenore Walker.
142
BWS was developed as a means of explaining to juries why abused women stay in 
abusive relationships in order to counter damaging social stereotypes. BWS was 
developed after Walker found patterns in the way abused women described their 
experiences of violent relationships,
143
which in the context of the defences to 
homicide could present the abused woman’s reaction as reasonable.  
BWS was subsequently introduced into the court room in the United States in cases of 
self defence, in order to justify treating the defendant differently. The existence of the 
syndrome was used to explain the psychological state of the defendant and how this 
was influenced by the abusive circumstances leading up to the homicide,
144
making it 
unfair to hold the defendant accountable under the standards of the reasonable person.  
Further, expert testimony was admissible to explain to the judge and jury why the 
abused woman could not leave the relationship and how the abuse sustained impacted 
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upon the defendant’s psychological functioning,
145
requiring her to be held 
accountable under such different standards. 
In the criminal justice system in England and Wales, BWS has been used to reduce a 
finding of murder to one of manslaughter. BWS is most notably used to inform a plea 
of diminished responsibility. Expert testimony concerning BWS is admissible to 
explain to the jury the characteristics of abused women, and why abused women often 
blame themselves for the violence endured. The testimony further clarifies the abused 
woman’s fear for her own life and the lives of her children.
146
Evidence of BWS in the court room relies upon Walker’s cycle of violence, coupled 
with learned helplessness, to explain why the abused woman was unable to leave the 
relationship. It adheres to Walker’s theory, which claims that the psychological 
symptoms of BWS develop when women are exposed to a cycle of violence, which 
she developed as a means of trying to predict the stages of abuse within a relationship. 
Walker labels the first phase ‘the honeymoon phase’,
147
where the abuser is charming 
and goes out of their way to make their partner feel loved. This leads to the second 
phase, the ‘tension building phase’. This involves the abuser becoming jealous, 
paranoid and short tempered, making their partner alter their behaviour in an attempt 
to try and ensure that the abuser does not lose their temper. This culminates in
Walker’s third stage in the cycle of violence, the ‘acting out phase’, where the abuser 
actually becomes violent. After all three phases, the cycle of violence starts all over 
again. 
Following Walker’s cycle of violence and its application to the partial defence of 
diminished responsibility, the defendant can receive psychiatric treatment or 
alternative penal or rehabilitative sentences instead of the mandatory life sentence. 
The reliance upon BWS therefore demonstrates the benevolent protectiveness that the 
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legal system has towards women,
148
with the possibility of rehabilitative as opposed 
to punitive sentences suggesting judicial leniency.
149
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2.3.1 The Implications of BWS for Abused Women Who Kill
Despite the perceived strategic advantages for abused women who kill, the cycle fails 
to explain the realities faced by many abused women, as the cyclical nature of 
domestic violence is contested. This is because Walker’s cycle of violence does not 
recognise that domestic abuse can have a constant presence in some relationships, as 
opposed to existing as part of a cycle.
150
In response, the Duluth power and control 
wheel was developed to recognise that in certain abusive relationships, violence is 
constantly present.
151
The Duluth power and control wheel recognises physical and 
sexual violence and details the methods used by abusers to develop a system to keep 
their partner trapped, isolated and afraid. This includes combining economic abuse 
with physical and sexual abuse, as well as using masculine privilege to treat the 
abused woman as a slave and prevent her from making any decisions.
152
This abuse 
can occur over a prolonged period of time, with the incidents of abuse overlapping, 
but also existing as components of a comprehensive power and control regime.
153
Although both interpretations can help to express the experiences of abused women, 
not all of the aforementioned factors are engaged during abusive incidents.  Not every 
incident of violence is the same,
154
making Walker’s development of a one size fits all 
explanation as to the onset of psychological and behavioural symptomology 
somewhat controversial. 
In addition to the often contextual deficiencies of Walker’s cycle, it has also been 
criticised for the inaccuracy of its data.
155
Walker found in sixty five percent of cases 
there was evidence of a tension building phase prior to the battering. In fifty eight
percent of all cases there was loving contrition afterwards, which demonstrates that 
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the data on the phases does not correlate, as only thirty eight percent of women would 
experience the full cycle.
156
Therefore, under Walker’s theory, only thirty eight 
percent of these women would be experiencing domestic violence and would be 
capable of developing the psychological symptoms necessary to conform with BWS. 
Despite being constructed upon tenuous contextual and scientific foundations, 
Walker’s cycle of violence has been used to inform the judge and jury about abused 
women’s perceptions and behaviours and has been used within the criminal justice 
system to explain how women can eventually develop ‘learned helplessness’ in 
response to abuse. 
2.3.2 Abused Women and Learned Helplessness
Learned helplessness in abused women who kill is based upon research conducted by 
both Seligman and Hiroto,
157
in which learned helplessness was found to develop in 
response to ‘inescapable aversive events’,
158
which interfere significantly with later 
instrumental learning.
159
In Hiroto’s experiment aversive noise was tested using three 
control groups. For the pre-treatment, group one were exposed to aversive noise 
which they could turn off by pushing a button. Group two were exposed to aversive 
noise with no means of escape and group three were not subjected to any aversive 
noise. After the pre-treatment, each group received controllable noise. Groups one and 
three easily escaped. Despite being able to control the noise, group two did nothing.
160
This demonstrates learned helplessness in individuals, as responding becomes 
independent of reinforcement, suggesting that learned helplessness is an induced 
trait.
161
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Learned helplessness is used to assist Walker’s theory of BWS and why some women 
stay in abusive relationships, suggesting that domestic violence presents an induced, 
inescapable aversive event, leaving abused women psychologically trapped and 
unable to escape.
162
However, BWS and the references to learned helplessness explain 
why abused women stay in the abusive relationship through a narrow psychological 
lens, which has the effect of reinforcing stereotypical assumptions that abused women 
are weak and passive victims.
163
This label is often inaccurate, as Abraham’s research
suggests that abused women do not always perceive themselves as powerless or 
passive within these situations.
164
Many take positive action to defuse tension or take 
any measures they can to protect themselves or their children.
165
Therefore, BWS as a 
legal and socially reinforced label can create a derogatory and often inaccurate 
psychological profile of abused women. 
Consequently, the abused woman’s behaviour becomes even more difficult to legally 
and socially comprehend as reasonable when she kills her abuser, as learned 
helplessness, a psychological condition which reinforces passivity, is attributed as the 
cause of the homicide. Walker’s theory of BWS has been used to argue that after 
developing learned helplessness, abused women can believe that they have no means 
of escape other than killing their abusers.
166
Although logically inconsistent, this 
explanation has become entrenched in legal practice and is reinforced through the use 
of expert testimony on the condition of BWS, which seeks to ensure that abused 
women who kill are not held accountable under male norms and standards of 
behaviour by enabling women to share their experiences of violence as a means of 
assisting the jury in fairly evaluating the reasonableness of their actions.
167
The testimony that is admissible is on BWS alone, defining the defendant’s state of 
mind and psychology as being of relevance, rather than her circumstances or 
experiences. The sole focus of the syndrome is on the defendant’s state of mind, 
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which disconnects the defendant’s response to violence from the social context in 
which it occurs.
168
Consequently, abused women are presented foremost as victims of 
a psychological condition rather than as victims of abuse. BWS is used to explain that 
after having lived in a constant state of fear, the abused woman becomes incapacitated 
by learned helplessness, which causes her to believe that she has no control over her 
life and her future.
169
BWS is subsequently applied to explain the abused woman’s 
perceptions that she could not leave the relationship while her abuser was still alive, 
and that she had no safe alternative.
170
BWS does little to portray the abused woman as a rational agent, as accompanying 
testimony demonstrates psychological disability and this insinuates a reduced capacity 
to behave normally.
171
Recourse to a syndrome affirms that the court is dealing with a 
psychologically damaged victim and not a woman responding rationally or reasonably 
to a threat,
172
eliminating any need for consideration of her factual context, or the 
societal and legal mechanisms which kept her trapped in such a violent 
relationship.
173
  
Therefore, the reliance upon BWS as a means of legally constructing abused women 
who kill exposes the criminal justice system’s inability to accommodate abused 
women who kill and their experiences.
174
Instead, the abused woman is viewed as 
incapable,
175
with evidence of BWS demonstrating that her actions were wrong, not 
reasonable, but that her sentence can be mitigated on the basis of her psychological 
abnormality and her need for professional help.
176
The psychological connotations of 
BWS invalidate any further understanding of the abused woman’s deviance, ensuring 
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the preservation of conventional gender stereotypes.
177
By acting out against the 
traditional female stereotype the defendant is viewed as psychotic, enabling the 
criminal justice system to determine the outcome of social relations. The abused 
woman’s psychological label ensures that her circumstances do not have to be 
understood, as her narrative exists within a psychologically impaired framework. 
Although BWS and accompanying expert testimony can reduce a defendant’s 
sentence, the social and legal implications of BWS ensure that the defendant is still 
being punished for their actions, and not completely excused.
178
Consequently, BWS 
does not challenge the legal way of knowing or require the legal system to 
accommodate a feminist agenda.
179
This helps to construct the denial of abused 
women’s injustice, and reinforce what social scientists have labelled as ‘a belief in the 
just world,’
180
a belief that individuals deserve what they get. This enables abused 
women to be blamed for their choices and experiences, and the law is required to 
reflect the deserved punishment for these choices.
181
This ensures that the law operates as a ‘mechanism for social control’,
182
developing a 
system which outlines the normative standards of behaviour to be expected from 
members of society. Furthermore, the experiences of domestic violence and how they 
shape women’s reactions to violence remain unnamed, as do abused women’s 
contextual realities. The reality that is not named is unable to inform understanding 
and is ‘powerless to claim its own existence,
183
ensuring that reactions to violence 
continue to be forced into fixed categories, which ignore the fluid and contextual 
social realities pertaining to the crime. The law therefore fails to assign any kind of 
weight to the social background of the violence, and develops the law according to 
masculine experience,
184
as BWS is unable to sufficiently accommodate the many 
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ways in which women cope and respond to violence.
185
It ignores the context in which 
the violence took place and the disparity in power relations and assumes that women 
have the same autonomy as men in violent situations, and that they have the same 
levels of power needed to escape from such a situation.
186
2.4 Beyond BWS: Alternative Psychological Constructions of Battered Women 
Who Kill
The legal and social preference towards masculinity as the standard of normativity 
becomes even more evident when alternative psychological constructions of abused 
women who kill are critiqued. Toffel argues that the psychological effects of domestic 
violence should be described as Traumatic Bonding Theory (TBT) or Stockholm 
Syndrome,
187
which characterises the psychological bonding that can often develop 
between hostages and their captors.
188
The recognition of TBT within the criminal 
justice system would be more sufficient for abused women who kill from an activist 
perspective, as TBT manages to go beyond Walker’s theory of why strong emotional 
attachments develop in violent relationships. The theory finds that such attachments 
develop because of the intermittent, and not the predictable nature of abuse.
189
Following TBT, domestic violence can be understood as a social trap,
190
with the 
strong emotional bonding occurring before the victim realises that the abuse will 
continue and repeat.
191
TBT can also be used to explain why abused women behave 
the way that they do, as they develop hostage survival strategy.
192
Consequently, 
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abused women actively decide to behave in a certain way in order to avoid harm,
193
as 
they react to what they perceive to be a hopeless situation.
194
Although covering most of the tenets of Walker’s cycle of violence theory, TBT 
recognises that the behaviour of the victim is an adaptive way of surviving,
195
not the 
result of a mental impairment or the onset of learned helplessness. Hostage survival 
strategy can be used to describe ‘what the average, rational person would do in the 
same abusive situation.’
196
It is situation centred and can be used as a means of 
explaining why women bond with their abusers and remain in violent relationships 
which eventually result in the commission of female perpetrated intimate partner 
homicide. The recognition of multiple psychological theories, such as TBT, as 
constituting appropriate forms of legal knowledge would force the criminal justice 
system to consider the situated context in which the reaction occurred, making the 
abused woman’s circumstances, narrative and experiences of direct legal relevance. 
However, even with the adoption of TBT as an alternative psychological theory, 
abused women would still be constructed within a psychological framework.  These 
frameworks, despite being developed to help abused women who kill, are susceptible 
to masculine bias in the form of legitimising damaging gender stereotypes. According 
to Kochan, this is reflective not of the work itself, but of the ‘intransigent, 
unchallenged, underlying presumptions of the law.’
197
As such, constructing abused 
women through any kind of psychological framework continues to allow women to be 
constructed as men construct women, according to notions of irrationality and 
unreasonableness.
198
This continues to apply a standard of sameness, as all women 
must ascribe to the accompanying symptomology of a particular psychological 
condition in order for their reaction to be perceived as a legally legitimate response to 
abuse. 
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2.5 Towards a Woman-Centred Court Room Strategy: Using Expert Testimony 
to Overcome Gender Bias in the Defences to Homicide
Therefore, it is strategically necessary to move beyond confining the reactions of 
abused women who kill to narrow psychological conditions. In order to do so, the 
strategic possibilities apparent in the use of expert testimony will be considered.
199
Although expert testimony has been used in conjunction with BWS, it is necessary to 
evaluate the means of using expert testimony to incorporate more of the abused 
woman’s social context, as opposed to utilising expert testimony solely concerning 
the defendant’s mental state.
200
Without such change, abused women will continue to 
be constructed from a victimised and mentally impaired perspective, which can 
significantly hinder the legal recognition of their reactions as reasonable. 
In order to evaluate the woman-centred possibilities apparent in the use of expert 
testimony, it is necessary to look to the United States, and the case State v Wanrow
201
concerning women who kill in self defence. Yvonne Wanrow was convicted of 
second degree murder after shooting and killing a man whom she knew to be a child 
molester when he came up behind her after approaching the child of a friend.
202
During her trial, Wanrow was forced to justify her conduct in accordance with the 
prima facie neutral, but intrinsically gender biased, legal requirements for self defence 
of reasonableness, imminence and proportionality. The standard applied to Wanrow, 
was the same standard that was applicable to circumstances in which two men of 
equal size and strength had fought.
203
  Consequently, the Washington Supreme Court 
found that the traditional legal standards applied to the defendant had neglected to 
consider the perspective of women.
204
Further, the case recognised that the defendant’s experiences were distinct and unique 
and formed a crucial aspect of her perspective. Consequently, they could serve as a 
foundation for the admissibility of expert testimony surrounding the context of the 
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defendant’s individual experience.
205
The case also recognised that the defendant’s 
experiences were both distinct and shared,
206
and that they were outside the common 
experience of jurors.
207
One of the main strategic advantages of the ruling from Wanrow was that more of the 
defendant’s social context became admissible.  Applied to situations in which battered 
women had killed their abusers, the testimony would be able to focus on the entire 
experience of being a battered woman,
208
rather than being confined to a stereotypical 
psychological narrative. Therefore, the reasonableness of the defendant’s conduct 
could be explained to the judge and jury through expert testimony according to the 
defendant’s circumstances. This would facilitate a consideration of the complete 
nature of her experience, in addition to her coping strategies, behavioural adjustments 
and her lack of viable alternatives which could have protected her from her abuser.
209
  
These considerations would further expose the dominance within abusive 
relationships, by recognising and directly considering the unequal levels of power in 
the abusive relationship and how this power imbalance effectively kept the abused 
woman trapped and controlled. 
However, any consideration of the abused women’s experiences in the context of 
being an abused woman, raises issues of difference. It could be perceived that any 
legal emphasis on the different experiences and actions of abused women who kill is 
only required to ensure equal treatment within the criminal justice system, as 
recognition of abused women’s experiences as different from men’s experiences 
demonstrates that abused women cannot be expected to adhere to masculine legal 
standards.  This implies that the different experiences of abused women who kill only 
have to be accommodated in order to address the social discrimination women face.
210
Simply acknowledging difference in the context of abused women who kill and the 
application of expert testimony would not go far enough, as the recognition of 
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difference in itself implies unequal legal treatment,
211
suggesting that abused women 
are incapable of being held accountable under normative legal standards. 
Therefore, a sufficiently woman-centred court room strategy must be able to use 
expert testimony to transcend the sameness/difference dichotomy by using such 
testimony to inform the judge and jury of the individual’s own experiences and 
reactions and how these are reasonable in the circumstances.
212
It must also use expert 
testimony to demonstrate that the abused woman’s individual narrative and 
experiences exist as part of an experience of collective discrimination reinforced by 
masculine dominance. The application of such testimony would distance the abused 
woman from the damaging connotations associated with BWS, and how the syndrome 
fails to describe the complexity and reasonable nature of the abused woman’s reaction 
to abuse.
213
The application of such expert testimony to the defences to homicide 
would go beyond BWS by challenging masculine dominance through the legal 
recognition of the significance of the experiences of abused women who kill as both 
individuals and as members of a subordinated group. This would expose gender 
discrimination in relation to the defences to homicide by recognising that apparently 
gender neutral legal standards actually disadvantage women by adopting masculinity 
as the standard of normativity, rather than constructing abused women through a lens 
of abnormality. 
2.6 Towards a Woman-Centred Court Room Strategy: The Use of Expert 
Testimony and the Implications of  R v Turner
However, the admissibility of human behaviour evidence in the context of psychiatric 
and psychological evidence conforms to the admissibility requirements of R v 
Turner.
214
Evidence is admissible only if it furnishes the court with ‘scientific 
information which is likely to be outside the experience or knowledge of a judge and 
jury.’
215
Following Lawton LJ, this is because ‘jurors do not need psychiatrists to tell 
them how ordinary folk who are not suffering from any mental illness are likely to 
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react to the stresses and strains of life.’
216
Once deemed admissible, the testimony 
must satisfy evidence of reliability.
217
This is easily achieved, as there is no formal 
assessment of the reliability of expert evidence when ascertaining whether it should 
be admissible.
218
Following Turner and the conditions of admissibility, patterns of behaviour are 
essentially perceived as transparent
219
and within the knowledge and experience of 
both judge and jury,
220
unless relating to a mental illness. The Turner rule suggests 
that what constitutes a normal reaction to domestic violence is believed to already be 
within the experience of the jury.
221
This reinforces the legal and social construction 
of abused women who kill through medicalised frameworks of abnormality, 
constructed with reference to social stereotypes. 
Nevertheless, it may be possible to admit expert testimony on domestic violence 
under the Turner construction, as there is evidence to suggest that the courts may be 
adopting a more liberal interpretation of the matters which are beyond the common 
knowledge and understanding of the jury.
222
The Home Office has already developed 
proposals to allow more general expert evidence to be admissible in cases of rape, to 
disparage myths about the behaviours
223
and reactions of victims.
224
Therefore, by 
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analogy, it is possible that general evidence concerning myths about domestic 
violence and appropriate reactions to abuse could be admissible. This position would 
further the aims of the Home Office’s proposals on the admissibility of expert 
evidence to inform the court of the ‘acknowledged psychological reactions that occur 
after a prolonged relationship of abuse and/or after a deeply traumatic event.’
225
Despite the fact that the Home Office proposals were not carried forward, the 
objectives of the proposals could be achieved by continuing to follow a more liberal 
interpretation of R v Turner. This would ensure that general evidence on domestic 
violence would be admissible. This would allow the abused woman’s context to be 
taken into consideration and recognise her reaction as a reasonable response to a 
traumatic situation.
226
It would further extend the range of testimony available to the 
jury about behaviours which are commonly misunderstood, but are not states of 
mental abnormality. 
Therefore, the testimony could focus on the abused women’s social realities and her 
lack of alternatives in their own right,
227
enabling the abused woman’s experiences to 
become of central importance.
228
Expert testimony would no longer be shaped against 
the backdrop of a framework based on abnormality and pathology, allowing the jury 
to undertake an informed assessment of the defendant’s context.
229
This would ensure 
that the approach outlined in Wanrow could be strategically adopted, demonstrating 
that abused women’s experiences are both individual, but exist as part of a wider 
framework of gender discrimination. This would move expert testimony beyond 
standards of sameness and difference, allowing the defendant’s own reaction to be 
considered in light of the defendant’s own circumstances, thereby recognising 
multiple reactions as reasonable reactions. 
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2.6 Conclusions
This chapter has sought to develop a woman-centred framework for understanding the 
typical reactions of abused women who kill in cases of intimate partner homicide. The 
framework draws upon existing empiricism which details the methods and 
motivations apparent in cases of female perpetrated intimate partner homicide and 
applies such empiricism in conjunction with existing feminist epistemologies. These 
epistemologies reveal the way in which women are constructed within the criminal 
justice system. The epistemologies expose the patterns of masculine dominance, the 
unequal levels of power and control apparent within abusive relationships and how 
this power imbalance is maintained by the resulting legal structure, which adopts 
prevailing notions of masculinity as the normative legal standard and excludes the 
non-conforming narratives of abused women who kill. 
In order to challenge the legal exclusion of the recognition of the reactions of abused 
women who kill as reasonable, a woman-centred analytical framework was 
developed, which incorporated existing feminist epistemologies with the aim of 
developing a sufficiently woman-centred court room strategy for abused women who 
kill. Such a strategy would prioritise the individual experiences of abused women who 
kill in order to facilitate deconstruction, ensuring that the realities of abused women 
could displace existing stereotypes and overcome masculine dominance. In order to 
develop such a strategy, the analytical framework had to confront issues of sameness 
and difference which significantly influence the way in which abused women are 
constructed and understood, as both standards have the capability to exaggerate 
gender stereotypes and essentialise both the experiences and reactions of abused 
women who kill. A preoccupation with such standards fails to challenge masculine 
dominance.  In order to ensure that abused women were neither constructed as the 
same as men, nor constructed as so very different to men, the analytical framework 
sought to overcome issues of sameness and difference by focusing on gender 
disadvantage. This involves positioning abused women who kill within the wider 
context of gender discrimination, evaluating how abused women are disadvantaged by 
relationships of power and how the ensuing masculine dominance keeps abused 
women subordinated. 
48
The effects of gender disadvantage were further explored when the analytical 
framework was applied to BWS in order to challenge the current legal construction of 
abused women who kill. The framework recognised that although BWS was 
developed to overcome common misconceptions about abused woman who kill, that 
the application of BWS actually perpetuates gender stereotypes. Constructing abused 
women who kill through a psychological condition crystallises the belief that abused 
women are mentally ill, and that their behaviours and reactions are actually 
manifestations of their illness, rather than reactions shaped by the abuse endured and 
the need for self preservation.
Consequently, the analytical framework was used to move beyond pathological 
constructions of abused women who kill and evaluated the strategic possibilities 
apparent within the use of expert testimony. The framework sought to build upon the 
intentions of BWS and dispel the powerful myths and stereotypes that influence the 
construction of abused women who kill. In order to move beyond BWS, expert 
testimony would be used to distance abused women who kill from damaging 
psychological constructions and would use abused women’s actual experiences and 
reactions to overcome gender stereotypes. This could be achieved by following the 
position adopted in the United States case of Wanrow, recognising that the 
experiences of abused women are outside of the ambit of common understanding. The 
testimony could be utilised as a means of addressing the gender disadvantage and 
dominance that abused women face both as individuals, and as part of a group. Such 
an approach could expose the wider structures and processes of inequality which 
perpetuate gender disadvantage and keep masculine dominance in place. This would 
enable the social realities and experiences of abused women who kill to become 
central to the testimony, allowing their narrative to dispel the powerful legal and 
social myths pertaining to their capacity to behave rationally. 
In order to critically evaluate the potential of expert testimony as a sufficiently 
woman-centred court room strategy, this thesis will apply expert testimony to both the 
complete defence of self defence and the partial defences to homicide in order to 
ascertain whether such a strategic approach is sufficient to tackle the imbedded gender 
disadvantage within the defences. The following chapters will critically evaluate 
whether such a strategy can be integrated into the current defensive framework, or 
49
whether alternative homicide defences are required to ameliorate the existing gender 
bias and recognise the reactions of abused women as reasonable responses to 
domestic violence. 
50
Chapter Two
A Woman-Centred Analysis of the Partial Defences to Homicide
3.1 Introduction
This chapter seeks to apply the woman-centred analytical framework to the partial 
defences to homicide in order to critique and deconstruct the partial defences of 
diminished responsibility and provocation as they existed under the Homicide Act 
1957. This chapter will further evaluate the recent legislative modification of the 
partial defences to homicide under the Coroners and Justice Act 2009.
230
The partial 
defences are of particular significance for abused women who kill, as until the 
implementation of the Coroners and Justice Act 2009, the partial defence of 
diminished responsibility was the defence most often used in cases of female 
perpetrated intimate partner homicide.
231
The implementation of the Coroners and 
Justice Act 2009 has altered the operation of the partial defences to homicide, and 
thereby modified the defensive options available to abused women who kill. 
This chapter will evaluate how the legal construction of abused women who kill has 
evolved, and establish whether abused women’s reactions are capable of being 
recognised as reasonable responses to violence within this modified framework. This 
chapter will also consider whether further reform is required to sufficiently overcome 
the gender bias within the defences to homicide and reflect and overcome the wider 
structures of gender discrimination and dominance which have kept the experiences 
of abused women who kill legally subordinate to masculine experiences. 
3.2 The Homicide Act 1957, s2 and the Partial Defence of Diminished 
Responsibility
The partial defence of diminished responsibility as it existed under The Homicide Act 
1957, s2 was used as a means of reducing a finding of murder to one of manslaughter 
in cases in which abused women had killed their abusers in contradiction to law and 
society’s comprehension of a reasonable reaction to domestic violence and the 
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appropriate nature of female behaviour. Therefore, had the abused woman stayed in 
the abusive relationship, waited for a window of opportunity before killing her abuser, 
or used a weapon in the commission of a homicide ultimately motivated by fear, she 
would be pushed towards a plea of diminished responsibility.  Although diminished 
responsibility could be pleaded alongside the partial defence of provocation, which 
would increase the likelihood of a manslaughter conviction,
232
provocation was 
widely thought to be reserved for the mentally normal.
233
Under The Homicide Act 1957, s2, a verdict of manslaughter would apply if the 
defendant was suffering from an ‘abnormality of the mind.’
234
The abnormality had to 
have arisen either from a condition of arrested or retarded development of the mind or 
any inherent causes, or must have been induced by disease or injury at the time of the 
homicide, resulting in an impaired mental responsibility.
235
The partial defence of 
diminished responsibility served as a partial denial of the defendant’s responsibility. 
This ensured that the defendant was not judged according to excusatory standards, as 
was the case under the partial defence of provocation, as the defendant’s abnormality 
of the mind meant that they were unable to adhere to the relevant standards of 
behaviour expected of the mentally normal.
236
Abnormality of the mind was described by Lord Parker C.J in Byrne, as ‘a state of 
mind so different from that of ordinary human beings that the reasonable man would 
term it abnormal.’
237
The partial defence suggested the existence of formal 
distinctions between the normal and abnormal mind, sending a very clear societal 
message that the defendant’s mitigated sentence existed on the basis that no normal 
person would have behaved in the same way, thus reducing the defendant’s sentence 
in line with their reduced capacity to be held fully responsible for their conduct. No 
consideration was made of the existence of a sliding scale or mental health 
continuum,
238
or any acknowledgement made of the scientific and psychiatric 
                                                          
232
J. Horder, ‘Between Provocation and Diminished Responsibility’ (1999) 10 K.C.L.J 143, 161
233
A. Ashworth, ‘The Doctrine of Provocation’ (1976) Cambridge LJ 292, 312
234
The Homicide Act 1957, s2(1)
235
The Homicide Act 1957, s2(1)
236
J. Horder, ‘Between Provocation and Diminished Responsibility’ (n232) 144.
237
[1960] 2 Q.B. 396 at 403
238
S. Morse,‘ Diminished Rationality, Diminished Responsibility’ (2003) 1 Ohio State Jo. of Crim. 
Law 289 . In the course of arguing for a generic partial defence of diminished rationality, Morse 
describes the capacity for rationality as a “continuum concept”; at 295
52
explanations as to what can happen when individuals are subjected to stress and 
trauma.
239
Consequently, for the purposes of the law, the abused woman’s social 
context was irrelevant, as the reliance upon diminished responsibility reinforced the 
‘psychological cul de sac’.
240
This legally prioritised an assessment of the defendant’s 
personality, with the effect of normalising domestic violence and labelling abused 
women’s reactions to it as legally abnormal. 
Moreover, it was unclear which conditions the reasonable man would deem 
‘abnormal’ for the purposes of The Homicide Act 1957, s2. This was emphasised by 
the lack of judicial guidance available on the matter and by the fact that expert 
testimony and evidence varied as there was, and still is, no consensus within the 
medical community as to what conditions are mentally abnormal.
241
Additionally, the 
inherent causes of mental illness are capable of being interpreted in many different 
ways resulting in a lack of consistency and clarity.
242
This raised problems for abused 
women who kill, as their reaction to domestic violence would only serve as a partial 
defence if their actions were the direct consequence of an abnormal mind, which 
would allow the admissibility of expert evidence to support mental abnormality.
243
This position follows R v Turner, in which evidence that does not deal with mental 
disorders or mental handicaps is not admissible. This is because other psychological 
functions are apparently matters of common knowledge and experience of the jury
and can be understood without the need for expert evidence.
244
In cases of female perpetrated intimate partner homicide, BWS was considered as a 
recognised abnormality of the mind. Evidence of the condition became admissible 
under the Homicide Act 1957, s2, as it was considered beyond the comprehension of 
the ordinary person who would be unable to detect or appreciate the effect of evidence 
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of the condition without accompanying expert testimony.
245
This became somewhat 
of a catch for abused women who kill, as they had to further embrace the pathological 
stereotype that BWS represents. Psychiatric evidence is only available for the 
abnormal,
246
as juror’s do not need experts to inform them of the workings of a 
normal and reasonable mind.
247
This further fuelled the ‘antedilivian myth,’
248
that 
experts only concern themselves with the workings of the abnormal mind. The only 
alternative was to allow the defendant to be assessed according to the common sense
standards of the jury.
249
This ignored the complexity of the human mind and 
individual reaction especially in cases concerning domestic violence and left the 
abused woman with a stark choice. She had to choose either to allow herself and her 
reaction to abuse to be constructed and understood as the result of a mental 
abnormality, or she faced the possibility of the mandatory life sentence.  
This had the effect of further limiting societal understanding of abused women who 
kill their abusers and ignored the possibility that any increased exposure of the jury to 
alternative psychological alternatives could be advantageous.
250
Instead, the 
admissibility of expert evidence was dependent on the existence of abnormality and 
evaluated according to prevailing social standards, which were unable to fully 
understand or account for domestic violence and its implications and were abstracted 
from their social context. It also failed to recognise that the homicide was the end 
result of the abused woman’s personality pattern, which she had developed as a 
coping strategy within the abusive relationship. The reactive behaviour was 
situationally determined, and not the result of a personality disorder.
251
This 
completely overlooked the existence of external factors, failing to recognise that an 
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individual’s reaction is significantly influenced by environmental factors.
252
Diminished responsibility therefore focused exclusively on the existence of a mental 
abnormality instead of recognising and uncovering the reasons and factors behind the 
reaction. This resulted in findings that were completely abstract, with no 
consideration of the historical and social context in which the act took place and 
culminated in the finding that abused women’s reactions were not reasonable 
according to masculine legal standards, so she must therefore be mentally disturbed.
3.3 The Homicide Act 1957, s3 and the Partial Defence of Provocation
If an abused woman chose not to plead diminished responsibility, her alternative 
partial defence was provocation. The partial defence would make reasonable her 
reaction by moving the focus of the investigation away from concepts of mental 
abnormality and medicalisation and towards an understanding of the circumstances 
which triggered the commission of the homicide. The partial defence of provocation 
as it existed under the Homicide Act 1957, s3 stated as follows: 
Where on a charge of murder there is evidence on which the jury can find that 
the person charged was provoked (whether by things said or done or by both 
together) to lose his self-control, the question whether the provocation was 
enough to make a reasonable man do as he did shall be left to be determined 
by the jury; and in determining that question the jury shall take into account 
everything both done and said according to the effect, which, in their opinion, 
it would have on a reasonable man.
253
In order to invoke a successful plea of provocation under this statute, the defendant 
had to show that ‘that there was some provocative conduct, that the defendant as a 
result lost her self control; and that an ordinary person (possibly with the same 
personal characteristics of D,) might have killed in response to such conduct.’
254
  The 
test was subjective in the sense that it had to be shown that the defendant had been 
temporarily deprived of the power of self control. This was followed by an objective 
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analysis of whether the reasonable man would have lost his self control and behaved 
in the same way. If so, the defendant’s sentence could be reduced to manslaughter on 
the grounds of provocation.
3.3.1 The Partial Defence of Provocation and the Loss of Self Control
The requirement that an individual loses their self control in order to fall within the 
ambit of the partial defence of provocation, sought to ensure that only killings 
committed in a state of anger arising from some form of provocation were partially 
excused by the law in an attempt to ensure that killings committed in a controlled and 
premeditated manner did not fall within the ambit of the partial defence. The concept 
of loss of self control was problematic for abused women trying to plead provocation, 
as it required the defendant to be so angry that they were unable to control 
themselves.
255
This concept privileged angry and violent outbursts, which are not 
contextually reflective of the circumstances in which abused women kill. Female 
perpetrated intimate partner homicide is not usually the consequence of an angry loss 
of self control, as rage is internalised and not manifested in furious outbursts.
256
Nevertheless, the concept of loss of self control attempted to address the relationship 
between ‘the external factors and the internal capacity for self control,’
257
suggesting 
that the loss of control mirrored an individual’s pathology.
258
However, Edwards 
argues that this was not often the case, and instead of mirroring pathology and giving 
way to physiology, the loss of self control requirement followed the ‘mirror of nature’ 
principle.
259
This gave exculpation to masculine emotions, like anger, and prescribed 
situations in which external conditions were allowed to weaken the moral bind.
260
This enabled the law to dictate the circumstances in which provocation applied 
according to social constructions of acceptable responses in a given situation. 
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Gender inequality was the ensuing consequence of the adoption of such a legal stance, 
as contemporary evidence of loss of self control had depended on ‘outwardly visible
signs of outburst,’
261
and words such as ‘snap,’
262
and ‘exploded’
263
became 
commonplace when describing a loss of self control. Edwards argues that displays of 
terror, hysteria, isolation or exhaustion often apparent in female perpetrated intimate 
partner homicides, did not fit within the model of an individual losing their self 
control,
264
further excluding abused women’s reactions to abuse from the partial 
defence.
The gender disparate implications of the partial defence of provocation were further 
codified in R v Duffy,
265
when it was held that the loss of self control must occur 
almost immediately. According to Edwards, Devlin J took the law down a path from 
which it strained unsuccessfully to recover and with disastrous consequences for 
battered women who killed their abusers.
266
This was because Devlin J claimed that 
loss of self control had to be sudden and temporary, and make the accused so subject 
to passion that they were not the master of their mind.
267
This privileged sudden, 
angry and violent outbursts often perpetrated by men. It failed to recognise that 
women delay the fatal strike and use weapons to alleviate the disparities in both size 
and strength between themselves and their abuser. Instead, weapons signified a 
‘significant degree of planning and premeditation,’
268
which again, was inconsistent 
with the legal interpretation of loss of self control.  This made the manner in which 
abused women kill appear premeditated and controlled, as opposed to a reasonable 
response to provocative conduct. 
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It was not until R v Ahluwalia
269
that the criminal justice system attempted to 
incorporate the situation in which many abused women find themselves in. However, 
it is essential to note that Ahluwalia’s appeal and her subsequent reduction in sentence 
to manslaughter was on the grounds of diminished responsibility.  Although the case 
succeeded on the basis of there being new evidence that Ahluwalia was suffering 
from depression, the case did have a significant impact on the partial defence of 
provocation, as an attack was launched upon the temporal nexus required for the 
demonstration of a loss of self control. It was held that the sudden requirement for a 
loss of self control should no longer serve as a legal bar to access the partial defence 
of provocation and the effect of cumulative provocation, or ‘slow burning’
provocation should be recognised.
270
This would recognise that an individual who did 
not respond immediately to provocative conduct, could still have lost their self control 
and could therefore plead provocation. However, it was expressly noted that ‘the 
longer the delay and the stronger the evidence of deliberation on the part of the 
defendant, the more likely it would be that the prosecution would negate
provocation.’
271
Although the recognition of a time lapse signified that the law was beginning to 
recognise the plight of battered women who kill, it did introduce problems, as the 
removal of the immediacy requirement could allow for the penetration of multiple 
motives. Anything in theory could constitute provocation, provided the accused 
argued that their delayed response was a reaction to prolonged provocation. 
Consequently, Horder claimed that the relaxation of the immediacy requirement threw 
a cloak of legitimacy around cases in which men have plotted revenge on a partner.
272
This demonstrates that although the situation was supposed to improve for abused 
women, the legal implications were still more beneficial to male defendants due to the 
adoption of angry and typically masculine responses as the normative legal standard.
Nevertheless, the recognition of cumulative provocation could have been of benefit to 
those unable to escape from abusive relationships, as Horder claimed that they would 
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be regarded as having their powers of self control ‘naturally diminished’ by the abuse, 
without the diminution automatically being associated with a mental abnormality.
273
The removal of the immediacy requirement would incorporate abused women’s social 
realities, recognising that after being subjected to abuse, the defendant’s powers of 
self control were eroded, culminating in their reaction and the commission of the 
homicide. The adoption of such an interpretation would bring abused women who 
killed their abusers within the ambit of the partial defence of provocation, as their 
reaction could be recognised as a reasonable response to cumulative provocation 
instead of the product of a mental abnormality. 
However, even with the relaxation of the imminence requirement and the possibility 
of recognising the natural diminution of self control, the subjective nature of loss of 
self control was still problematic for abused women because it still lacked a sufficient 
legal definition making it subject to judicial interpretation. Loss of self control was a 
fundamental legal concept which could continually be reinterpreted on the basis of the 
existence of deserving cases. This further demonstrated that abused women and their 
reactions to abuse were not considered to fall within the original parameters of loss of 
control through anger, and therefore had to be squeezed into the preferentially 
masculine framework on the grounds of judicial benevolence. This meant that any 
legal gains for abused women could be taken away, should loss of self control be 
reinterpreted and the legal parameters redefined. This forced the Law Commission to 
conclude that asking whether an individual could have exercised self control posed an 
impossible moral question, as the definition and concept of loss of self control was 
riddled with such ambiguity.
274
For example, the way in which loss of self control was 
interpreted assumed that the individual had self control to lose in the first place, as in 
theory, ‘only an agent who antecedently possesses self control can lose it,’ as one 
cannot lose what one does not have.
275
Consequently, the partial defence of provocation did not fully explain and account for 
what exactly was lost when one loses self control, as surely self control could be lost 
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without a person having to lose complete control of their body, or by not being able to 
understand what they were doing.
276
Further, the interpretation made no consideration 
of the defendant’s capacity for self control prior to the incident, as the defendant 
could have lacked the self control to deal with the things said or done. This would 
result in the defendant lacking in the self control and therefore capacity to refrain 
from submitting to any kind of provocation.
277
Another alternative is that the 
defendant did have sufficient self control, but that the provocative incident gave rise 
to inclinations and undermined the level of self control that the defendant already had 
which had previously restrained them from responding.
278
In seeking to overcome the uncertainty surrounding the meaning of loss of self control 
and what it could have entailed, Holton and Shute proposed that self control could 
have been legally defined and understood as follows: ‘self control consists in the 
ability to bring one’s actions into line with one’s considered judgments about what it 
would be best to do, where these judgments depart from one’s desires.’
279
This 
definition claims that strength of will is a crucial factor in maintaining self control, 
and recognises that judgment can be clouded or corrupted by emotion. This would 
recognise the role of other emotions besides anger in homicide, recognising that 
although abused woman had previously been fearful of their abusers and submissive 
to them, that they still retained the ability to respond with an act of violence, without 
this necessarily being reflective of a mental abnormality.
280
It would acknowledge that 
the abuse sustained could erode the capacity to endure it any longer. This would have 
brought the legal interpretation of a loss of self control in line with empirical 
literature, as experiments have demonstrated that individuals do not have an unlimited 
and unwavering capacity for self control, but that self control is quantified and can be 
used up.
281
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3.3.2. Provocation, Loss of Self Control and the Ordinary Reasonable Person
Unfortunately, the legal definition of loss of self control did not reach such a state of 
clarity. Should the abused woman have been able to demonstrate that she had been 
provoked to lose her self control, it was then left to objectively assess her capacity for 
self control against the standards of the ordinary and reasonable person. The case of R 
v Ahluwalia was again instrumental in developing the partial defence of provocation 
so that it could incorporate the claims of battered women who killed their abusers. 
The case was significant because it enabled BWS to be addressed when assessing the 
defendant’s capacity for self control against the standards of the ordinary and 
reasonable person. During Ahluwalia’s trial, the jury had been asked to consider how 
a reasonable, educated, Asian woman would respond to the provocation.
282
Although 
evidence of BWS was not considered in relation to Ahluwalia, as there was no 
evidence that it was a condition that she had,
283
it was suggested that if there was the 
right sort of evidence, then the reasonableness ought to be judged from the 
perspective of the syndrome sufferer.
284
  
This moved the standard of the ordinary and reasonable person towards what Horder 
called ‘weak excuse theory.’
285
In effect, this allowed the defendant to be judged by 
the standard of what could reasonably have been expected of the individual in 
question. This widened the ‘moderate excuse theory’
286
that had been applied under R 
v Camplin when Lord Diplock in the House of Lords stated that: 
the reasonable man referred to in the question is having the power of self 
control to be expected of an ordinary person of the sex and age of the accused, 
but in other respects sharing such of the accused’s characteristics as they think 
would affect the gravity of provocation to him; and that the question is not 
merely whether such a person would in like circumstances be provoked to lose 
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his self control but also whether he would react to the provocation as the 
accused did.
287
This made age and sex the only relevant characteristics, but the jury could consider all 
other characteristics ‘which have to be the subject of taunts, gestures etc.’
288
In 
Ahluwalia it was not stated whether BWS had to be the subject of taunts, expanding 
Camplin as the defendant had to be ‘a different person from the ordinary run of 
women’, or ‘marked off or distinguished from the ordinary woman of the 
community.’
289
This enabled abused women to fall within this construction and use 
BWS as a characteristic, as by virtue of their commission of the homicide they 
become distinguished from the ordinary woman of the community. 
Despite the legal recognition that BWS impacted significantly upon the capacity for 
self control, the fact that age and sex were relevant factors in determining the 
reasonable person’s capacity for self control allowed the legal construction of the 
reactions of abused women to be influenced by damaging sexual stereotypes. A 
woman who commits a crime, particularly one of a violent nature, has stepped outside 
of her gender role expectations and is therefore deviant and deserving of harsh 
treatment.
290
She has breached the social attitudes that define the legitimate 
parameters of her behaviour, regardless of the fact that she may have responded out of 
fear and the need to protect herself or her children.
291
As such, the law must be seen 
to respond to characterisations of male and female behaviour and render her reaction 
abnormal.
292
The concept of a variable or fixed capacity for self control continued to be 
problematic even after the decision in Ahluwalia and the recognition of BWS as a 
relevant characteristic, and oscillated ambivalently between an objective and 
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subjective interpretation. When the standard was subjective, as in R v Humphreys
293
and R v Thornton (No 2),
294
the abuse sustained became legally relevant to the issue of 
the ordinary and reasonable person, as abuse was not inconsistent with the concept of 
the reasonable person.  When the test was objective, abused women found it much 
more difficult to fall within the ambit of the ordinary and reasonable person, as this 
person did not have the characteristics of a battered woman, which pushed abused 
women towards a plea of diminished responsibility. 
The effects of a strict objective test can be witnessed in Luc Thiet Thuan v Queen.
295
This case held that the defendant’s brain damage, which could reduce or impair his 
capacity for self control was not a factor to be considered. The ordinary and 
reasonable person requirement did not enable the consideration of idiosyncrasies, as 
they were not consistent with the powers of self control expected of the ordinary and 
reasonable person.
296
Therefore, the defendant’s mental abnormality could be 
considered under diminished responsibility, not provocation. Following the position 
in Luc Thiet Thaun v Queen, characteristics of mental impairment, such as BWS, 
became relevant only to the gravity of the provocation, and not to the reasonable 
man’s loss of self control.
297
This made a distinction between factors going to the 
‘provocativeness’ and factors going to the ‘provocability’, holding only the former to 
be relevant,
298
suggesting that the two can be neatly separated,
299
and rendering the 
implications of violence upon loss of self control irrelevant. 
However, a subjective interpretation of the ordinary and reasonable person returned in 
R v Smith (Morgan),
300
when it was held that the characteristics personal to the 
defendant should be considered when deciding whether the objective component of 
the provocation defence had been satisfied. This enabled abused women to fall within 
the ambit of the partial defence, but the outcome of this case was controversial as it 
                                                          
293
[1995] 4 All E.R. 1008
294
[1996] 1 W.L.R. 1174
295
(1997) AC 131 
296
Luc Thiet Thuan v The Queen (1997) AC 131, 140 
297
‘Homicide-Murder-Provocation-Characteristics of the reasonable man’ (2000) Criminal Law 
Review 1004 
298
Homicide-Murder-Provocation-Characteristics of the reasonable man’ (n297) 1008.
299
A. Norrie, ‘From Criminal Law to Legal Theory: The Mysterious Case of the Reasonable Glue 
Sniffer’ (2002) 65 M.L.R. 538, 546
300
(2001) 1 AC 146 (HL) 
63
allowed the objective, self control requirement to be expanded to the point where 
abnormal characteristics which had no bearing on the gravity of the provocation 
became relevant.
301
Although, it was still necessary for the jury to apply an objective 
standard of behaviour which society was entitled to expect, the approach gave rise to 
the danger of Dressler’s ‘oxymoron principle,’
302
in which it was argued that the 
objective test had been expanded to such an extent that the jury may have had to 
consider how the reasonable paranoid might have reacted to provocative conduct. 
Consequently, objectivity returned in A-G of Jersey v Holley,
303
and remained the 
standard upon which to judge the defendant’s capacity for self control up until 
provocation was abolished under the Coroners and Justice Act 2009. The decision 
adhered to the school of thought that emotions do not drive individuals, but that 
individuals retain an ability to assess their reactions and regulate their conduct.
304
The 
decision in Holley therefore appeared to exclude the recognition of a variable capacity
for self control, which is apparent in women who have been abused. 
305
However, following Lord Millet’s dissenting judgment in R v Smith(Morgan), it 
became clear that abused women who kill could fall within an objective construction 
of the standard of self control to be expected from the ordinary and reasonable person. 
Lord Millet claimed that the objective test recognised that the treatment battered 
women receive from their abusers had the effect of gradually wearing down their 
ability to refrain from resorting to violence.
306
Lord Millet’s position acknowledged 
that prior to the abuse, the abused woman had the same standard of self control 
expected of the ordinary and reasonable person. Lord Millet claimed that under the 
objective test: ‘the question for the jury is whether a woman with normal powers of 
tolerance and self control, subjected to the treatment which the accused received, 
would or might finally react as she did.’
307
This recognised that the defendant who 
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had been abused was still capable of considering the situation, but that their 
assessment and evaluation of the situation and how they should respond, could alter 
because of their heightened emotional state.
308
This ensured that the standard expected 
recognised that abused women’s thinking and judgment can alter due to trauma,
309
abuse,
310
or stress,
311
and as a result, in certain circumstances, the abused woman 
would find it more difficult than her non abused counterpart to control her reaction in 
order to conform with the law’s expectations.
312
Despite the woman-centred potential of Lord Millet’s construction of the objective 
test, should the abused woman respond in what objectively appeared to be a 
considered desire for revenge, then expert evidence would still be required to 
demonstrate that the abused woman’s reaction was the result of a loss of self control 
triggered by the abuse she had received at the hands of her partner.
313
Should the 
abused woman wait until her partner was off guard and use a weapon, her reaction 
could objectively be construed as motivated by a considered desire for revenge. 
Consequently, her reaction would need to be explained with reference to the 
damaging stereotypical assumptions that accompany BWS,
314
unless modified 
standards of expert evidence were introduced to explain the abused woman’s conduct 
in light of her circumstances. Otherwise, the abused woman would technically fall 
within the ambit of the objective test, but her narrative and context would still have to 
be explained through a narrow psychological framework. This would move the focus 
of legal investigation back onto her state of mind, and away from the impact of the 
abuse. 
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The partial defence of provocation as it existed under the Homicide Act 1957, s3, was 
therefore unable to recognise the reactions of abused women who had killed their 
abusers as an example of the conduct that an ordinary person may have been driven to 
commit in light of the abuse sustained. The substantive legal requirements governing 
the partial defence of provocation demanded abused women to fall within a 
construction of loss of self control which was shaped according to masculine social 
context. Angry responses to provocative conduct were recognised as reasonable, but 
responses motivated by fear and self preservation were not. In order to fall within the 
partial defence of provocation, abused women had to react like men. This ensured that 
the wider structures of domination apparent within abusive relationships were not 
addressed and that abused women’s reactions to abuse were still legally constructed 
through a lens of masculinity, as the morphology of violence was not the ‘centrifugal 
point of focus.’
315
Consequently, it was the role of the judiciary to stretch and redefine the legal concepts 
governing provocation in order to accommodate the experiences and reactions of 
abused women who kill and attempt to present their reactions as examples of 
behaviour that the ordinary person might have been driven to commit, had they been 
abused.  Although this allowed for some abused women to fall within the ambit of the 
defence, expert testimony was still required to translate the experiences of abused 
women into a context that might be understood as reasonable, should she have reacted 
as many abused women do.
316
  Therefore, masculine domination and the masculine 
context of the defence remained unchallenged, as abused women were still required to 
fit within a framework which ultimately failed to acknowledge their social context.
317
3.4 The Coroners and Justice Act 2009
Due to the gender disparate application of the partial defences to homicide and the 
legal failure to accommodate the reactions of abused women who kill, numerous 
reform proposals were developed to respond to the problems inherent within the 
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partial defences of diminished responsibility and provocation.
318
It was seriously 
questioned whether it was legally appropriate for anger to form the basis of a partial 
defence, but for fear not to.
319
  The legal result of these proposals and considerations 
is the Coroners and Justice Act 2009, which seeks to overcome the direct rejection of 
fear as constituting a reasonable reaction,
320
in what has been hailed as a means of 
‘avoiding the difficulty in trying to shoehorn killings primarily triggered by fear into a 
partial defence aimed at killings in anger.’
321
  
The recognition of fear builds upon the Law Commission’s proposals, which were 
envisaged to cover situations in which an abused woman has killed her abuser in order 
to prevent an anticipated attack which is not immediately imminent.
322
In order to 
ascertain whether the recognition of fear in the commission of intimate partner 
homicide is enough to bring abused women who kill within the framework of the 
partial defences, it is necessary to critically evaluate how the changes made by the 
legislation will impact upon the defences available to abused women who kill and 
whether these modifications have sufficiently challenged and addressed the intrinsic 
gender bias within the partial defences.
3.5 The Coroners and Justice Act 2009 and the Partial Defence of Diminished 
Responsibility
Although supposed to serve as a modification of the partial defence, the Coroners and 
Justice Act 2009, s52, substantially alters the partial defence of diminished 
responsibility as it existed under the Homicide Act 1957, s2. Instead of being 
required to demonstrate that she was suffering from an abnormality of the mind, the 
abused woman must now demonstrate that she was suffering from an abnormality of 
mental functioning.
323
She must then show that the abnormality of mental functioning 
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arose from a recognised medical condition,
324
that it substantially impaired her 
ability
325
to understand the nature of her conduct,
326
to form rational judgment,
327
or 
to exercise self control.
328
Once an abnormality of mental functioning can be shown to 
be responsible for her impaired judgment, she can satisfy the last requirement, that the 
abnormality must provide an explanation as to why she was a party to the killing.
329
According to s52(1)(b), ‘an abnormality of mental functioning provides an 
explanation for D’s conduct if it causes, or is a significant contributory factor in 
causing D to carry out their conduct.’ The provision attempts to avoid the 
idiosyncrasies that can arise under the pre-existing abnormality of the mind 
requirement,
330
by requiring the defendant’s abnormality of mental functioning to fall 
within the World Health Organisations ICD-10 criteria or those specified by the 
American Psychiatric Association’s diagnostic and statistical manual.
331
Under this 
stricter construction, evidence that the defendant was suffering from BWS is 
admissible, as both ‘battered spouse syndrome’ and ‘effects of abuse of an adult’ 
classify as maltreatment symptoms for the purposes of these criteria. This ensures that 
BWS can be used as evidence of a mental abnormality resulting from a recognised
medical condition. 
However, due to the way in which abused women kill, it is uncertain as to whether 
BWS will be used as a means of demonstrating a loss of self control or as an 
explanation for not being able to understand the nature of certain conduct. Moreover, 
it is unclear whether the construction of loss of self control as it existed under the 
partial defence of provocation and the Homicide Act 1957, s3, will be used to judge 
whether the defendant had lost their self control. Although the legal concept of self 
control is evidenced as being malleable enough to cover almost any type of behaviour 
or reaction through judicial interpretation and redefinition, the application of this legal 
construct to the partial defence of provocation was clearly shaped by masculine social 
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context. This had the effect of reinforcing masculine standards of behaviour, such as 
anger, as reasonable, whilst constructing abused women and their reactions as 
unreasonable. Should the reformed partial defence of diminished responsibility 
recognise BWS as being debilitating to self control, then abused women could fall 
within the modified construction of the partial defence, further demonstrating the fluid 
and uncertain nature of the pivotal legal concept of loss of self control.  
If, however, the masculine informed legal construction of loss of self control remains, 
the abused woman must be able to show that due to having BWS, her ability to form a 
rational judgment was substantially impaired. If successful, this further conveys that 
abused women who kill are irrational and abnormal. It further reduces the need to 
even consider the reasons why the abused woman behaved the way that she did in 
light of the abuse that she sustained. s52, makes it very clear that her reaction is 
unreasonable because of her mental infirmity, as it is her psychological condition that 
caused her to behave the way that she did. The central focus on the abused woman’s 
psychological condition reinforces the narrow construction of the original partial 
defence of diminished responsibility, as the abused woman is not held accountable 
under ordinary standards of behaviour because her mental infirmity means that she 
falls short of these standards every time. This ensures that abused women continue to 
be understood both socially and legally as unreasonable and mentally ill. 
Moreover, by having to demonstrate a substantial impairment of ability, it is likely 
that more cases involving diminished responsibility will be contested.
332
Mackay 
claims that the likeliness increases,
333
as successful diminished responsibility pleas 
were falling continuously even before the introduction of the Coroners and Justice Act 
2009 and the implementation of stricter substantive legal requirements. The figure 
stood at one hundred and nine successful pleas in 1979 and reduced to apparently 
thirty five in 2005.
334
This raises significant problems for abused women who kill, as 
evidence suggests that if diminished responsibility pleas are contested, then juries are 
                                                          
332
See R.D. Mackay, ‘The Diminished Responsibility Plea in Operation--An Empirical Study’, in 
Appendix 2 of the Law Commission's Final Report, Partial Defences to Murder (Law Com No.290 
Cm.6301 2004) para.20 which reveals that there was no jury trial in 77.1% of relevant cases.
333
R.D. Mackay, ‘The Coroners and Justice Act 2009-Partial Defences to Murder(2) The New 
Diminished Responsibility Plea’ (2010) Criminal Law Review 209, 301 
334
K. Coleman, ‘Homicide’ in Homicides, Firearm Offences and Intimate Violence 2008-09, Table 
1.08.
69
much more likely to convict the defendant of murder.
335
Therefore, it becomes even 
more important that the abused woman is able to conform to the requirements of 
BWS, as women who do not adhere to all of the symptoms or demonstrate the 
behaviour typical of BWS sufferers then they will not fall within the ambit of the 
partial defence. The modified partial defence of diminished responsibility ensures 
that BWS continues to be used as a checklist to determine whether abused women 
have been abused for the purposes of the criminal justice system and continues to 
render their reactions to abuse as abnormal. 
3.6 The Coroners and Justice Act 2009 and the Partial Defence of Loss of 
Control
The Coroners and Justice Act 2009 replaces the partial defence of provocation with a 
partial defence based on a loss of control. The new partial defence is underpinned by 
two qualifying triggers. The first trigger is a fear of serious violence,
336
and the 
second trigger refers to things said or done,
337
of an extremely grave character,
338
which causes the defendant to have a justifiable sense of being seriously wronged.
339
In order to fall within the ambit of the act, the defendant must now prove that they lost 
their self control,
340
that the loss of self control had a qualifying trigger,
341
and that a 
‘person of D’s sex and age, with a normal degree of tolerance and self-restraint and in 
the circumstances of D, might have reacted in the same or in a similar way to D.’
342
The act also codifies that the loss of self control need not be sudden,
343
and that when 
considering the circumstances of the defendant, all of the defendant’s circumstances 
can be considered, other than those whose only relevance is that they bear on the 
defendant’s capacity for self restraint and tolerance.
344
If an abused woman is to fall within the ambit of the new partial defence, she must 
firstly demonstrate that she lost her self control. The retention of the concept of loss of 
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self control does not automatically mean that abused women who kill cannot fall 
within its construction, as it is a legal concept capable of judicial modification. 
However, without any legislative modification, it is unclear how the legal construct of 
loss of self control can be severed from its previous construction, which privileged 
angry and violent responses, which were reinforced by societal perceptions of 
appropriate reaction. The Coroners and Justice Act 2009, s54, therefore fails to clarify 
the concept of loss of self control and whether the existence of an angry and violent 
outburst is necessary to demonstrate it. The only clarification that the act provides is 
that the loss of self control need not be sudden,
345
recognising the effects of slow burn 
and codifying the judicial developments following Ahluwalia and Thornton No 2 in an 
attempt to ensure that the partial defence becomes more accessible to abused 
women.
346
However, a time lapse will still be considered under the act, as it will move 
from being a question of law, to a question of fact.
347
A time lapse will become 
significant when considering the background circumstances of the defendant, ensuring 
that the longer delay, the more evidence there will be of premeditation and 
consequently a finding of no loss of self control. 
Without an explicit change to the standard of loss of self control, it is unclear how 
dominant standards of masculinity will be replaced by alternative conceptions of 
reasonable reaction. This becomes of particular significance, as loss of self control 
must now be compatible with fear as a qualifying trigger.
348
The legislation makes no 
attempt to define how the concept of loss of self control through fear is going to be 
configured within the existing legal construction of a loss of self control through 
anger.
349
Edwards questions the relationship between the two concepts, arguing that 
anger is an eruptive moment, whereas fear is a break down in control due to an 
inability to control circumstances,
350
suggesting that the two states are actually 
asymmetrical.  Fear is not an explosive state, rather it is one which is endured.
351
Consequently, it is unclear how a loss of self control caused by fear should be 
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manifested for the purpose of the partial defence and whether the reactions of abused 
women who kill will fall within this legal construction. Due to this legal uncertainty, 
it will be up to the judge and jury to decide whether the abused woman’s reaction 
constitutes a loss of self control attributed to a fear of serious violence. 
This leaves the law in much the same state as before, with it being the responsibility 
of the judiciary to stretch the legislative requirements of the partial defences to fit the 
circumstances of abused women who kill in deserving cases and demonstrates that 
battered women are not appropriately brought within the ambit of the partial defence. 
The lack of legislative guidance on the definition of loss of self control further risks 
allowing the judge and jury’s own views of an appropriate reaction underpinned by 
fear to be imposed upon the defendant. This would mean that in certain situations in 
which abused women have reacted in contravention to the jury’s own perceptions of a 
fearful reaction, that the defendant’s reaction, despite being motivated by a fear of 
future violence, will not be considered as a manifestation of an individual losing their 
self control.  
This leaves the Coroners and Justice Act 2009 open to the Law Commission’s 
criticism that ‘loss of self control was a judicially invented concept, lacking a 
sharpness or a clear foundation in psychology.’
352
Consequently, under their 
proposals, the Law Commission recommended that the loss of self control 
requirement be abolished.
353
Instead, the defendant had to demonstrate that they were 
responding to gross provocation in the form of words and/or conduct which caused 
them to have a justifiable sense of being seriously wronged,
354
or that the defendant 
was responding to a fear of serious violence.
355
Horder was critical of this standard, 
arguing that without the subjective component, juries may have been required to 
consider clearly premeditated murders under the guise of provocation.
356
Mackay and 
Mitchell argued that in their haste to remove the troubling concept of loss of self 
control and the majority approach in R v Smith (Morgan) the Law Commission failed 
to deal with the fundamental issue, that emotion affects human behaviour, as without 
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a loss of self control requirement there is a notable absence of reference to the 
defendant’s mental state at the time of the killing.
357
All that is required is that the 
defendant acted in response to gross provocation and had a justifiable sense of being 
seriously wronged. 
The rationale for retaining the concept of a loss of self control is that without it, 
killings committed in cold blood could be included, and the partial defence could be 
used inappropriately to mitigate the sentences received by those killing out of a 
considered desire for revenge.
358
Although the Law Commission’s reform proposals 
were not a perfect means of accommodating the reactions of abused women who kill 
as reasonable, they demonstrated that legislative attempts to define loss of self control 
needed to be made, or that loss of self control in its unmodified state should not 
remain central the operation of a partial defence to homicide.
359
The Coroners and 
Justice Act 2009 was the legislative opportunity to address these concerns and provide 
solutions which did not solely privilege masculine reactions. Instead, in the absence of 
legislative clarification, self control appears to remain as something that should 
suddenly snap or break,
360
ensuring that it can continue to be constructed in 
accordance with masculine social context.  This continues to privilege masculine 
reactions and responses to external events, and fails to recognise that women’s 
experiences of abuse shape their reactions to it.  
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3.6.1. The Qualifying Triggers of a Loss of Self Control
If the abused woman cannot demonstrate that her loss of self control was attributable 
to a fear of serious violence, the defendant can also try and explain their loss of self 
control as being due to things said or done, or both,
361
which constituted 
circumstances of an extremely grave character,
362
and caused her to have a justifiable 
sense of being seriously wronged.
363
However, this raises its own set of legal 
uncertainties, as it is unclear what constitutes circumstances of an extremely grave 
character. Furthermore, justifiable for the purposes of the act means in eyes of the 
jury, rather than the defendant. This could allow for the continuation of social myths 
concerning domestic violence and acceptable reactions to inform legal interpretation, 
namely that if the circumstances were so grave, the abused woman could have simply 
left the relationship resulting in her sense of being seriously wronged being non 
justifiable. 
The potential for social myths to influence the application of the partial defence is 
furthered by the consideration of the background circumstances leading up to the 
homicide. If the violence sustained leading up to the homicide is not perceived as 
objectively severe, there is the possibility that the jury are not likely to perceive these 
circumstances as giving rise to a reasonable perception of future violence.
364
This 
ignores the battered woman’s perceptions of violence and the threat posed to her 
future safety, which reveals the reasonable nature of her reaction. It completely 
disregards her own perceptions of the threats received and the significance of her 
abuser’s behaviour, ignoring the fact that abused women have to be very attentive to 
the moods of their abusers as their survival depends upon their ability to read and 
navigate their abuser’s temperaments and behaviours.
365
This enables the jury’s 
perception of her situation and the reasonableness of her reaction to become more 
important than her own perception and understanding of her own circumstances and 
the consequences of inaction, demonstrating that her experiences do not form any 
kind of category or consideration upon which to build. This proves that the legislation 
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is still trying to fit the experiences of battered women into a model which it has long 
been established is not sufficient.
366
3.6.2. Sex and Age and the Capacity for Self Control
Furthermore, should an abused woman be able to satisfy the qualifying triggers for a 
loss of self control, she must then satisfy the objective requirement of the partial 
defence of loss of control. She must prove that an ordinary person of the same sex and 
age and with ordinary powers of tolerance and self restraint could have responded in 
the same way as she did.
367
This construction follows the Holley approach, precluding 
the recognition of BWS as a relevant characteristic. However, the effects of this 
position can be mitigated should Lord Millet’s interpretation of the objective standard 
of self control following Holley be adopted. This could be used to assess whether ‘a 
person with the power of self control of an ordinary person would or might have 
reacted in the same way to the cumulative effect of the treatment which she 
endured.’
368
This approach allows for contextual recognition, as it enables the abuse 
sustained to be considered, as opposed to holding that the abused woman must adhere 
to the standards of self control reasonably expected of her non abused counterpart. 
Consequently, there would be little difficulty in taking into consideration the history 
of abuse as it does not ‘necessarily suggest’
369
that the defendant is someone with a 
reduced capacity to exercise self control.
However, the abused women must still satisfy the evaluative standards of sex and age. 
This makes sex, and therefore gender,
370
directly relevant to the evaluative standard, 
thus re-establishing the position under Camplin. The position adopted under the 
Coroners and Justice Act 2009 differs from the Law Commission’s proposals, as the 
Law Commission recommended that only the defendant’s age should be of 
relevance.
371
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Consequently, the nature of both evaluative positions, whilst both aiming to tackle the 
gender bias within the previous partial defence of provocation, have significant 
implications for abused women who kill, as they further raise issues of sameness and 
difference and how best to legally protect abused women who kill. The Law 
Commission’s decision not to include sex in the evaluative standard demonstrates a 
reluctance to depart from a standard of formal equality. This raises initial concerns on 
behalf of abused women who kill, as standards of formal or procedural equality have 
treated men and women as though they are similarly situated, thus neglecting 
women’s social and legal subordination due to masculine dominance.  Formal 
equality has failed to address the status quo that masculinity has defined and risks the 
further entrenchment of principles of gender inequality,
372
as women’s social realities 
are disregarded as they cannot be assimilated to masculine social context. 
The Coroners and Justice Act 2009 sought to challenge the gender bias within the 
previous partial defence of provocation by incorporating sex directly into the 
evaluative standard. By adopting a sexed evaluative standard, the gender bias 
ingrained in prima facie gender neutral laws could be combated.
373
This would enable 
the law to better consider the contexts of abused women who kill, as Leigh claims that 
the recognition of sex would allow for the appropriate consideration of the issues of 
size and strength and better account for the motivations underpinning the abused 
woman’s reaction.
374
Although the adoption of a sexed evaluative standard seeks to accommodate the 
experiences of abused women, it also risks stereotyping abused women who kill and 
essentialising their experiences of abuse. The legal and social standard of appropriate 
and reasonable behaviour still adopts masculinity as the normative standard. 
Therefore, even if the Coroners and Justice Act 2009 adopted Lord Millet’s 
interpretation of the objective test, abused women can still be legally constructed 
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according to all the necessary societal stereotypes of domesticity and passivity.
375
This risks rendering abnormal abused women’s reactions to abuse, as their 
experiences can be essentialised through the adherence to social stereotypes which 
assume that women’s experiences are shared, and therefore makes no consideration of 
the importance of the individual narrative in relation to the shaping of reactions to 
abuse. Women are held accountable under a uniform standard, which allows for 
gender based generalisations to be made without a meaningful consideration of the 
particularity of experience. 
Furthermore, the age and sex of the ordinary and reasonable person are only 
considered in relation to the defendant’s capacity to exercise tolerance and self 
restraint. If the legislation’s intention was to incorporate evidence of abused women’s 
social realities, and the implications of abuse, this could arguably have been better 
considered when evaluating ‘all the defendant’s circumstances’ under s54(1)(c). 
Instead, the explicit incorporation of sex into the evaluative standard suggests that 
men and women have different abilities in relation to retaining their self control.
376
Society already accepts angry and aggressive reactions as acceptable masculine 
responses, suggesting that men can ascribe to a lower standard of self control.
377
Consequently, the re-emergence of sex based distinctions further encourages apparent 
judicial benevolence. Instead of looking at the reasonableness of the abused woman’s  
reaction in the appropriate context of her experiences, she will be seen as less 
responsible on the basis that she has responded in contradiction to typical 
constructions of femininity and in some way must not be as responsible as her male 
counterpart would be.
378
This reinforces social and legal perceptions that abused 
women are abnormal and irrational,
379
and will be reaffirmed if the defendant reacts 
with objectively excessive force, as this suggests a diminished capacity for self 
                                                          
375
A. Worral, Offending Women: Female Law Breakers and the Criminal Justice System (Routledge 
1997) 60
376
S. Yeo ‘ The Role of Gender in the Law of Provocation’ (n66) 450.
377
See A. Carline, ‘ Reforming Provocation: Perspectives from the Law Commission and the 
Government’ (2009) 2 Web J Current Legal Issues <http://webjcli.ncl.ac.uk/2009/issue2/carline2.html> 
accessed 29
th
March 2011
378
see C. Bishop, Women and Crime (Chatto & Windus 1931); H. Goodman and J. Price, Studies of 
Female Offenders (HMSO 1967)
379
H. Barnett, (n60) 269.
77
control.
380
Such an approach further pushes the abused woman towards legal 
constructions of mental instability, as the reasonable woman would not behave in 
such a violent manner. 
3.7 Conclusions
Therefore, it is possible to conclude that the partial defences to homicide are not 
sufficiently capable of forming the basis of a woman-centred court room strategy. 
This chapter sought to apply a woman-centred analytical framework of the legal 
construction of abused women who kill and their reactions to abuse in order to 
counter legally imbedded gender stereotypes. The woman-centred analytical 
framework was used to critically evaluate the partially defensive framework both 
before and after the implementation of the Coroners and Justice Act 2009 and found 
that despite legislative modification, the partial defences to homicide still privilege 
masculine behaviours.  
The retention of the ambiguous legal concept of loss of self control ensures that 
abused women fall outside the ambit of the partial defence of loss of control. This is 
because it is legally unclear how such a concept, which traditionally favours angry 
responses can be reconciled with responses underpinned by fear and the need for self 
preservation without legislative modification and clarification. This suggests that the 
status quo is maintained, and that it is the role of the judiciary to continue to stretch 
and reinterpret the requirements of such a fundamental legal concept on the basis of 
their perception of deserving cases. This does little to ensure that abused women’s 
typical responses to abuse are recognised as responses motivated by fear and that they 
fall within the ambit of an individual losing their self control due to a fear of serious 
violence.  
Further, the introduction of sex and inevitably gender, into the evaluative standard 
ensures that abused women can continue to be constructed accorded to socially 
determined gender stereotypes. This reinforces the societal perception that women are 
passive. If the abused woman strikes while she can, and uses a weapon to do so, her 
behaviour can be perceived as aggressive and premeditated according to normative 
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behavioural standards. In such circumstances, the abused woman has contravened the 
expectations of her sex, and is deserving of punishment. Moreover, the role of sex 
within the evaluative standard can be used to demonstrate that men and women have 
different levels of self control. Consequently, when an abused woman kills her abuser, 
her behaviour can further be understood as a manifestation of an underlying mental 
illness. This further pushes abused women towards constructions of mental 
abnormality, as they are unable to conform to the objective and stereotypical 
requirements of their sex. 
Therefore, in order to distance abused women who kill from the confines of 
psychological syndromes and constructions of abnormality, it is necessary to move 
beyond trying to incorporate the experiences of abused women who kill into a 
partially defensive framework, which is constructed according to masculine standards 
of behaviour and expectation and evaluate the strategic possibilities available in the 
complete defence of self defence.
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Chapter Three
Abused Women Who Kill and the Complete Defence of Self Defence
4. Introduction
The previous chapters have critiqued the ways in which legal knowledge has been 
constructed and applied according to masculine principles and normative behavioural 
standards to the extent that the experiences and reactions of abused women who kill 
are excluded from legal knowledge and societal understanding. This can be witnessed 
through the application of a woman-centred analytical framework to the partial 
defences to homicide, which recognises that typically masculine reactions premised 
upon anger and a loss of self control are held as normative.  Responses that do not 
conform to this masculine construction are rendered as the product of an abnormal 
mind. 
Consequently, masculine concepts and values are deeply imbedded within the legal 
framework of the partial defences to homicide and this legal and consequently social 
allegiance to masculine reaction as reasonable reaction is apparent within the 
Coroners and Justice Act 2009. Although the legislation attempted to incorporate the 
understanding that abused women react out of a sense of fear when they kill their 
intimate partners, their reactions still have to conform to masculine standards of 
behaviour by aligning to the fundamental and paradigmatically masculine standard of 
loss of self control. This reinforces the legal and social commitment to adopting a 
standard of masculinity as normative and allows little room for deconstruction and the 
legal realisation that abused women reasonably respond to threats of future violence.
This chapter seeks to establish whether a woman–centred analytical framework and 
court room strategy could be applied to the complete defence of self defence to more 
accurately capture and reflect the defensive nature of female perpetrated intimate 
partner homicides and demonstrate the reasonableness of the reactions of abused 
women who kill in light of their social context. 
However, reforming the complete defence of self defence poses significant social and 
legal problems, especially in the context of abused women who kill, as the defence 
results in complete legal exculpation through an acquittal, and therefore raises 
80
significant legal and social issues as to when an individual can take the life of another 
without punishment. In order to justify reforming the complete defence of self 
defence, academics have tried to search for conclusive explanations as to the 
circumstances in which an individual has the right to take the life of another without 
punishment. This has resulted in the development of confusing frameworks based on 
the abdication of rights when things are no longer equal in situations where actions 
threaten the lives of others,
381
or forfeiture of rights.
382
It has also resulted in attempts 
to identify morally defective acts, which enable homicide in self defence to be 
permissible,
383
and examinations into whether self defence can only be applicable in 
kill or be killed situations.
384
What has become clear from the development of alternative frameworks and means of 
interpretation is that the circumstances governing the application of self defence send 
out clear and seemingly unalterable societal messages as to when homicide can be 
justified and the defendant exculpated. The values promoted by the current defence 
are socially ingrained, demonstrating that if the complete defence of self defence can 
be reformed, any reform proposals must be capable of overcoming the current 
construction, which has set the legal and social bar to the exclusion of abused women 
who kill. 
Therefore, in order to critically evaluate the complete defence of self defence and 
ascertain whether the complete defence can be reformed to better reflect the reactions 
of abused women who kill as reasonable, this chapter will firstly apply the woman-
centred analytical framework to current defence of self defence. It will use the 
framework to critique the way in which the defence is constructed, and argue that the 
reliance upon objective and justificatory criteria facilitates little consideration of the 
circumstances of the parties. Despite the current legal exclusion of abused women 
who kill from the complete defence, it will be argued that defence is theoretically and 
strategically capable of modification. 
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This chapter will discuss the theoretical possibility of changing the legal framework to 
include the reactions of abused women who kill. Two options for challenging the 
defence will be critically evaluated. The first will consider the consequences of 
altering the legal framework from one based upon justification, to one based upon 
excuse and the second possibility will consider amalgamating both excuse and 
justification to develop an alternative defensive framework.  An excuse based 
framework would enable the defendant’s subjective perceptions of the threat posed to 
her life to carry greater legal weight and enable abused women’s reactions to abuse to 
be legally and socially recognised as reasonable responses in the context of abuse. 
After a consideration of the theoretical possibilities apparent in the current legal 
construction of self defence, this chapter will consider the possibilities available in 
using the complete defence of self defence to present abused women’s reactions to 
abuse as reasonable. This involves using the purpose of self defence, that of being 
able to justifiably respond to unavoidable harm, and applying it as a meta concept.  
Such a construction of self defence could work within the existing conceptual 
parameters of the current legal construction, whilst using expert testimony about the 
experiences of abused women who kill to incorporate an awareness of, and a response 
to gender inequalities apparent within relationships of domination.  The adoption of a 
woman-centred strategy based upon the meta narrative of unavoidable harm seeks to 
apply feminist methodology directly to the law, by recognising that the context of 
women’s experiences are ignored. 
The woman-centred court room strategy takes the primacy of women’s experiences as 
the means upon which to build, leading to a rejection of certain laws on the basis that 
they are conceptually inadequate and only reflect masculine social reality.
385
However, the validity of this approach is premised upon judges and juries and society 
as a whole understanding the abused woman’s reaction as reasonable and finding her 
conduct to be deserving of full exculpation. Therefore, this chapter will demonstrate 
that although the full defence is capable of incorporating the reactions of abused 
women who kill and recognising these reactions as reasonable, that it is societal 
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conceptions of appropriate behaviour and justice that prevent the integration of 
abused women’s reactions to abuse into the complete defence of self defence. 
4.1 The Complete Defence of Self Defence and a Legal Framework of 
Justification
The complete defence of self defence in English and Welsh law is located in a number 
of different sources.
386
A key statute is the Criminal Law Act 1967, s3(1). This 
stipulates that an individual can deploy defensive force ‘as is reasonable in the 
circumstances in the prevention of crime, or in affecting or assisting in the lawful 
arrest of offenders or suspected offenders or of persons unlawfully at large.’ Due to a 
successful plea of self defence resulting in a complete acquittal, necessity and 
proportionality are pre-requisites to the reasonable deployment of defensive force.
387
The complete defence of self defence is also underpinned by the common law. The 
case of R v Palmer
388
provides an overview of this position. The case held that if the 
defendant is attacked, or honestly believes
389
she is threatened by an imminent attack, 
even if this belief is unreasonable,
390
then the defendant is justified in taking as much 
defensive action as is reasonably necessary to avert the danger. For the purposes of 
the defence, reasonable force refers to force which is proportionate to the necessity for 
action in the situation.
391
Further, reasonable force is a question of fact, which is 
objectively assessed by the jury. The requirements that the force be both reasonable 
and necessary in the circumstances is further codified under the Criminal Justice and 
Immigration Act 2008.
392
The legislation serves as a partial codification of the 
complete defence of self defence and is assisted through the application of common 
law rules regarding the imminence of the threat and the concept of proportionality to 
judge the standard of reasonableness. These common law factors help to ascertain 
whether an individual has legitimately and therefore justifiably acted in self defence.
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Consequently, in order to determine a claim of self defence, it must be ascertained 
whether it was necessary for the defendant to use any force at all, and if so, whether 
the force was a reasonable response in the circumstances.
393
Self defence is only 
applicable if the defendant used no more force than was reasonable in the 
circumstances as they believed them to be.
394
The requirements are tested by 
reference to the facts as the defendant honestly believed them to be, even though this 
may have been based on an unreasonable belief.
395
Despite the prima facie 
willingness to accommodate the perceptions of the defendant, the Court of Appeal in 
R v Martin
396
held that in order to establish self defence, the apprehension of the 
necessity to use lethal force had to be reasonable. Reasonableness was to be 
determined according to a purely objective standard. 
The implications of a purely objective standard mean that reasonableness is not based 
on the subjective perceptions of the defendant. Instead, reasonableness is tested by 
reference to what the ordinary and reasonable person would have done in the same 
situation and whether the ordinary and reasonable person would have deployed the 
same amount of force as the defendant.
397
  Even if the defendant believed the force to 
be necessary and reasonable, it will not follow from an objective assessment of the 
facts that the jury finds this to be the case. This has significant implications for abused 
women who kill under a justificatory framework, particularly if they strike when their 
partner is quiescent, as it is difficult to assume from an objective standpoint that the 
abuser was threatening harm on this occasion.
398
Consequently, the ramifications of a justification based framework for abused women 
who kill are significant, as ‘justification defences identify objectively determinable 
external circumstances that render otherwise criminal acts acceptable to society.’
399
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As reflected within the partial defences to homicide, abused women’s reactions do not 
often fall within objectively defined conditions, as they leave little room for 
consideration of personal circumstances and subjective understandings of danger. 
Instead, the defence assumes that when these objective circumstances exist, then the 
individual has accomplished ‘a socially desirable objective by committing the act or, 
at least, has not harmed society.’
400
This results in self defence being based on somewhat of a balancing act, as an act will 
be justified if the societal harm avoided manages to outweigh the harm that has been 
inflicted.
401
This sends a clear societal message about the circumstances in which self 
defence is appropriate. It aims to prevent individuals from acting as both the judge 
and the executioner,
402
as they have no legal authority to pass judgment and punish 
each other.  It maintains the distinction between an action that is just, and an action 
that is justified,
403
ensuring that justification depends on adherence to rules and that 
the defence is based on objective justification in fact, not in mind,
404
as ‘beliefs alone 
cannot justify the infliction of violence on another human being.’
405
  This ensures that 
the circumstances in which a defendant responds with lethal force are limited, aiming 
to protect every individual’s right to life under Article 2 European Convention on 
Human Rights (ECHR) and leaving little room for mistake, as rigid and prescribed 
circumstances and substantive requirements limit deviation. 
4. 1.1 Necessity 
In order to be able to plead self defence, an abused woman who kills her abuser must 
be able to demonstrate that her actions were necessary in the circumstances. In order 
to demonstrate necessity, the defendant must satisfy the substantive rule of 
imminence. In R v Palmer, Lord Morris held that if the defendant was not in 
immediate danger, there was a risk that ‘the employment of force may be by way of 
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revenge or punishment or by way of paying off an old score or may be pure
aggression.’
406
Since R v Palmer, the standard has been modified to include imminent 
threats, which are not immediate.
407
However, a strict temporal standard exists, and 
the defendant must be able to show that the danger they perceived was ‘almost 
immediately’ going to be inflicted upon them.
408
Such a stance ensures that only in 
very prescribed circumstances can the defendant decide to be the judge of when to 
dispense with the requirements of the law, preserving the rule of law argument that a 
legal system will not work should its authority be optional. Due to the uncertain scope 
of what is necessary in a particular situation,
409
a rigid and prescribed application of 
this concept limits its potentially undermining effects on the legal system. 
When assessing necessity in self defence, the genuine belief in the need for force will 
be questioned. This will evaluate whether there were less costly measures available to 
the defendant,
410
which exists as an assessment of the defendant’s ‘counterfactual 
conditional response.’
411
Abused women who wait until their partner is incapacitated, 
will fall outside of the ambit of imminency. They are perceived not to be averting 
unavoidable peril, as at the precise moment that the attack took place the victim was 
of no immediate threat and was posing no ‘visible manifestation of aggression.’
412
Fletcher argues that this is important because the imminence requirement is a concept 
of political and not moral theory, as incidents of self defence signal to society that the 
incident was one in which the law could not protect the individual from, forcing the 
individual to take matters into their own hands.
413
This makes the background 
relationship between the parties of limited importance and makes assumptions about 
the state of mind of the defendant based on temporal considerations rather than 
context. It is assumed that if the defendant is objectively responding to an immediate 
attack or perilous situation then their objective intention is to deflect the attack and 
not to make the victim suffer.
414
The reasoning behind the adoption of such a stance, 
is to ensure that those who kill in cold blood have no access to the defence. However, 
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this results in many abused women who kill not being able to plead self defence, as 
their attack is not a response to an objectively perceived and sufficiently proximate 
threat.  
Therefore, under the current construction of the imminence requirement, the 
interaction between the abuser and the defendant is viewed within a very narrow 
timeframe, which significantly limits the legal and therefore social understanding of 
the reactions of abused women who kill. This results in the assessment of imminence 
becoming contextually divorced from the social reality of the incident. There must be 
no other option available to the defendant to ensure that their actions are perceived as 
necessary to avert real peril.
415
According to Fletcher, this is because ‘a pre-emptive 
strike against a feared aggressor is illegal force used too soon, and retaliation against a 
successful aggressor is illegal force used too late.’
416
In order to ascertain whether the defendant was averting real peril, the situation is 
judged through an objective lens of immediacy, and an observer must be able to 
objectively see that the attack was just about to happen. This provides a significant 
indication of the social context of the defendant’s action which is of importance to the 
law.
417
This immediate timeframe therefore severs from consideration much of the 
previous abuse and violence that has been endured, as well as neglecting to address 
any previous efforts to escape,
418
suggesting that this context is not important for the 
defence. This ignores evidence about the social, cultural and economic conditions 
surrounding domestic violence and legally reinforces social myths concerning 
domestic violence and abused women.
419
Society assumes that if a woman can simply 
walk out, then she is free. It assumes that leaving guarantees protection, and therefore, 
the only time that she can act is when the attack is imminent and the police cannot 
intervene. It is also thought that if the defendant had the opportunity to put the matter 
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into the hands of the police, then the violence is not a response to an immediate 
danger.
420
It ignores the fact that if the abused woman leaves the relationship, that 
there is always the chance that her abuser will track her down and harm her, as it is 
‘virtually impossible for women to disappear completely from their abusers.’
421
Without an appropriate consideration of the social context of the act, the law adopts 
an intentionalist perspective, holding that a person freely choses their actions and are 
responsible for what they do.
422
This maintains illusory choice, allowing defendants to 
become scapegoats and failing to prevent the perpetuation of social myths.
423
An 
analysis of this kind simply holds that the abused woman assumed the risk, and is 
therefore responsible for the consequences. It fails to even consider that her choice 
could have been constrained by the impact of domestic violence, as domination ‘often 
subverts meaningful choice.’
424
Willoughby argues that the imminence requirement further neglects to account for the 
gender based differences between the abilities of men and women towards aggressive 
conduct,
425
failing to consider why an abused woman may wait until her partner poses 
no immediate threat before attacking to alleviate the inequalities of strength and size 
between herself and her abuser. Under the current law, in order to satisfy the 
imminence requirement, the abused woman must wait until her abuser attacks her 
before being able to legitimately act in self defence. Willoughby argues that society 
gains little from this, and the risk that an abused woman will herself be killed by her 
abuser if she strikes back in the midst of the attack increases.
426
This indicates a 
gender disparity, as in an attack between two males, their respective sizes and 
strengths are more likely to be equal, ensuring that they have almost equal capabilities 
to defend themselves. In an attack between a man and a woman, this is not the case, 
placing an abused woman at a disadvantage should she choose to defend herself 
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during an attack. Should the abused woman wait until she has the advantage in 
strength or opportunity, then the law will punish her for not spontaneously responding 
with violence, for not risking her life and for striking while she can. This supports the 
criticism that this substantive legal requirement is defined with men in mind,
427
as the 
refusal of the law to take women’s reactions into account illustrates that objective 
standards are devised in male terms.
428
The imminence requirement creates a two-tier system of women who kill because of 
domestic violence. Those who risk their lives in the middle of an attack are deemed 
potentially worthy of running the full defence and receiving full exculpation for their 
actions.  Those who wait until they know that they will succeed, striking before their 
abuser strikes them, are deemed unworthy of the defence and fully accountable for 
their legally unjustifiable actions and susceptible to the mandatory life sentence.   
4. 1. 2 Proportionality 
In the event that the abused woman can satisfy the imminence requirement, she must 
then also demonstrate that her actions were a proportionate response to the danger she 
believed that she faced. The proportionality requirement ‘addresses the ratio of harms 
emanating from both the attack and the defence.’
429
The harm done in disabling the 
aggressor must not be excessive or disproportionate relative to the harm threatened 
and likely to result from the attack.
430
This adopts a human rights approach, upholding 
respect for life and the integrity of the attacker.
431
This requires balancing competing 
interests, but the only guidance that the jury has is based on their own view of what is 
reasonable. Given the limited societal understanding of the wider implications of 
domestic violence, the jury’s judgment is entirely based upon their own core values 
and ad-hoc evaluations of the situation. This disadvantages abused women who kill 
when their partner is off guard, as the concept of proportionality has ‘developed 
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through cases concerning male defendants and is generally taken to demand parity 
between attack and defence.’
432
Proportionality would be more appropriate if the adversaries were of comparable 
strength. In cases of domestic violence, the victim will often resort to weapons to 
alleviate this inequality of arms. In trying to preserve her own life she will then be 
punished for her actions.  In order to try and overcome the gender biased nature of the 
proportionality requirement, it was recognised that the defendant cannot ‘weigh to a 
nicety the exact measure of his necessary defensive action.’
433
However, if the abused 
woman strikes while her partner is off guard, and with a weapon, the force used will 
still be deemed excessive and evident of intent.
434
4.1.3 Reasonableness
The requirements of necessity and proportionality are pre-requisites to a finding that 
the defendant’s use of force was reasonable. Therefore, the defendant must also be 
able to demonstrate that their reaction was reasonable according to objective 
standards. The concept of reasonableness is judged objectively, according to the 
subjective perceptions of the defendant of the events and the danger that they believe 
they face. This requires ascertaining whether a hypothetical reasonable person would 
have perceived the same level of danger that the defendant did, and whether under the 
same circumstances, the reasonable person would have deployed the same amount of 
force.
435
Following Lord Simmonds in Bedder v Director of Public Prosecutions
436
the 
purpose of an objective standard is to allow the jury to ‘consider the act of the accused 
by reference to a certain standard or norm of conduct and with this object the 
“reasonable” or the “average” or the “normal” man is invoked.’ This enables the 
judge and jury to bestow universal characteristics upon the defendant, rather than 
considering the defendant’s own, personal characteristics.
437
  Under such a standard 
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the jury can consider age and sex, further allowing society to impose stereotypical 
assumptions upon the defendant. 
The consequences of such a standard of reasonableness are reflected in R v Martin. In 
this case, the defendant shot and killed one of the burglars who broke into his house.
During his trial, Martin argued that it was reasonable for a person suffering from 
depression to have perceived a greater threat to their safety than an ordinary person, 
not suffering from depression would have perceived.
438
  However, the Court of 
Appeal held that reasonableness was not based on the subjective perceptions of the 
defendant, holding that only physical characteristics could be taken into account when 
assessing the defendant’s perceptions of danger.
439
  
The case of R v Martin has significant implications for abused women who kill. The 
objective nature of the complete defence of self defence and its application within a 
justificatory framework can limit the relevance of evidence of the abuse sustained and 
the unequal levels of power and control within the relationship, as ‘in determining 
whether conduct is justified, the focus is on the act, not the actor.’
440
Consequently, 
concerns are raised as to whether a jury are sufficiently capable of determining the 
reasonableness of the defendant’s behaviour without full knowledge of the 
accompanying context. A jury are very capable of having an awareness of the facts of 
the incident, but an assessment of the danger that these facts give rise to is a 
completely different matter.
441
Without information as to the relevant context of the 
act, their determination of whether force was reasonable will be completely 
decontextualised and ignorant to the realities of domestic violence. Consequently, the 
jury are going to look at an idealised model of what is objectively reasonable and 
assess the defendant according to this standard. According to Crocker, ‘together with 
the incompatibility of aggressive force with stereotypical femininity, this means that 
the apparently gender neutral concept of reasonableness is actually weighted against 
the female defendant.’
442
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Consequently, the objective nature of self defence can result in the continuation of 
domestic violence myths, as the reasonableness of force and belief in the need to use 
force could be influenced by the fact that the defendant stayed in the abusive 
relationship. This should not occur, as following Julien,
443
instead of following the 
common law principle that the defendant should take any safe avenue of retreat,
444
the 
question that the jury should answer is whether the defendant’s use of force was 
reasonable. This was followed in Field,
445
which ruled that the defendant may remain 
in a particular place, not withstanding the knowledge that they may be attacked should 
they stay. This was confirmed in Redmond-Bate,
446
as the defendant will not lose their 
right to defend themselves by maintaining a lawful voluntary presence and this 
applies even if the defendant is the initial aggressor.  Despite prevailing case law, a 
failure to retreat is still a factor to be taken into account by the jury when determining 
the reasonableness of the defendant’s conduct.
447
Consequently, the defendant’s continuation of the relationship can be put on trial,
448
as the jury may feel that the force was not reasonable because the defendant had the 
choice to leave, but chose to stay, making her reaction appear objectively 
unreasonable. This moves the focus of the trial further away from the abuse, and onto 
the reasons why the defendant stayed in the relationship. This can make her conduct 
appear objectively unreasonable without a proper consideration or understanding of 
her circumstances and the control tactics used by abusers to reinforce dependency and 
keep the abused woman trapped. 
Virgo argues that as a fair concession to human frailty that the defendant’s conduct 
should be assessed according to their circumstances as the existence of certain 
conditions can reduce the defendant’s responsibility for his or her conduct.
449
This is 
supported by Schneider who claims that the courts should be allowing the question of 
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reasonableness to be assessed in light of all the circumstances relevant to the 
defendant to ensure gender equality.
450
Without these considerations, the courts are 
perpetuating a ‘wilful blindness to the realities of private violence,’
451
ignoring that 
domestic violence has implications on a person’s behaviour, their reactions and their 
motivations. However, consideration of the defendant’s circumstances as advocated 
by Virgo and Schneider would move the legal focus away from the act, and towards 
the actor, negating the moral blameworthiness of the actor for causing the harm.
452
The adoption of such an approach would be inconsistent with a justificatory 
framework, as the legal and societal focus rests firmly on the objectively justifiable 
nature of the act, not the justifiable nature of the act based on the defendant’s 
circumstances. Justifiable conduct is behaviour which is socially viewed as correct or 
tolerable,
453
and due to the full exculpatory nature of the defence, this societal 
message cannot be altered by an evaluation of the defendant’s circumstances alone.  
Therefore, despite the prima facie gender neutral application of the requirements of 
self defence, and the willingness to consider the defendant’s subjective perceptions, 
the objective and justificatory nature of the complete defence of self defence excludes 
the reactions of abused women who kill. Due to the way in which abused women 
commit intimate partner homicide, and how their reactions are often shaped by the 
abuse sustained and the fear of future violence, abused women are often unable to fall 
within the justificatory requirements of necessity, proportionality and reasonableness. 
Instead, the abused woman must wait until she is in danger of becoming a homicide 
victim herself, before being able to deploy objectively justifiable lethal force to 
preserve her own life. 
The complete defence of self defence excludes the reaction of abused women who kill 
as reasonable, upholding dominant legal and social standards which privilege 
masculine reactions. Due to the societal significance of the complete defence, the 
legal system cannot be seen to deviate from this standard. This exposes a 
predisposition to, and a deeply imbedded understanding of what constitutes 
                                                          
450
E. Schneider, 'Equal Rights to Trial for Women: Sex Bias in the Law of Self-defence' (n175) 630.
451
S. Edwards,   'Battered Women who Kill' (1990) NLJ 1380, 1385
452
J. Dressler, ‘Justifications and Excuses: A Brief Review of the Concepts and the Literature.’ (1987) 
33 Wayne Law Review 1155, 1163
93
reasonable behaviour equating to masculine reaction, which is reinforced by societal 
conceptions of when it is reasonable to take the life of another. The current defence of 
self defence constitutes an abstract framework of judgment, failing to incorporate the 
experiences of those whose interests are not at the centre of the law. Therefore, in 
order to try and demonstrate the reasonable nature of abused women’s reactions, it is 
necessary to consider alternative theoretical possibilities which can encourage the 
reactions of abused women who kill to be re-conceptualised in the context of self 
defence. 
4.2 Reforming Self Defence: Changing the Framework from One of Justification 
to One of Excuse.
One theoretical possibility would be to change the complete defence of self defence 
from a framework based on justification, to a framework underpinned by the 
principles of excuse. Such an approach would ensure that subjectivity played a much 
larger role.
454
Instead of having to fit within rigid objective categories developed to fit 
patterns of male behaviour, an abused woman’s experiences could be considered in 
determining whether her actions were excusable. This could not occur under a 
framework based on justification, as it is inconsistent with the theory that a justified 
act is either beneficial or not harmful to society.
455
A theory of excuse would enable the defendant’s choice to be assessed in light of her 
subjective perceptions and circumstances, ensuring that domestic violence and the 
effects of abuse are exposed and considered. This would enable the jury to make a 
decision based on an assessment of the defendant’s circumstances and life 
experiences, establishing whether or not she had a fair opportunity to choose 
meaningfully whether or not to inflict the harm.
456
This would assist the jury in 
understanding the social reality of domestic violence, as they would be able to 
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recognise that in some cases, threats from the deceased can create coercive pressure 
that can limit freedom of choice, making excuse analysis appropriate.
457
However, it is important to note that there is not a consensus regarding the proper 
components of a theory of excuse. This could result in attempts to limit the theory 
according to prevailing social standards, so that it would only apply if the individual 
suffered from a disability which would cause an excusing condition.
458
Fletcher 
claims that a ‘limited temporal distortion of the actor’s character’ is required to satisfy 
the requirements of an excuse based framework.
459
Although abused women who kill 
could argue that they were suffering from BWS, this does little to portray the reaction 
as a reasonable response to domestic violence.
Evidence of such a subjective approach can be witnessed in Canadian jurisprudence. 
The case of R v Lavallee
460
implemented a psychologically individualised standard of 
reasonableness. This enabled evidence of BWS to be admissible to explain to the 
judge and jury why an abused woman may have reacted in the way that she did. BWS 
was used to explain how abused women become attuned to the moods of their 
abusers, and may respond pre-emptively to their abuser’s signals.
461
However, the 
admissibility of evidence of BWS in English and Welsh law in this context would 
offer limited legal gains for women. Although prima facie BWS can address the 
circumstances of abused women who kill, it carries with it an insinuation that the 
legal system must compensate for the abused women’s physical and mental weakness, 
without realising that often her behaviour is motivated by the need to preserve her 
own life rather than because she is weak or overemotional.
462
Therefore, any reliance upon a disability or temporal distortion within an excusatory 
framework would enable the law to continue to be shaped by masculine social 
context, as the law would still be able to adopt the masculine point of view through 
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the recognition of abused women’s reactions as abnormal.
463
Battered women would 
continue to be constructed through a psychological stereotype which distorts their 
wider experiences so that they could fall within a framework which requires women 
to justify their reactionary differences through a recourse to a syndrome associated 
with a mental abnormality.
464
This would detract from any legal consideration of their 
circumstances and the failure of prima facie gender neutral legal requirements to 
recognise abused women’s social realities.  This would ensure that stereotypes about 
abused women who kill would continue to be recognised as empirically valid,
465
limiting the need to consider alternative reactions as reasonable reactions.
466
In order to sufficiently reflect the subjective perceptions of the defendant, expert 
testimony would be required to demonstrate the reasonable nature of the abused 
woman’s reaction. The testimony could be used to explain why the abused women 
had to act in self defence in light of her circumstances. However, due to the complete 
acquittal that accompanies a successful claim of self defence, enabling the subjective 
perceptions of the defendant to carry such significant legal weight would be met with 
resistance. In State v Janes,
467
Chief Justice Durham J, claimed that allowing a 
subjective test to determine reasonableness would force the jury to evaluate the 
defendant’s actions in a ‘vacuum of the defendant’s own subjective perceptions.’ 
Provided the defendant believed that they were acting in self defence, there would be 
a finding of self defence, and therefore a full acquittal. 
Consequently, a subjective standard within a theory of excuse could create the 
perception that the law was granting a licence for abused women to kill their 
abusers.
468
If one women is excused for her conduct, it is assumed that anyone who 
does the same act under the same external circumstances must be excused too.
469
This 
could inhibit societal understanding of the social reality of domestic violence, as 
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instead of furthering an understanding as to the effects of prolonged domestic abuse 
on a woman’s physical and mental wellbeing, domestic violence could be perceived 
as a tactic to ensure an individual’s conduct is excused. Therefore, the possibility of 
developing an excusatory framework could in fact encourage the adoption of a 
reactive position.
470
The incorporation of the defendant’s subjective perceptions into a 
complete homicide defence could be seen as threatening the legal credibility of a 
defence with such social and legal significance.
471
  This would make a woman-
centred approach to self defence look more damaging than the justificatory 
framework already in place and could in fact encourage the retention of fixed and 
unequal gender identities.
472
4.3 Reforming Self Defence: Towards a Theory of Rational Excuse
Therefore, it is necessary to move away from the damaging effects of choosing 
between justificatory and excuse based frameworks. An alternative reform possibility 
is presented by Claire Finkelstein, who argues that in order to overcome the problems 
inherent in both justification and excuse frameworks, the best approach for abused 
women who kill would be to focus on a theory of rational excuse. This would be a 
framework based on both justification and excuse to ensure that ‘near self defence’ 
claims would fall within the self defence framework.
473
This would include cases in 
which the defendant is motivated by a desire to protect herself against her aggressor, 
but her legal claim of self defence fails because she is unable to satisfy one or more of 
the objective justification requirements.
474
Consequently, a theory of rational excuse 
would share a characteristic with justification, as it would apply to defensive 
reactions, but the excuse element of the theory would provide the ‘reason for the 
violation of the prohibitory norm.’
475
This would not endorse the defendant’s 
behaviour, but would recognise that it is important to make legal judgments based on 
the defendant’s reasons for acting. This would ensure that the defendant’s motivations 
became the focus, and would analyse the reasons why she may have acted as she did. 
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The adoption of a framework based on rational excuse would be in contrast to the 
reliance on a mental abnormality as Finkelstein argues that the theory applies to ‘sane, 
responsible agents in virtue of a judgment made about the content of their reasons for 
acting.’
476
This adopts a more subjective approach, as the conduct can be excused if 
the actor has good reasons for acting, requiring a reasonably held belief that the 
conduct is permissible.
477
However, the adherence to such an approach still risks interpretation in accordance 
with masculine social context despite the adoption of a more subjective approach. The 
requirement that the actor had good reasons for acting would be assessed according to 
societal constructions of reasonable behaviour in the context of the deployment of 
lethal force. It does not necessarily translate that the abused woman’s reasonably held 
belief in the permissible nature of the conduct will adhere to society’s understanding 
of such a situation despite the adoption of a more subjective approach. The abused 
woman’s reaction could still fall prey to the pitfalls of the reasonableness test under a 
justificatory framework of self defence, allowing social stereotypes which focus more 
on her reasons for not leaving an abusive relationship to become more important than 
the abused woman’s particular narrative and social context.  
Moreover, although the adoption of a framework based on rational excuse appears to 
be ideologically desirable by amalgamating excuse based frameworks and 
justificatory frameworks to benefit abused women who kill, it fails to establish why 
the defendant is exonerated for her crime. Rational excuse theory assesses the reasons 
behind the defendant’s actions, but does not explain whether the defendant is not 
charged because her act was not wrongful in the circumstances, or because she lacked 
responsibility for the wrongful act because of her circumstances.
478
  Although neither 
frameworks of justification or excuse best serve the interests of abused women in 
isolation, it is clear in a framework of justification that the defendant is not charged 
because their act was not wrongful, and in a framework of excuse, the defendant is 
not charged because they were not responsible for their act.
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Pendleton claims that the failure to explain whether the defendant’s act is not 
wrongful, or the actor is excused means that the rational excuse theory involves an 
incoherent conception of the link between responsibility and punishment,
479
which 
would be an absolutely crucial feature in a new self defence framework. The law’s 
determination of legal responsibility involves drawing a line on a continuous scale of 
degrees of criminal responsibility, above that line, one is responsible, below that line, 
one is not responsible.
480
Without addressing responsibility, it is unclear whether the 
abused woman is responsible for her conduct under this model, and if so, what 
conception of responsibility this is based on.
481
This misses the opportunity to look at 
domestic violence through the lens of responsibility, to establish the parameters of 
when the defendant is responsible for her conduct, and under what circumstances 
domestic violence can reduce this responsibility. Responsibility also has a link to 
intention, as an act is normally an expression of will.
482
This fails to consider the 
effect of domestic violence on the defendant’s ability to make a choice. Although it 
addresses the reasons why the defendant acted as they did, without addressing 
responsibility, the defendant’s choice cannot be sufficiently scrutinised as the two are 
linked. A coerced person’s choice can be made from a set of circumstances so 
constricted, that they can no longer be regarded as an expression of will and this 
mitigates legal responsibility.
483
   
Consequently, a theory of rational excuse indirectly ascribes moral responsibility to 
an act, without clearly defining its parameters.  As a result of this, rational excuse 
theory attempts to squeeze women within a self defence framework which seeks to 
overcome the problems of a single framework based on justification, and a single 
framework based on excuse without sufficiently outlining why the defendant would 
be fully exculpated for their conduct. Although encouraging the full defence of self 
defence to consider the defendant’s actual context and the motivation behind their 
actions would be advantageous for abused women who kill, it is unclear how the 
theory of rational excuse could be used to further challenge prevailing constructions 
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of masculinity. This is because it is unclear how a theory of rational excuse would be 
capable of countering social stereotypes about abused women who kill without being 
able to present a sufficient explanation as to why the defendant’s conduct would fall 
within the reformulated framework.  
Therefore, although the complete defence of self defence is capable of theoretical 
reform, the main theoretical alternatives of a framework based on excuse, and a 
framework based on rational excuse, do not present viable alternatives for abused 
women who kill. The theoretical frameworks discussed demonstrate that the complete 
defence of self defence can be reconstructed according to alternative theoretical 
frameworks, but that without significant social changes, the theoretical frameworks 
are constructed according to masculine social contexts and values. The application of 
a woman-centred analytical framework to the legal construction of the reactions of
abused women who kill in self defence, reveals the extent to which women are denied 
the opportunity to present the circumstances of their behaviour under the traditional 
self defence framework.
484
The traditional framework is based on male 
perspectives,
485
and by simply changing the framework from one based on 
justification, to one based on excuse, little is revealed about the relationships of 
domination which keep abused women trapped and their reactions legally and socially 
subordinate to their male counterparts. Any change to the defence must be able to 
account for and deconstruct the patriarchal nature of the homicide defence. In order to 
demonstrate the reasonable nature of abused women’s reactions to abuse under the 
complete defence of self defence, abused women must fall within the ambit of a 
justificatory framework. Consequently, it is necessary to move beyond theoretical 
interpretations of self defence and towards the possibilities that may exist under a 
justificatory framework. 
4.4 Self Defence and Unavoidable Harm
In order to present abused women’s reactions to abuse as reasonable under the 
complete defence of self defence, it is necessary to demonstrate that the current 
defensive framework and feminist principles can actually conflate. This can be 
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achieved by demonstrating that both the current construction of self defence and 
feminist constructions of self defence are both based on the meta concept of 
unavoidable harm.
486
They both seek to evaluate the circumstances in which an 
individual can legitimately respond to unavoidable harm with lethal force. However, 
the current construction detracts from this meta concept by constructing situations of 
unavoidable harm in accordance with objective, masculine criteria, which limits any 
further social or legal understanding of abused women. As such, the current 
perspective of gender bias, seeks to limit a consideration and acknowledgement of 
abused women’s experiences and their reactions to abuse and excludes this 
knowledge from the legal framework. The concept of unavoidable harm needs to be 
able to incorporate the social realities of abused women who kill in order to attempt to 
eliminate the gender bias. 
Therefore, law and society are required to understand a more complex version of 
social reality, which recognises that choice is constrained by social experience.
487
All 
action is situated in a particular context and ‘not all of the agent’s making and much 
of which may be beyond her or his control’.
488
This is important, as ‘the traditional 
view of self defence must not be allowed to prevent the application of its principles to 
appropriate cases where battered women kill.’
489
Consequently, redevelopment efforts 
should be aimed at ensuring that abused women who kill have access ‘to generally 
applicable fair trial determinants,’
490
which would require recognising and removing 
issues of gender inequality apparent within the substantive requirements of the 
defence and considering the application under an equal rights framework.
491
This 
requires engaging with notions of equality, moving beyond a standard of formal 
equality which requires sameness with men, and recognising abused women’s 
experiences as the product of legal and social acceptance of relationships of 
domination. In order to overcome this, the requirements of self defence should be 
reinterpreted in accordance with the meta narrative of unavoidable harm.
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4.4.1 Imminence
One way of ensuring that abused women have equal access to the defence would be to 
reframe the substantive requirement of imminence. Ripstein argues that this is not 
beyond the legal construction of imminence as it stands under the current defence of 
self defence, as the defence is designed to ensure that no one must endure an 
unreasonable risk of unavoidable harm.
492
As a result, Ripstein argues that imminence 
is an instantiation of the concept of ‘unavoidable harm’ in self defence law, and 
therefore fits within the objective of the defence.
493
Regarding imminence as an 
instantiation of unavoidability would move the focus of the enquiry away from 
considerations of temporal proximity and towards the defendant’s circumstances, 
establishing whether the abused woman was in unavoidable danger. This would 
amalgamate existing self defence theory with feminist legal theory, amending the law 
so that the defendant can use lethal force on the victim if it is ‘necessary to avoid’
harm.
494
This would remove any kind of temporal concept, and would express the underlying 
concept of inevitability or unavoidability.
495
This would ask whether the defendant 
‘had any choice but to act as she did in order to avoid grave risk of death or serious 
harm’
496
at the hands of the victim. This would not threaten the purpose of the 
defence, given that its ultimate goal is to permit necessary acts of self defence,
497
but 
would ensure that abused women who kill would be able to fall within its ambit. This 
would help to recognise that in cases of female perpetrated intimate partner homicide 
that the defendant is trying to protect themselves from harm and that this is the case 
even when the defendant does not strike immediately.   
However, conceptions of choice would be crucial under this approach, as the defence 
would need to recognise that notions of free will must be ‘tempered by recognition of 
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social circumstance.’
498
Furthermore, the concept of inevitability would have to be 
regulated, otherwise any defendant trying to rely on the defence could just claim that 
the risk of harm was inevitable. A degree of probability would be necessary, requiring 
the belief that when the defendant killed the victim, it was because the victim 
intended to inflict serious harm upon the defendant, and this belief must be 
reasonable.
499
In cases concerning abused women who kill, this could be supported by 
expert testimony, as this could provide evidence that it was reasonable for the abused 
women to believe that there was no alternative.
500
This could also enable a greater 
investigation into the epistemic situation between the defendant and the victim,
501
as 
the defendant’s previous efforts to escape, or involve the police could be considered. 
It could also enable the burdens placed upon abused women who kill to be evaluated. 
This would enable consideration of the safety of her children or financial stability, as 
it would be unreasonable for her to simply leave if these burdens had to be 
assumed.
502
An alternative solution would be to relax the requirement of imminence. This would 
ensure that the legal rule would be general enough to apply to potentially anyone.
503
  
This could be achieved by requiring the court to specifically direct the jury to consider 
the history of violence between the defendant and the victim.
504
This would enable the 
situation to be looked at from an entirely new perspective, and would ensure that the 
legal definitions used to determine self defence do not exclude battered women from 
consideration. The recognition of the defendant’s circumstances is absolutely 
essential, as they serve as critical junctures ‘for the intersection of law and social 
attitudes.’
505
This is because issues of domestic violence and the exculpation or 
perceived special treatment of abused women within the criminal justice system 
triggers anxiety about the possibility of ‘abuse excuse’.
506
This demonstrates the need 
to understand domestic violence, as it has to stop being perceived as a form of ‘special 
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pleading’
507
and be recognised as a factor that needs to be considered to ensure that 
women have equal access to self defence.
508
This would not excuse all abused women 
who kill, but a relaxation of the imminence requirement could help the jury to 
recognise that just because an abused woman does not retaliate in the middle of an 
attack, it does not mean that she is not in danger from her abuser. 
The adoption of such an approach would go some way towards remedying the gender 
inequality within self defence, as society would be forced to recognise that the family 
home is not a place of safety and comfort for all women. It would acknowledge that in 
certain circumstances, a patriarchal family legitimises male domination over women, 
ensuring that the violence occurs in a sexist context.
509
By relaxing the imminence 
requirement, society would recognise that by preserving the ideology of family life 
and making it difficult for abused women to leave the family home, they are not 
recognising the social context of domestic violence and its effects.
510
This would 
force an examination of the social structures and attitudes that keep women trapped in 
these situations.
511
It would also help to show that in these cases, many abused women 
are justified when fighting for their lives within the most intimate of relationships.  
This would not give abused women preferential treatment, but would go some way to 
addressing the existing prejudice.
512
4.4.2 Reasonableness
The meta concept of unavoidable harm could be further reinforced through reforming 
the concept of reasonableness and its requirements. The requirements that the force be 
both necessary and proportionate should be evaluated in light of all of the defendant’s 
circumstances. This would require recognising that in the circumstances of abused 
women who kill, it is reasonable to feel the need to use a weapon.
513
This would 
ensure gender equality as women would not be expected to conform to masculine
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standards, and would not be condemned for seeking recourse to weapons or for not 
leaving the abusive relationship. Instead, the approach adopted in Wanrow, could be 
followed to demonstrate that this stance already exists within a comparative 
framework.  In this case, the Washington Supreme Court recognised that any 
instruction limiting self defence to the equal use of force was denying female 
defendants their right to equal protection under the law.
514
This is necessary to ensure 
equal protection in the context of underlying inequalities,
515
as without a full 
understanding of the circumstances and accompanying social context, abused women 
would continue to be expected to conform to male standards of behaviour. 
In order to achieve this, the objective construction of reasonableness would not need 
to be significantly altered. Instead, it could be demonstrated through expert testimony 
that violent relationships change the circumstances in which self defence would be 
needed,
516
thus allowing the defendant’s personal history and the implications of 
battering upon an individual’s reaction to be considered.
4.4.3 Expert Testimony
The meta concept of unavoidable harm could be sufficiently expressed through expert 
testimony concerning the reactions of abused women who kill their abusers, which 
could adopt a more subjective standard in determining the reasonable nature of the 
defendant’s response.
517
Expert testimony about the sociology and psychology of 
battering relationships could help judges and jurors to appreciate and understand the
specifics of a particular woman’s narrative.
518
This is supported by Schneider, who 
argues that the psychological stereotypes of abused women who kill have to be 
minimised and placed in the broad context of a patriarchal society which tolerates and 
facilitates violence against women.
519
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Consequently, general evidence concerning the ‘empirically validated behaviours or 
reactions of victims and witnesses’
520
would need to become admissible, ensuring that 
the courts acknowledged the psychological reactions that occur during abusive 
relationships and why some victims find it so difficult to leave these relationships.
521
This could provide the jury with a useful tool in which to understand the defendant’s 
situation, and whether her apprehension of danger was reasonable,
522
as it would 
recognise that perception of danger is affected by socialisation.
523
This would also 
help to eliminate gender bias, as it would show that in a particular set of 
circumstances, a woman’s response can be reasonable even though it would be 
different to a man’s response in the same set of circumstances.
524
This explains why, 
in some situations, a woman could perceive herself to be in danger from an 
objectively unthreatening man.
525
It could help to contextualise and normalise the 
behaviour of a battered woman,
526
mitigating the harsh objective approach to 
reasonableness. It therefore reflects a determinist approach, as it adopts the principle 
that human behaviour can be understood as a product of prior causal events.
527
The admissibility of human behaviour evidence in the context of psychiatric and 
psychological evidence conforms to the admissibility requirements of R v Turner, 
which allows the admissibility of expert evidence provided that it relates to a 
recognised mental illness. Liberally interpreted, the construction under R v Turner
could include the experiences of abused women who kill through the admission of 
social scientific evidence pertaining to a wider range of behaviours.
528
However, the 
relaxation of any of the requirements of self defence to incorporate the social realities 
of an excluded group can raise ‘moral panic.’
529
This relates to the social belief that 
the requirements of a complete defence of self defence were being relaxed to 
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guarantee the acquittal of a particular group.
530
The introduction of a more subjective 
standard could be seen to threaten the law’s claim to objectivity,
531
undermining the 
strict objective and justificatory standards that society demands of self defence. 
Therefore, even with the relaxation of the Turner standard, the testimony would be 
applied in the context of a masculine society which perceives any concession to the 
subjective perceptions of the defendant as undermining the legitimacy of the complete 
defence. However, without a relaxed interpretation of R v Turner and the admissibility 
of behavioural testimony, any admissible testimony would be on BWS, therefore 
developing the reasonable battered woman.
532
This would not be a sufficiently 
woman-centred strategy, as due to BWS and notions of learned helplessness, evidence 
of the abused woman trying to protect herself in a defensive context could be taken to 
mean that she is not a real battered woman.
533
Therefore, despite the woman-centred 
potential in adopting a more subjective approach to the admissibility of expert 
testimony concerning abused women who kill in conjunction with the meta narrative 
of unavoidable harm, society’s adherence to the justificatory framework currently 
prevents both the admissibility and effectiveness of such testimony. 
The development of an alternative framework of self defence based upon the meta 
narrative of unavoidable harm demonstrates that the underlying rationale of the 
complete defence of self defence, that of being able to respond justifiably and with 
lethal force in the face of unavoidable harm, signifies that the current construction of 
self defence and the theoretical principles of a woman-centred epistemology of the 
role of reaction conflate. In theory, this meta narrative can be used to reform and 
expand conceptions of imminence, reasonableness, necessity and proportionality and 
facilitate the introduction of expert testimony which can present abused women who 
kill as reasonable. 
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However, strategic possibilities of the meta narrative of unavoidable harm are limited 
by the need to use expert testimony to explain the reactions of abused women who kill 
as reasonable in order to overcome societal misconceptions of appropriate reaction 
and behaviour which are endorsed by the current construction of self defence. 
Although a subjective approach to the requirement of reasonableness is theoretically 
possible under the meta narrative, strategic possibilities are limited by the application 
of the complete defence in a masculine society. 
4.5 Conclusion
This chapter has applied a woman-centred analytical framework of the legal 
construction of abused women who kill to the complete defence of self defence in 
order to analyse how the current construction of the complete defence excludes the 
recognition of abused women’s reactions to abuse as reasonable. Consequently, 
abused women are excluded from the ambit of the defence due to the reliance upon 
and adherence to objectively defined justificatory criteria. These criteria cannot 
accurately reflect the reactions of abused women who kill, as the application of
objective standards under this framework exist in abstraction from abused women’s 
social contexts. The focus of the complete defence rests firmly upon whether the 
defendant’s act can be justified, rather than the underlying motivations for the 
commission of the homicide. The adoption of such a stance ensures that only the most 
socially determined deserving defendants fall within the ambit of the defence, 
ensuring that full exculpation is reserved for those who can adhere to the strict 
justificatory criteria. 
This chapter sought to consider the woman-centred possibilities posed by the 
complete defence of self defence, in order to determine whether reform of self 
defence could develop a sufficiently woman-centred homicide defence. The 
theoretical advantages of altering the defensive framework from one based upon 
justification, to one based on excuse were firstly considered. However, due to the 
fluid nature of an excusatory framework, and the absence of rigid and prescribed 
criteria, the theoretical advantages of an excusatory framework were thwarted by 
perceptions that objective and justificatory requirements would be giving way to the 
subjective perceptions of the defendant. This would enable a wider range of 
108
behaviours and circumstances to fall within the ambit of the complete defence purely 
based on the defendant’s interpretation of harm, creating the perception that socially 
undeserving defendants were being given a ‘license to kill’.
Consequently, the possibilities within the current complete defence were considered. 
In order to attempt to incorporate the reactions of abused women who kill within the 
complete defence of self defence, it was necessary to work within the existing 
parameters of the defence using the meta narrative of unavoidable harm. Under this 
construction, the legal criteria underpinning the complete defence could legitimately 
be reformed to incorporate abused women who kill, as their cases can be perceived as 
socially deserving as they adhere to the underlying rationale of the complete defence. 
However, further strategic possibilities were limited by expert testimony. In the 
context of the complete defence of self defence there exists a conflict between a 
woman-centred position, which recognises the necessity of expert testimony in order 
dispel social myths and inaccuracies about abused women who kill, and a complete 
defence which upholds societal conceptions that an individual can only take the life of 
another in limited circumstances. The full acquittal which accompanies the defence 
suggests that complete exculpation should only be allowed in the most limited of 
cases, and in situations where at the precise moment the defendant deployed defensive 
force, the state was unable to protect them. Therefore, even with the admissibility of 
expert testimony there is no guarantee that the jury are going to embrace the claims of 
the defendant as legitimate acts of self defence worthy of an acquittal.
In order to incorporate the reactions of abused women who kill into the defences to 
homicide, alternative homicide defences must be considered. The way in which both 
the current complete and partial defences to homicide are constructed exclude the 
reactions of abused women who kill from being legally recognised as reasonable. As 
such, attitudes concerning abused women who kill are deep rooted and have 
crystallised to the detriment of abused women who kill. It is necessary to move 
beyond the current and gender disparate defences to homicide and towards alternative 
modes of conceptualisation, which can tackle both social and legal attitudes to abused 
women who kill in order to ensure substantive change. 
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Chapter Four
Abused Women Who Kill and a Partial Defence of Excessive Force in Self 
Defence
5. Introduction
After applying a woman-centred analytical framework and exploring the strategic 
possibilities apparent in the use of expert testimony, to both the complete and partial 
defences to homicide, the inability of the current legal framework to incorporate 
abused women’s experiences of abuse and subsequent reactions to it has been 
exposed. The defences pivot upon masculine constructions of what constitutes an 
acceptable reaction to a potentially life threatening situation, whilst the legal 
preoccupation with objectivity ensures that abused women’s experiences have little 
significance within the decision making process. This makes the possibility of 
significantly altering the existing defences, particularly self defence, to incorporate 
the reactions of abused women who kill somewhat unattainable, as the defence 
reflects and upholds the standards of behaviour and accountability that society 
demands. Any deviance from this standard encourages claims of special treatment 
which the legal system cannot be seen to endorse. 
Consequently, the social myth that abused women are free to leave the relationship at 
any time enables the legal system to hold that abused women’s reactions to abuse are 
unreasonable and disproportionate due to the many perceived alternatives and choices 
available to her. Within the current legal framework, the abused woman cannot be 
understood as reasonable and is forced to justify her behaviour within the limiting and 
damaging confines of psychological syndromes as opposed to being able to argue that 
her reaction was a reasonable response to severe violence. Even with the assistance of 
expert testimony concerning the reactions of abused women who kill, the 
psychological focus of the testimony ensures that abused women and their reactions 
continue to be interpreted within the context of her perceived mental dysfunction.
534
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This testimony exists as evidence of an excuse,
535
rather than evidence of the justified 
nature of the abused woman’s reaction. 
In an attempt to legally and socially detach the reactions of abused women who kill 
from stereotypical psychological syndromes and context limiting standards of 
objectivity, whilst still recognising that the abused woman’s reaction was a defensive 
response to ongoing abuse, this chapter will apply the woman-centred analytical 
framework to the partial defence of excessive force in self defence. The partial
defence seeks to take the experiences of abused women in the context of the law as a 
starting point and develop a defence that is both woman-centred and socially 
acceptable. 
A partial defence of excessive force in self defence would find that a defendant was 
guilty of manslaughter, not murder, if the use of defensive force exceeded that which 
was necessary and reasonable in the circumstances.  The partial defence is a strategic 
means of overcoming the existing societal and legal reluctance to relax any of the 
requirements of a full self defence claim, maintaining the theoretical standpoint that a 
full claim of self defence and subsequent acquittal can only be available to a 
defendant has who responded with lethal force at the precise moment that the state
was unable to protect them. It also recognises that when abused women kill they often 
strike with what society perceives as objectively excessive force, failing to meet the 
requirements of necessity, reasonableness and proportionality as set out in self 
defence. As a result, their claim of self defence fails, and the partial defences of loss 
of control and diminished responsibility are unable to reflect the fact that their 
reaction was in response to the abuse sustained and to account for the defensive 
motivation surrounding the homicide. 
A partial defence of excessive force in self defence could recognise the impact of 
domestic violence, whilst at the same time preserving the legal system’s interests. The 
partial defence would reduce a charge of murder to manslaughter, even with the 
existence of a clear intention to kill, as it recognises human reaction in much the same 
way as the partial defence of loss of control, by recognising reduced moral 
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culpability.
536
The partial defence should be considered to be a partial excuse as it 
reinforces the societal feeling that premature resort to self help is blameworthy and 
reflects the amount of determinism that society will allow the legal system to 
tolerate.
537
It would limit determinist human behaviour,
538
which the criminal law is 
reluctant to accommodate in self defence doctrine,
539
but would recognise that in 
situations where an abused woman kills her abuser that the nature of the homicide is 
ultimately defensive, as her actions were the consequence of the abuse sustained. 
Moreover, the partial defence would be advantageous for the jury, as they would not 
be forced to pick between two extremes. Instead of the defendant’s conduct either 
falling within the ambit of self defence, or being excluded, the jury could find 
excessive force in self defence. This would operate as somewhat of a half way house. 
The partial defence would more appropriately recognise that the defendant’s 
circumstances do not always fall within the two extremes of full responsibility and 
non responsibility, and that an all or nothing approach to self defence is insufficient to 
consider the different levels of culpability and reflect the defendant’s circumstances 
and the influence of external factors.
540
The partial defence could serve as a socially 
acceptable case for accommodating partial determinism,
541
as the jury can be 
compassionate as long as the interests of the legal system are being encouraged.
542
The partial defence also avoids a complete acquittal where the jury feels that there is 
some culpability and that this requires punishment.
543
This chapter will argue that a partial defence of excessive force in self defence is the 
most sufficient woman-centred approach to the defences to homicide. This is because 
it occupies the middle ground between the partial defences of loss of control and the 
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complete defence of self defence. It further recognises that both legal and social 
attitudes towards abused women who kill are gendered and that this gender 
discrimination is deep rooted. Any attempts to incorporate abused women who kill 
into these existing frameworks are problematic, as the defences were not designed to 
incorporate their experiences. Any attempts to widen or reform the defining legal 
concepts and requirements are met with resistance, as they appear to be changing the 
fundamental legal requirements to accommodate what are perceived as less deserving 
cases. A partial defence of excessive force in self defence would serve as a 
compromise. It would build upon the apparent legislative intentions to incorporate 
abused women’s reactions into the defences to homicide, recognising instead that the 
reactions displayed are motivated by self preservation rather than existing as 
unconvincing manifestations of a loss of self control. 
By adopting a pragmatic stance, the partial defence would use the law to characterise 
abused women who kill in a new way, using the role of the law to ensure that this 
characterisation filtered into popular understanding and would counteract the 
assumptions and stereotypes which already exist.
544
The partial defence would be 
used as somewhat of a stepping stone, serving as means of education and aiming to 
change societal perceptions of abused women who kill in order to incorporate the 
defensive nature of their reactions into a partial defence to homicide. 
Consequently, the partial defence of excessive force in self defence will firstly be 
critically evaluated according to its application in the jurisdictions of Australia and 
Canada and its potential application in England and Wales. It will be argued that 
although the defence can be successfully applied to cases in which abused women 
kill, the legal standard would still have to be further reformed to be sufficiently 
woman–centred, otherwise the partial defence could conclude that the defendant was 
not acting objectively and reasonably.  This will be followed by a consideration of the 
requirements of imminence and necessity, which will draw upon comparative 
defensive principles to demonstrate that in the context of abused women who kill, the 
traditional concept of imminence must give way to necessity. Therefore, necessity 
should be legally prioritised over imminence, to ensure that the partial defence can 
                                                          
544
K. Abrams, ‘The Constitution of Women’ (1997) 48 Alabama Law Review 861, 862 
113
sufficiently incorporate the reactions of abused women who kill as reasonable. Due to 
the partially defensive nature of excessive force in self defence, these concepts are 
capable of being modified to incorporate the contextual realities of abused women 
who kill as their modification would not result in an acquittal. Societal and legal 
conceptions of appropriate behaviour are still ultimately being upheld, but the 
modified concepts can serve as a means of altering societal and legal perceptions of 
abused woman who kill, demonstrating that the reaction was a legitimate and 
reasonable response to a serious threat to her safety. 
After an evaluation of the application of the partial defence of excessive force in self 
defence, this chapter will argue that in order to ensure that abused women fall within 
constructions of both necessity and reasonableness, that the use of expert testimony 
concerning domestic violence is essential. This will enable the jury to understand the 
situation from the perspective of the abused woman, ensuring that she is not 
constructed and labelled according to her pathology, but that her actions are 
understood from her own context. This would have the effect of changing the societal 
perceptions of abused women who kill, as their actions would be exposed as a 
reasonable response to abuse in the absence of viable alternatives and would help to 
encourage further legal reform.  
5.1 Australia and the Partial Defence of Excessive Force in Self Defence 
Excessive force in self defence is widely regarded as being the creation of the 
Australian common law,
545
and existed as a partial defence to homicide until 1987 
when it was abolished in Zecevic v Dpp.
546
The defence was abolished because trial 
judges were having great difficulty in expressing the requirements in a manner which 
were readily understandable to the jury.
547
  Instead of reformulating the partial 
defence, it was abolished on the grounds that the doctrine was too uncertain, and 
lacked the support of case authority.
548
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The partial defence had previously been applied according to the requirements set out 
in the case of R v Howe.
549
The Court found that a person who is subjected to a 
violent and felonious attack and who, in endeavouring, by way of self defence, to 
prevent the consummation of that attack by force exercises more force than a 
reasonable man would consider necessary in the circumstances, but no more than 
what he honestly believed to be necessary in the circumstances, is guilty of 
manslaughter and not of murder.
550
The partial defence recognised that a defendant 
can honestly believe that the force that they deploy at the time is reasonable, even 
though it is not objectively reasonable.
551
  This makes the concept of reasonableness 
the focal point of the defence, as provided the defendant had an honest belief in the 
reasonableness of their action, then the partial defence could apply. 
The position in Howe was subsequently approved in R v Viro,
552
and the stages of 
inquiry were further elaborated. In order to be able to rely on the doctrine of excessive 
force in self defence, Mr Justice Mason outlined the requirements to be satisfied by 
the defendant.
553
It had to be demonstrated that the defendant reasonably believed that 
there was an unlawful attack which threatened them with death or serious bodily harm 
and that this was being made, or was about to be made upon them. In assessing the
defendant’s ‘reasonableness’ of belief, the standard adopted is what the accused 
themselves might reasonably believe in all the circumstances. It was the task of the 
jury to decide whether the accused’s belief was reasonable. If the jury are satisfied 
beyond reasonable doubt that there was no reasonable belief by the accused in all the 
circumstances, then the defendant has no access to the defence. 
If the jury are not satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that there was no reasonable 
belief by the accused, then the jury must consider whether the force deployed by the 
defendant was reasonably proportionate to the danger the defendant believed that they 
faced. If the jury finds that the defendant deployed a disproportionate amount of force 
in relation to the danger the defendant believed that they faced, the jury were left with 
two options. They could either convict the defendant of murder, or convict the 
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defendant of manslaughter. This decision rested on one final decision. The jury had to 
decide whether the accused believed that the force which they used was reasonably 
proportionate to the danger which they believed that they faced. If the jury finds that 
the defendant believed that the force they deployed was reasonably proportionate to 
the danger faced, the conviction will be for manslaughter rather than murder.
554
In summary, the Australian doctrine recognises that a defendant may honestly believe 
that the force they deploy is reasonable, even though when objectively assessed, the 
force used may be considered unreasonable.
555
If this is the case, the defendant is 
convicted of manslaughter, even with the existence of an intention to kill. The 
advantage of the Australian doctrine is that it recognises and accounts for the 
procedural obstacles faced by abused women who kill when pleading self defence. It 
accounts for the possibility that the jury are not going to find that the defendant 
honestly believed in the need for force in the circumstances, and it recognises that the 
jury may not believe that the defendant responded with proportionate force. 
This would be advantageous in English law, as when trying to plead self defence, 
abused women have found it very difficult to convince a judge and jury that their use 
of force was a reasonable response in the circumstances, despite this requirement 
being tested by reference to the facts as the defendant honestly believed them to be, 
even though this may have been based on an unreasonable belief.  Typically, these 
findings bar access to the self defence doctrine, resulting in any woman who took her 
chances and tried to plead self defence being convicted of murder. 
However, one key disadvantage of the Australian doctrine is that the overall 
conviction for either murder or manslaughter pivots on whether the jury believe that 
the defendant believed that the force that they deployed was reasonably proportionate 
to the danger that they believed they faced. Due to prevailing societal attitudes, 
abused women who kill have found it very difficult to convince a jury that their 
actions were either reasonable or proportionate. This demonstrates that if the 
Australian doctrine were to be transposed into domestic law, the domestic standards 
used to address reasonableness and proportionality would have to be significantly 
modified to prevent abused women falling at the very last hurdle when trying to plead 
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excessive force in self defence. Although the partial defence would allow more of the 
context of violence to be available to the jury, as the reasonableness of the conduct is 
looked at according to the perceptions of the defendant, further reform would be 
required to ensure that the concept of reasonableness was not prejudicial to the 
defendant.
Consequently, expert testimony would be required to explain to the jury why the 
defendant thought that their conduct was reasonable in light of their circumstances.  
Otherwise, there would still be the possibility that the judge and jury could not fully 
understand and appreciate the abused woman’s social context and systems of belief. 
In addition to this, any consideration of proportionality in domestic law will also take 
into consideration whether it was objectively necessary to use any violence at all. This 
will lead to a consideration of whether there were less costly measures available to the 
defendant.
556
This is going to continue to be detrimental for any abused woman who 
struck when her partner was off guard, as societal perceptions are going to prevail, 
risking the finding that instead of responding with force, the abused woman should 
have simply left the relationship, thus eradicating any need for force. 
5.2 Canada and the Partial Defence of Excessive Force in Self Defence
Similar problems for abused women who kill arise when the partial defence of 
excessive force in self defence is applied in accordance with Canadian law, as the 
existence of circumstances in which the use of some force would be justified is a 
qualifying condition. In R v Fraser,
557
Mr Justice Moir claimed that excessive self 
defence existed if the following factors were apparent: Firstly, serious circumstances 
must exist, enabling the accused to reasonably believe that a dangerous situation 
existed. Secondly, the accused must have used excessive or unreasonable force in 
these circumstances. Thirdly, the accused must have been acting honestly when such 
force was deployed, under the mistaken apprehension that the force that they were 
using was reasonable.
558
In addition to the factors specified by Mr Justice Moir, Mr 
Justice Martin in R v Trecroce
559
claimed that in order for excessive force in self 
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defence to be recognised as a substantive doctrine, the following qualifying factors 
would also need to be apparent: He claimed that the accused must have been justified 
in using some force in defending themselves against an attack, either imminent or 
reasonably apprehended. He also claimed that the accused must have honestly 
believed that he was justified in using the force that he did, and that the force used 
was excessive because it exceeded what the accused could reasonably have 
considered to be necessary.
560
Both the Australian and Canadian approaches to the partial defence of excessive force 
in self defence, demonstrate that the partial defence is workable. However, they also 
demonstrate that the doctrine is not sufficiently woman-centred, as given the nature of 
domestic violence and its effects, not all abused women who kill strike in 
circumstances where the use of some force would be justified. This results in the 
partial defence being unable to overcome the obstacles imbedded in the traditional 
law of self defence, as women would still be required to adhere to the rigid standards 
of proportionality and necessity, which fail to recognise the impact of domestic 
violence. The partial defence focuses on whether the defendant could have justifiably 
used some force at the time of the homicide, which implicitly incorporates a temporal 
restriction for abused women who kill, as in order to be able to deploy legitimate 
force, the threat of violence traditionally has to be ‘sufficiently proximate’
561
to 
trigger an act of self defence. This results in the defence focusing on the satisfaction 
of the requirements of self defence, which become paramount to the success of the 
partial defence, further removing domestic violence and its effects from the 
investigation. 
5.3 England and Wales and the Partial Defence of Excessive Force in Self 
Defence
Existing jurisprudence in England and Wales outlines that no partial defence of 
excessive force in self defence exists.
562
Despite this, the possibility of extending the 
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doctrine of self defence to include excessive force in self defence has been discussed 
by the Criminal Law Revision Committee,
563
a House of Lords select committee
564
and was the subject of clause 59 of the Law Commission’s draft criminal code.
565
Under the Law Commission’s proposals, Clause 59 stated as follows:
A person who but for this section, would be guilty of murder is not guilty of 
murder if, at the time of his act, he believes the use of force which causes 
death to be necessary and reasonable to effect a purpose referred to in section 
44 (use of force referred to in public or private defence) but the force exceeds 
that which is necessary and reasonable in the circumstances which exist or 
(where there is a difference) in those which he believes to exist. 
Section 44(1) states that ‘ A person does not commit an offence by using such force 
as, in the circumstances which exist or which he believes to exist, is immediately 
necessary and reasonable.’ Following s44(1)(c) this includes the protection of the 
defendant or another from unlawful force or unlawful personal harm. However, 
s44(7) states that ‘the fact that a person had an opportunity to retreat before using 
force shall be taken into account, in conjunction with other relevant evidence, in 
determining whether the use of force was immediately necessary and reasonable.’
This creates a disadvantage for abused women who kill, as following s44(7), it is 
unlikely that the use of force would be perceived as necessary and reasonable if the 
abused woman had delayed the fatal strike to ensure her survival. Fortunately, the 
Law Commission’s proposals for the doctrine were raised again in their 2004 partial 
defences to murder report.
566
However, it was in this report that the partial defence of 
excessive force in self defence was rejected on the basis that the Law Commission’s 
reformulated partial defence of provocation would be sufficiently wide to cover cases 
in which excessive force in self defence was deployed. The Law Commission 
recognised that without the adoption of their proposals, the partial defence of 
provocation would not be a sufficient partial defence for abused women who kill, as 
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‘the risk of conviction is high when the proportionality requirements of self defence 
are juxtaposed with the apparently inconsistent requirement of loss of control 
necessary for provocation.’
567
Had the Law Commission’s reformulated proposals for the partial defence of 
provocation been adopted, its construction of excessive force in self defence would 
have been insufficiently woman-centred, unless informed by modified self defence 
principles. The proposals focused on circumstances in which it would have lawful to 
deploy some force, but that the defendant was unable to rely on self defence, as the 
force that they had deployed had exceeded what was reasonable.
568
The Law 
Commission’s construction of the partial defence derives its legitimacy from applying 
to circumstances in which some use of force would be justified. This provisionally 
excluded abused women who strike when they have an advantage and their partner is 
otherwise incapacitated. 
Upon a strict interpretation, this reinforces an unnecessary two-tier system for abused 
women who kill. Those who responded with lethal force could fall within the ambit of 
a complete defence of self defence and a partial defence of excessive force in self 
defence. Those who waited until their partner was off guard, would fall within the 
ambit of neither defences. This would further signify that the circumstances in which 
some abused women kill are manifestly unreasonable and therefore should not be 
accorded legal protection. If the partial defence was going to be used to protect 
abused women who kill, then this applicational requirement must recognise that when 
abused women kill, the force deployed is necessary even though it is not always 
imminent. 
However, relaxing the requirement of imminence to give way to necessity raises 
concerns, as in theory without an imminence requirement, the partial defence has little 
chance of success, as killings in cold blood, without any temporal or necessity 
restrictions would fall within the partial defence. Instead, the defence must derive its 
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legitimacy from the fact that the use of some force was legitimate,
569
but that the 
defendant had gone too far, making it socially acceptable to find a conviction of 
manslaughter rather than murder, as there was an occasion when the defendant needed 
to protect themselves. Without this requirement, by hypothesis, any use of force 
becomes excessive,
570
and abused women who kill would be forced to plead either 
loss of control or diminished responsibility as the chances of conviction under 
traditional self defence doctrine are too high.
Therefore, after evaluating the doctrine of excessive force in self defence as it existed 
under Australian and Canadian law, and how it could have been potentially developed 
in English law, it is clear that if the defence continues to rely upon masculine 
constructions of imminence, necessity and reasonableness then little will change for 
abused women who kill. Although the interpretations of excessive force in self 
defence recognise that the force abused women deploy in comparison to the 
circumstances that exist at the time of the killing, is objectively excessive, this 
recognition alone would not be enough to protect abused women who kill. In order to 
be sufficiently woman-centred, the partial defence would have to be capable of 
recognising abused women’s circumstances and experiences and how these do not 
neatly fit within the objective components used to ascertain whether the deployment 
of lethal force can be justified. 
5.4 Towards a Woman- Centred Interpretation of Excessive Force in Self 
Defence
In order to reflect the experiences and reactions of abused women who kill within 
excessive force in self defence, the masculine concepts of imminence, necessity and 
reasonableness must be changed. Once modified, the partial defence of excessive 
force in self defence as outlined in Clause 59 of the Law Commission’s draft criminal 
code could be used as court room strategy for abused women who kill.  In order to 
ensure that abused women would fit within this legal construction of Clause 59, it is 
essential to interpret the concepts of necessity and reasonableness in line with the 
circumstances of abused women who kill in accordance with their subjective 
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perceptions. This could be achieved through expert testimony to demonstrate the 
reasonable and defensive nature of the abused woman’s reaction.
However, as previously discussed, attempting to demonstrate reasonableness in light 
of the defendant’s subjective perceptions and social context risks becoming immersed 
in concepts of justification and excuse. A finding that the defendant’s actions were 
both necessary and reasonable suggests that her actions were justified. This would not 
be appropriate under a justificatory framework, unless it could be demonstrated that 
the death of a batterer was a social gain.
571
This could lead to claims that the partial 
defence provides abused woman with a licence to kill. Holding abused women’s 
actions as justifiable implies a tacit endorsement of this behaviour.
572
Consequently, it will be argued that the labels of justification and excuse carry much 
more significance under a complete defence to homicide. Under a partial defence to 
homicide, the label becomes of less legal significance in this context because the 
defendant is not being exculpated for their conduct. Instead, a finding of excessive 
force in self defence should be perceived as an action for which the law chooses not to 
accord maximum punishment to the defendant.
573
This avoids having to demonstrate 
that the defendant’s course of action was the preferred choice of action for society by 
demonstrating that it is an act for which law and society are not going to demand that 
the defendant receive the mandatory life sentence, due to the circumstances of the 
case.
574
5.4.1  A Woman- Centred Interpretation of Necessity in Excessive Force in Self 
Defence
Under the constructions of excessive force in self defence, an indicator of necessity 
was whether the use of some force would have been justified, but that the defendant’s 
application of force went beyond objective standards of reasonableness. This 
inevitably leads to a consideration of imminence when investigating necessity, as if 
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the defendant could have averted the threat, then her use of force was unnecessary. In 
order to be sufficiently woman-centred, the partial defence would have to mitigate 
existing tension over relaxing the requirement of imminence as it exists in self 
defence, and balance this against concerns that the imminence requirement is not 
sufficiently woman-centred. There are concerns that the relaxation of the imminence 
requirement could undermine its historical origins, as imminence forms ‘the 
fundamental justification for the permission to resort to violence in self defence,’
575
as 
it recognises that the individual only has the right to resort to defensive force because 
the authorities and the state are unable to protect them. Although the authorities and 
state are unable to protect abused women who kill, the standard of imminence is 
applied under a strict standard. 
Abused women are excluded from the ambit of imminence, as upon objective 
considerations of their contexts, it is held that the abused woman could always have 
left the relationship. This responds to societal concerns that without a strict standard 
of imminence, it is feared that the perpetration of homicides in cold blood could fall 
within the defence, undermining the role that imminence plays in ensuring that the 
individual has a moral right to act.
576
However, this conception of imminence places 
undue emphasis on the victim’s immediate conduct rather than considering the terror 
and fear that the victim deliberately and repeatedly subjected the defendant to over a 
prolonged period of time.
577
The way in which imminence is constructed neglects to 
consider that these circumstances do cause the abused woman to believe that her life 
is in imminent danger and that the past abuse forms the basis of the battered woman’s 
perception.
578
  
In order to balance these competing concerns, Rosen argues that imminence should be 
viewed as a translator for necessity. When imminence conflicts with necessity, it is 
necessity which must prevail. This recognises that imminence provides an assurance 
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that the defensive action is necessary to avoid the harm,
579
but that imminence is a 
condition precedent for necessity rather than an independent legal component.
580
  By 
adopting this understanding, circumstances in which defensive action is necessary to 
avert harm, even when the harm is not imminent, would fall within the construction of 
excessive force in self defence. This would enable the partial defence of excessive 
force in self defence to overcome the procedural hurdles posed by imminence in 
relation to the complete defence of self defence. 
Under the complete defence, the standard of imminence sends a clear societal 
message, that individuals can only take the law into their own hands at the precise 
moment that the state is unable to protect them. Although this construction adequately 
captures abused women’s social realities, upon a strict application, abused women 
who kill have been excluded from legal and social constructions and understandings 
of imminence. Due to excessive force in self defence existing as a partial defence, it is 
not limited by the same social demands as a complete defence, and can therefore relax 
and modify legal constructions without raising societal concerns over special 
treatment or the inclusion of undeserving cases, as the defendant is still being 
punished for their conduct.
According to Rosen, incorporating a standard of necessity changes the locus of 
decision making from judge to jury, leaving it up to the jury to weigh the evidence 
and determine whether the defendant’s use of force was necessary.
581
However, if this 
standard were to be applied, it would have to recognise that leaving the decision in the 
jury’s hands could in fact encourage discrimination and bias against the defendant. 
This would enable members of the jury to still blame the abused women for allowing 
herself to get into situations that the juror themselves believes that they would never 
have allowed themselves to get into and could blame the defendant for.
582
In order to safeguard against the improper application of juror discretion, it would be 
necessary for the trial judge to instruct the jury that killing, using excessive force in 
self defence must be in response to an imminent danger, unless the defendant is able 
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to overcome an initial threshold, by presenting substantial evidence that the killing 
was necessary even though the danger was not imminent.
583
This would both retain 
the imminence requirement in cases where imminence serves as a translator for 
necessity and would enable it to be removed in cases where it acts as a potential 
inhibitor as apparent in some American jurisdictions.
584
  
Although this would be beneficial to cases in which abused women kill, using 
imminence as a translator for necessity, only modifies conceptions of imminence and 
not necessity. Under the traditional framework of self defence, abused women who 
kill have found it very difficult to satisfy the requirement that their actions were 
necessary, regardless of whether the danger that they faced was imminent. Therefore, 
in order to be of legal benefit to abused women who kill, understandings of both 
imminence and necessity would be required to change. Abused women’s experiences 
and their link to the necessity for action need to be understood in an appropriate 
framework, one which allows for the consideration of evidence in the context of why 
she stayed in the relationship and whether the threats and abuse sustained produced a 
reasonable fear of death or serious injury. 
This would require a presentation of the defendant’s alternatives, so that the jury can 
understand that society may not have provided her with reasonable and realistic 
options which would protect her from her abuser,
585
making reliance on outside help 
both dubious and dangerous.
586
This would enable society to understand the realities 
faced by many abused women who kill. It would respond to findings that when a 
woman kills her abuser, the violence that she has experienced will have escalated in 
severity and frequency before the killing.
587
It will also acknowledge that the abused 
woman took other courses of action before killing her abuser,
588
and should not face a 
mandatory life sentence.
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Despite a modification of the imminence requirement, in order to ensure that the jury 
were evaluating the necessity and therefore reasonableness of the defendant’s 
application of lethal force appropriately, the admissibility of expert testimony on the 
experiences of battered women would be requisite. Without it, the jury would 
continue to evaluate abused women who kill according to objective, rigid and 
ultimately masculine conceptions of what constitutes necessary and reasonable 
behaviour. In order to overcome this, the testimony provided should consider the 
abused woman’s context and experiences of domestic violence, rather than adhering 
to objective considerations or constructing abused women who kill through 
psychological syndromes. This requires the adoption of a less gender biased standard, 
which allows the jury to fairly consider what may have been a battered woman’s 
necessary and reasonable response to the situation she faced.
589
5.4.2 Necessity, Reasonableness and the Application of Expert Testimony in 
Excessive Force in Self Defence
The application of expert testimony concerning domestic violence would ensure that 
the jury were able to assess the abused women’s actions in light of her context. This 
recognises that women act in self defence in different ways and in different 
circumstances to men,
590
that traditional concepts of self defence incorporate sex bias
and that these sex based stereotypes can interfere with defensive claims.
591
  The 
testimony provided should enable the jury to consider the state of cumulative terror 
that abused women face when trapped in abusive relationships alongside the failure of 
the legal system to protect them.
592
This demonstrates that the abused woman finds 
herself in a kill or be killed situation when she deploys defensive force and that the 
jury should consider this in light of her circumstances and perspectives to 
accommodate her unique situation.
593
This would help to remove some of the sex bias 
inherent within the traditional self defence framework, as the adherence to a strict 
objective standard limits the defendant’s right to have their individual circumstances 
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and beliefs considered and this has the effect of subordinating their experiences in 
favour of society’s interest in limiting recourse to defensive force.
594
Allowing expert testimony about domestic violence would enable the cumulative 
effects of repeated violence in the past, and the predictability of future violence to be 
taken into consideration.
595
This would go some way towards eliminating the sex bias 
inherent within the criminal justice system and attempt to equalise the treatment of 
abused women in the courts. It would recognise that abused women who kill have to 
overcome the special myths of why they did not leave, why they did not seek 
assistance before acting and why they believed that the danger that they faced was 
different this time to any other.
596
The testimony would provide credibility to their 
context, their explanations and ultimately their actions,
597
as it can answer the 
questions that the jury have and can show that they were behaving reasonably.
598
The expert testimony would challenge the perception that the battered woman should 
have left, and because she did not, everything that happened after that was her fault.
599
This would prevent looking at the abused woman’s conduct in abstraction, enabling 
her context to demonstrate the reasons why she could not leave. This would prevent 
the jury from bestowing their own higher moral standards upon her, which have
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developed in isolation from any consideration of the defendant’s circumstances and 
experiences.
However, this must be treated with caution, as previous analysis of judicial 
willingness to accept the testimony of abused women who kill has reinforced the 
perspective that the courts are listening to the accounts of damaged women,
600
not 
women who are responding reasonably to the threat of their abuser in the absence of 
alternatives. Therefore, expert testimony cannot be used in isolation and must be 
integrated within the overall defence strategy.
601
Battered women’s explanations of 
their actions from a solely victimised perspective cannot explain why she believed it 
necessary to act,
602
as it reinforces perceptions of passivity and weakness.  Their 
explanations also continue to emphasise the difference in their social reality in 
comparison to the rest of society, further rendering her situation and reaction as 
manifestly different. Experts are needed to translate the experiences of abused women 
who kill, as their reactions seem to be so far removed from societal comprehension.
603
This creates the perception that the defendant’s voice is not strong enough to be heard 
on its own, and that her account of her experiences lacks credibility.
604
  
Expert testimony must be able to strengthen the accounts of abused women who kill 
and enable their narrative to be heard and understood in their own words and it must 
be ensured that the testimony does not become a substitute for the individual voice.
605
This places the role of expert testimony in a difficult position. It must be able to 
overcome the problems inherent within objective considerations of reasonableness 
and the male values that it embodies. It must also be able to put the abused woman’s 
actions in the context of the victimisation that she faces, without portraying the 
abused woman as weak and passive, as this fails to acknowledge her complex social 
realities and the strength required to survive relationships of domestic abuse. It also 
leads to tendencies to pathologise abused women and their experiences. A struggle  
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occurs in trying to present the abused woman as an individual and consider her 
individual circumstances, whist at the same recognising that her experiences are often 
consistent with those of an oppressed group, and that this exists against a wider 
backdrop of gender discrimination.  
Further, the admissibility of evidence about domestic violence and women’s 
experiences pivots upon the adoption of a relaxed interpretation of R v Turner to 
ensure that abused women’s reactions to abuse are understood as reasonable. The 
Turner rules of evidence have posed significant difficulties in relation to the 
development of a woman-centred court room strategy in the context of the existing 
defences to homicide. However, in the context of a partial defence of excessive force 
in self defence, the relaxation of such a standard could be both legally and socially 
acceptable.  
If a partial defence of excessive force in self defence were developed and the Turner
rules were relaxed, such approach would not undermine the existing homicide 
defences. In the context of the complete defence of self defence, the liberalisation of 
the Turner rules of evidence would have little implication on the operation of the 
defence. The complete defence would still be underpinned by objective and 
justificatory criteria, which facilitate little consideration of the contexts of abused 
women who kill. The abused woman’s subjective perceptions would carry much 
greater legal weight under an excusatory framework. In the context of the complete 
defence, the objective and justificatory standard would mean that abused women 
would only fall within its ambit if they killed their abuser with proportionate force in 
the middle of an attack. 
Further, the Coroners and Justice Act 2009 and the development of a partial defence 
based on a loss of control was an attempt to incorporate the reactions of abused 
women who kill into a partial defence, which was not premised upon the existence of 
a mental abnormality. The legislation sought to acknowledge and reflect the fearful 
nature of abused women’s responses to violence. However, the advantages for abused 
women who kill were limited by the legislation’s retention of the gender biased 
concept of loss of self control and the inclusion of sex into the evaluative standard. 
Therefore, despite attempts to incorporate the social realities of abused women who 
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kill, the Coroners and Justice Act 2009 was unable to be fully severed from the 
underlying and deeply imbedded masculine concepts of its predecessor provocation. 
Consequently, the relaxation of the rules governing the admissibility of expert 
testimony and the adoption of a partial defence of excessive force in self defence 
would serve as a pragmatic incorporation of the reactions of abused women who kill 
into a legally partially defensive framework. This serves as a means to ensure further 
legal and societal understanding of both experiences of domestic violence and 
subsequent reactions to it. Law could be used as a means of changing society, as the 
partial nature of the defence and the receipt of punishment for the defendant would 
reduce societal perceptions of special pleading. The defendant would not be acquitted 
for their action, but would have their behaviour judged in light of their circumstances, 
enabling the requirements of self defence to be modified to consider the subjective 
perceptions of the defendant.  This would serve as a pragmatic attempt to overcome 
the gendered application of the concepts of self defence, in the hope that the 
application and understanding of the defendant’s context under a partial defence of 
excessive force in self defence would enable the defendant to legitimately meet the 
thresholds of necessity and reasonableness in relation to excessive force in self 
defence in the eyes of both society and the law. 
Further, it is hoped that the recognition of the defendant’s reaction as a defensive 
response to domestic abuse could pave the way for further change. By enabling a 
consideration of more of the defendant’s factual context, the partial defence of 
excessive force in self defence could be used as a means of dispelling the myths and 
stereotypes concerning abused women who kill. Instead, the defendant’s context 
would be able to expose the reasonable and defensive nature of their reaction in light 
of the violence sustained. This would enable society to realise that the defendant’s 
options were significantly limited, and that the defendant justifiably deployed 
defensive force to protect herself from future harm. This could facilitate the social and 
legal recognition that abused women’s reactions are acts of self defence, despite not 
being able to adhere to the objective and justificatory requirements of self defence,
and that by modifying the complete defence of self defence to incorporate the 
experiences of abused women who kill would not provide defendants with a license to 
kill. 
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5.3 Conclusions
This Chapter sought to ascertain whether a partial defence of excessive force in self 
defence could operate as a sufficiently woman-centred strategy, by recognising both 
the defensive nature of abused women’s reactions to abuse, and the societal reluctance 
to accommodate the claims of abused women who kill into a complete defence. The 
partial defence of excessive force in self defence could therefore break the existing 
deadlock involved in trying to incorporate the experiences of abused women who kill 
into the partially defensive framework of loss of self control and the complete defence 
of self defence. These defences demonstrate that gendered attitudes towards 
constructions of appropriate behaviour are already deeply ingrained in these defensive 
contexts. A partial defence of excessive force in self defence could strike a 
strategically appropriate balance between the legal recognition of abused women’s 
reactions as reasonable within a defensive context, and the societal need for the law to 
uphold strict standards of punishment when individuals deviate from its prescribed 
behavioural standards. 
After a critical evaluation of the partial defence of excessive force in self defence, as 
it existed in Australia, Canada and its potential application in England and Wales, it 
became increasingly clear that the defence would not be capable of being sufficiently 
woman-centred without a modification of its underlying concepts. In order to serve as 
a sufficiently woman-centred strategy, masculine orientated conceptions of 
imminence had to give way to understandings of the necessary deployment of 
defensive force. Without a modification of the imminence standard, many abused 
women who waited until their partner was off guard before committing the homicide 
would continue to fall outside of the ambit of the law. Therefore, imminence was 
recognised as a translator for necessity, requiring a consideration of whether it was 
necessary for the defendant to deploy defensive force in order to avert real harm, 
regardless of whether the threat was imminent. This ensured that the partial defence 
adopted a more subjective stance, allowing the defence to appropriately consider the 
abused woman’s factual context and whether alternative courses of action were 
meaningfully available to her. 
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Further, in order to be sufficiently woman–centred, expert testimony would be 
required to distance the abused woman’s narrative from typical pathological 
constructions. It was argued that expert testimony presenting abused women’s 
reactions to abuse as reasonable could be admissible under the requirements outlined 
in R v Turner, as there is evidence to suggest that both the courts and the government 
are not averse to such an approach. The liberalisation of the rules governing the 
admissibility of expert testimony would not threaten the legitimacy of the existing 
homicide defences and would not grant abused women a license to kill. The 
admissibility of expert testimony would enable the reasonable nature of the abused 
woman’s response to be evaluated in light of her social context. Her narrative would 
become the central point of legal focus, enabling her conduct to be assessed in light of 
her own reality rather than against pathological constructions of irrationality and 
mental illness, or against stereotypical standards of passivity.
Moreover, the testimony would ensure that abused women who kill would not have to 
adhere to standards of sameness due to the focus on the individual narrative. Such 
testimony would also demonstrate that the experiences of abused women who kill 
exist as part of a wider experience of collective discrimination and disadvantage, 
helping to expose the structures of domination which keep battered women trapped in 
abusive relationships.  
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Chapter Six 
Conclusions
In order to challenge the gender bias within the partial and complete defences to 
homicide, this thesis developed a woman-centred analytical framework and 
accompanying court room strategy. The analytical framework was shaped by existing 
feminist epistemologies, which can account for the processes and structures which 
subordinate abused women’s social realities, contexts and narratives. The 
epistemologies were used to reveal how masculine dominance has facilitated the 
consideration of men’s social realities at the expense of abused women’s experiences. 
This is achieved through the adoption of a legal standard of formal equality, which 
opens up two avenues for abused women who kill, both of which maintain 
masculinity as the normative legal standard. Abused women are required to 
demonstrate that they are either the same as men, or that they are so very different 
from men, and thus require different treatment within the legal system. Adherence to 
these standards enables law and society to objectively determine appropriate 
behaviours in abstraction from social context.
The epistemologies were used to distance the experiences of abused women who kill 
from prevailing standards of sameness and difference by recognising the importance 
of the abused woman’s narrative and how it could be used to achieve legal change. 
This required acknowledging the implications of both standards for abused women 
who kill. By addressing standards of sameness and difference, the woman-centred 
analytical framework was able to go beyond these constructions and focus on the 
gender disadvantage created. It was found that eliminating such disadvantage requires 
more than adopting either a standard of sameness or a standard of difference. Such an 
approach would be too narrow and restrictive and would always exclude some abused 
women who kill from its ambit, as masculinity would remain as the normative legal 
standard. 
Consequently, the analytical framework was used to determine how abused women 
are legally disadvantaged in light of their experiences and how their experiences can 
be used to overcome this disadvantage. This involved engaging with the current legal 
construction of abused women who kill through BWS, which legitimises the social 
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stereotypes that the court is dealing with an irrational and psychologically impaired 
individual, not a woman responding reasonably to domestic violence. As such, the use 
of BWS reinforces standards of sameness and difference without displacing 
masculinity as the normative legal standard. Abused women who kill are presented as 
so very different from men due to the perception that they are suffering from a 
psychological condition. Further, abused women must adhere to the necessary 
psychological symptomology in order to fall within the ambit of BWS. This 
reinforces standards of sameness, as abused women are expected to react in 
conjunction with the requirements of BWS in order to warrant legal protection. 
To move beyond constructing abused women through a lens of pathology, abused 
women’s experiences became central to the creation of a woman-centred court room 
strategy. This involved ascertaining whether the incorporation of more general expert 
testimony relating to the experiences and narratives of abused women who kill would 
facilitate the legal and social recognition of abused women’s responses to violence as 
reasonable. The strategic advantages apparent in expert testimony were developed in 
line with comparative jurisprudence, following the United States case of Wanrow. 
The case acknowledged that the adoption of a standard of formal equality can neglect
to consider the perspectives of women. Instead, the case recognised the distinct 
experiences of the defendant and the need for expert testimony to ensure that the jury 
could understand the defendant’s individual perspective.  
Wanrow further recognised that the defendant’s experiences often exist as part of a 
collective experience. In the context of abused women who kill, this reflects the 
individual nature of the abused woman’s experiences, whilst acknowledging that this 
experience exists as a small fragment of a wider framework of collective 
discrimination, held in place by the legal adoption of masculinity as the normative 
standard. It was hoped that the admissibility of such testimony would enable the 
defendant’s own social context and narrative to demonstrate the reasonable nature of 
her reaction in light of her circumstances. This would ensure that the defendant was 
judged in accordance with her social reality, rather than by societal perceptions of 
appropriate behaviour which are formed in abstraction from the abused woman’s 
actual experiences.
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Moreover, the application of expert testimony concerning the experiences of abused 
women who kill following the position in Wanrow could be used to challenge the 
current requirements governing the admissibility of expert testimony. Following R v 
Turner, the admissibility of expert testimony is permitted if it provides the court with 
scientific information which is likely to be beyond the comprehension of jurors. This 
furthers the position that jurors already understand normal behaviours, and only need 
expert testimony to educate them about the workings of the abnormal mind, which 
would continue to construct abused women through a lens of mental abnormality. 
Existing case law was used to challenge the admissibility requirements of R v Turner, 
as evidence suggests that a more liberalised interpretation of Turner allows for the 
admissibility of more general testimony relating to behaviours which are beyond the 
understanding of the jury but are not mental abnormalities. This would enable the 
position in Wanrow to be adopted, ensuring that abused women’s experiences can be 
used as a means of dispelling existing stereotypes. This could demonstrate the 
reasonable nature of their reactions to abuse without having to satisfy the 
requirements of a medicalised framework.  
However, the development of expert testimony was not enough to overcome the 
gender bias within the partial defences to homicide. This leaves abused women with a 
partial defence of diminished responsibility, which relies upon constructing the 
abused woman’s reaction through the psychological framework of BWS. This is 
significant because the Coroners and Justice Act 2009 was introduced to alleviate the 
gender disparate application of the partial defences to homicide by recognising that 
abused women kill out of fear. The legislation significantly alters the construction of 
the partial defences to homicide as they existed under the Homicide Act 1957. The 
Coroners and Justice Act 2009 abolishes the partial defence of provocation, replacing 
it with a partial defence of loss of control, and modifies the partial defence of 
diminished responsibility. 
To fall within the ambit of a partial defence of loss of control, the abused woman is 
required to demonstrate that she lost her self control, that the loss of self control had a 
qualifying trigger, and that an ordinary person of the same sex and age and with 
ordinary powers of tolerance and self restraint could have responded in the same way 
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as she did. By requiring the defendant to demonstrate a loss of self control, the deeply 
ingrained masculine bias of the partial defence is exposed. The concept of loss of self 
control is synonymous with angry and violent responses, as opposed to being 
reflective of responses motivated by fear. Moreover, the legislation fails to clarify 
how a loss of self control underpinned by fear should be manifested for the purpose of 
the defence. This position enables abused women to continue to be legally constructed 
in accordance with prevailing interpretations of loss of control through anger, which 
are not reflective of the circumstances in which abused women kill. Consequently, 
cases of female perpetrated intimate partner homicide appear premeditated and 
calculated, as opposed to the result of a fearful loss of self control.
The requirement that an ordinary person of the defendant’s sex and age may have 
reacted in the same way, reinforces prevailing standards of sameness and difference to 
the disadvantage of abused women who kill. The incorporation of sex into the 
evaluative standard was supposed to serve as a means of addressing formal equality 
by displacing masculinity as the normative legal standard. It sought to facilitate a 
better consideration of the circumstances of abused women who kill, by recognising 
the different motivations and methodologies involved in cases of female perpetrated 
intimate partner homicide. However, such an approach only begins to scratch the 
surface of gender disadvantage. Seeking to displace standards of formal equality does 
not automatically address standards of sameness and difference, resulting in the 
incorporation of sex into the evaluative standard actually reinforcing these standards. 
Women’s reactions to abuse are presented as so very different from men’s, hence the 
need to explicitly acknowledge sex. Furthermore, the recognition of sex actually 
encourages the application of gender stereotypes and essentialism as the abused 
woman is objectively assessed in accordance with the prevailing constructions of 
femininity. The ordinary woman embodies all the necessary attributes of domesticity 
and passivity, rendering violent behaviour contrary to such constructions. As the 
defendant’s sex is only considered in relation to their capacity to exercise tolerance 
and self restraint, the abused woman’s conduct can be perceived as irrational and 
incompatible with the standard of self control expected of the ordinary woman. This 
pushes abused women who kill towards constructions of mental abnormality, 
reinforcing the legal status quo. 
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Therefore, it was necessary to critically evaluate whether abused women’s 
experiences could be incorporated into the complete defence of self defence. 
Although this would recognise the defensive nature of the abused woman’s reaction to 
domestic abuse and bring the defence of self defence in line with existing empiricism, 
there were significant obstacles to overcome. The complete nature of the defence 
signifies the rigid and proscribed circumstances in which an individual can take the 
life of another without being punished and these circumstances are determined 
according to objective and justificatory requirements. These criteria limit 
considerations of the defendant’s factual context, as the requirements of necessity, 
proportionality and reasonableness are all objectively determined. Although the 
defence allows these conditions to be objectively determined according to the 
subjective perceptions of the defendant, upon application they accommodate the 
circumstances in which two men of equal size and strength have fought. 
Consequently, the woman-centred analytical framework and accompanying court 
room strategy were used to assess the numerous ways in which the complete defence 
of self defence could be reformed to better accommodate the subjective perceptions of 
the defendant and the social realities of abused women who kill. It was considered 
whether the framework could be changed from one of justification to one of excuse, 
which would examine the defendant’s context when assessing their conduct. It was 
determined whether the complete defence of self defence could be reinterpreted 
according to the meta concept of unavoidable harm in order to incorporate the 
experiences of abused women who kill. This would move beyond context limiting 
objective standards by acknowledging that the ultimate aim of the complete defence 
of self defence is to enable individuals to respond with force when faced with 
unavoidable harm.  Further, it was considered whether a relaxation of the Turner rules 
of evidence and the admissibility of more general expert testimony concerning the 
experiences of abused women who kill would enable abused women to fall within the 
complete defence by making more of the defendant’s social context available to the 
jury. 
Despite the theoretical possibilities apparent in altering the complete defence, any 
attempts to accommodate the subjective perceptions of the defendant are incompatible 
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with a complete defence underpinned by masculine constructions of appropriate 
behaviour and applied in a masculine culture. Allowing a more subjective 
interpretation of the principles underpinning the complete defence could be seen to 
undermine the strong justificatory nature of the complete defence, as if the defendant 
subjectively believes that they acting in self defence then they could be acquitted. 
This could create the perception that certain groups were given a license to kill, 
setting undesirable precedents, as if one individual is acquitted for their conduct, 
others in a similar situation could be too. 
Therefore, although the defence is capable of being reformed to recognise the 
reactions of abused women who kill as legitimate acts of self defence, objective 
constructions of appropriate behaviour are widely perceived as necessary to ensure 
that only deserving candidates are acquitted for their conduct. Consequently, in a 
masculine culture, abused women are not perceived as deserving of complete 
exculpation, making it unlikely that juries are going to be persuaded to acquit abused 
women who kill on the grounds of self defence even with a consideration of their 
circumstances and factual context. 
This made it necessary to move beyond trying to incorporate the experiences of 
abused women who kill into existing homicide defences underpinned by masculine 
standards of appropriate behaviour. This required exploring the possibilities apparent 
in a partial defence of excessive force in self defence, which could recognise that 
abused women’s reactions are defensive responses to domestic violence and could 
overcome the social reluctance to accommodating the defensive claims of abused 
women who kill. 
The partial nature of the defence would ensure that the defendant was not fully 
exculpated for their conduct. This would maintain the societal standpoint that a 
defendant can only be acquitted if they can satisfy the objective and justificatory 
requirements of self defence. The partial defence legally prioritises the legal 
recognition of the defensive nature of the reaction, rather than requiring abused 
women to be acquitted, recognising that the social realities of abused women who kill 
exist in contrast to societal perceptions of appropriate and reasonable behaviour. 
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In order to explore the woman-centred potential of a partial defence of excessive force 
in self defence, it was critically evaluated according to its application in Australia and 
Canada and existing proposals to incorporate the partial defence into English and 
Welsh law were analysed. It was recognised that without modification, the partial 
defence’s underlying principles of necessity and reasonableness would continue to be 
applied in accordance with masculine social context. This made it unlikely that the 
defendant’s reaction to domestic violence would be perceived as reasonable. 
Therefore, the defensive principles of necessity and reasonableness within the partial 
defence of excessive force in self defence were amended to incorporate the subjective 
perceptions of abused women who kill. This ensured that defensive standards were 
interpreted according to abused women’s social contexts in order to use these 
experiences to explain the reasonable and defensive nature of their behaviour. This 
was achieved by relaxing the standards governing the admissibility of expert 
testimony under R v Turner. Although relaxing the Turner rules would impact upon 
the existing defences to homicide, it would not enable abused women to fall within 
the complete defence of self defence or lower the standards of accountability that 
society demands under the existing defences to homicide.  
Consequently, the adoption of a partial defence of excessive force in self defence 
would represent a pragmatic woman-centred strategy capable of incorporating the 
defensive nature of abused women’s reactions to violence into the defences to 
homicide. It would also encourage further societal and legal development. The 
recognition of the defensive nature of abused women’s reactions and the 
accommodation of these behaviours into a defence to homicide would demonstrate 
that allowing the defendant’s subjective perceptions to play a greater role in the 
application of the defences to homicide would not undermine the legitimacy of these 
defences. Enabling the defendant’s perceptions and experiences to carry much greater 
legal weight would demonstrate that abused women would not be given a license to 
kill, or that individuals would be allowed to take the lives of others without 
punishment. This would encourage the societal recognition of abused women’s 
reactions as acts of self defence, rather than examples of special pleading or 
manifestations of an underlying mental abnormality and pave the way for future 
reform.
139
Statute List
Coroners and Justice Act 2009 
Criminal Code of Canada 1985
Criminal Justice Act 2003
Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008
Homicide Act 1957 
140
Case List
A-G of Jersey v Holley [2005] UKPC 23
Bedder v Director of Public Prosecutions [1954] 1 WLR 1119
Ibn-Tamas v. United States 407 A.2d 626 (D.C. 1979)
Luc Thiet Thuan v Queen (1997) AC 131
Newton, The Times 31 October 1992
People v. Bush, 148 Cal. Rptr. 430, 436-37 (Ct. App. 1978)
People v. Minnis, 118 Ill. App. 3d 345, 356, 455 N.E.2d 209, 219 (1983)
R v Abdul- Hussain (1999) Criminal Law Review 570
R v Acott [1997] 1 All ER 706
R v Ahluwalia (1992) 4 All E.R 889
R v Bratton [1981] Crim LR 119
R v Beckford (1987) 85 Cr.App.R. 378
R v Byrne [1960] 2 Q.B. 396
R v Camplin [1978] A.C. 705
R v Clarke [1995] 2 Cr.App.R. 425
R v Clegg [1995] 1 AC 482
R v Dallagher [2004] 2 Cr.App.R. 520
R v Duffy (1949) 1 All E.R 932
R v Emery (1993) 14 Cr. App. R. (S.) 394
R v Field (1972) Crim LR 435 (CA)
R v Fraser (1980), 55, C.C.C (2d) 503
R v Williams (Gladstone) (1984) 78 Cr.App.R. 276
R v Graham [1982] 1 W.L.R. 294,
R v Hinton, Daily Telegraph (March 26, 1988)
R v Howe (1958) S.A.S.R. 95
R v Humphreys [1995] 4 All E.R. 1008
R v Julien (1969) 1 WLR 839 (CA)
R v Lavallee [1990] 1 SCR 852
R v Martin [2003] QB 1
R v Martin [2002] 2 W.L.R. 1
R v McInnes [1971] 1 WLR 1600
R. v. McKay [1957] V.R. 560
R v O’ Brien (2000) Crim. L.R 676
R v Owino [1996] 2 Cr App Rep 128
R v Palmer [1971] AC 814
R v Redmond-Bate (1999) Crim LR 998
R v Shannon (1980), 71 Cr.App.R.192 (C.A.)
R v Smith (Morgan) (2001) 1 AC 146 (HL)
R v Strudwick (1993) 99 Cr. App. R. 326
R v Thornton (No.1) [1992] 1 All E.R. 306
R v Thornton (No.2) [1996] 1 W.L.R. 1174
R v Turner [1975] QB 834
R v Viro (1978) 141 C.L.R 88
R v Ward (1993) 99 Cr. App. R. 326
R v Warner, The Guardian (May 1, 1982)
R v Z (2005) UKHL 22
Solomon Beckford v The Queen [1988] AC 130
State v. Allery 101Wash. 2d 591, 682 p.2d 312 (1984)
141
State v. Hodges 239 Kan. 63, 74, 716 P.2d 563, 571 (1986)
State v. Hundley 236 Kan. 461, 693 P.2d 475 (1985)
State v Janes 1212 Wash 2d 220, 237, 850 p.2d 495 (1993)
State v. Kelly 97 N.J. 178 (1984)
State v. Lewis, 491 P.2d 1062, 1064 (Wash. Ct. App. 1971)
State v. Mash, 323 N.C. 339, 346, 372 S.E.2d 532, 536 (1988).
State v. Osbey 238 Kan. 280, 710 P.2d 676 (1985)
State v. Stewart 243 Kan. 639, 653, 763 P.2d 572, 582 (1988)
State v Wanrow 88 Wash 2d. 221, 223,559 p.2d 548 (1977)
Zecevic v Dpp (1987) 71 A.L.R. 641
142
Bibliography
Abrahams H, Supporting Women after Domestic Violence: Loss, Trauma and 
Recovery (Jessica Kingsley Publishers 2007)
Abrams K,  ‘The Constitution of Women’ (1997) 48 Alabama Law Review 861
Adams D, Why Do They Kill? Men Who Murder Their Intimate Partners (Vanderbilt 
University Press 2007)
Alldridge P. ‘The Coherence of Defences’ (1983) Criminal Law Review 665
Aldridge M L, and  Browne K D,  ‘Perpetrators of Spousal Homicide. A Review.’ 
(2003) 4 Trauma, Violence & Abuse 265
Alldridge ‘The Coherence of Defences’ (1983) Criminal Law Review 665
Allen H,  Justice Unbalanced: Gender, Psychiatry and Judicial Decisions (Open 
University Press 1987)
Allen P, Free Space: A Perspective on the Small Group in Women’s Liberation’ 
(Times Change Press 1970)
Arias I, ‘Women’s Reponses to Physical and Psychological Abuse’ in Arriaga X. B 
and Oskamp, S. (eds) ‘Violence in Intimate Relationships’ (Sage Publications 1999)
Armour J,  ‘Just Deserts: Narrative, Perspective, Choice and Blame’ (1995-1996) 57 
U.Pitt.L.Rev 534
Arriaga X B and Oskamp S,  (eds) ‘Violence in Intimate Relationships’ (Sage 
Publications 1999)
Ashworth A, ‘The Doctrine of Provocation’ (1976) Cambridge LJ 292
Ashworth A, ‘Self- Defence and the Right to Life’ (1975) 34 CLJ 282
Barnett H, Introduction to Feminist Jurisprudence (Cavendish Publishing Limited 
1998)
Bartlett K T,  ‘Feminist Legal Methods’ in Katharine T Bartlett and Rosanne Kennedy 
(ed) Feminist Legal Theory: Readings in Law and Gender ( Westview Press 1991)
Bates F, ‘Admissibility: Psychiatric Evidence: Towards a Coherent Policy’ [1977] 
Can. B.R. 178
Baumeister R et al, ‘Ego-Depletion: Is the Active Self a Limited Resource?’ 74 
(1998) Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 1252
143
Bender L, ‘A Lawyer’s Primer on Feminist Theory and Tort’ (1988) 38 Journal of 
Legal Education 3
Bem S L, The Lenses of Gender: Transforming the Debate on Sexual Inequality (Yale 
University Press 1993)
Bergman B et al,  ‘Utilization of Medical Care by Abused Women.’ (1992) 81 
American Journal of Public Health 1486
Berkowitz L, ‘Towards a General Theory of Anger and Emotional Aggression: 
Implications of the Cognitive Neoassociationic Perspective for the Analysis of Anger 
and Other Emotions’ in Wyer and Srull (eds), Perspectives on Anger and Emotion 
(Hove 1993)
Bernard G W et al, ‘Till Death Do us Part: A Study of Spousal Murder’ (1982) 10 
Am. Acad. Of Psychiatry and the Law 271
Bishop C, Women and Crime (Chatto & Windus 1931)
Blackman J,  ‘ Emerging Issues of Severely Battered Women and the Criminal Justice 
System’ (1990) 8 Behavioural Sciences and the Law 121
Braidotti R,  Nomadic Subjects: Embodiment and Sexual Difference in Contemporary 
Feminist Theory’ (Columbia University Press 1994)
Browne A, ‘Assault and Homicide at Home: When Battered Women   Kill’ (1985)  3 
Advances in Applied Social Psychology 124
Browne A, When Battered Women Kill (Free Press 1987) 175
Bryson V, Feminist Debates. Issues of Theory and Political Practice. (Macmillan 
1999)
Butcher J et al, Abnormal Psychology: Core Concepts (Pearson, Allyn and Bacon 
1933)
Byrd S, ‘Till Death Do Us Part: A Comparative Law Approach to Justifying Lethal 
Self-Defense by Battered Women’ (1991) 1 Duke J. Comp. & Int’l L. 169
Campbell J et al ‘Risk Factors for Femicide in Abusive Relationships: Results from a 
Multisite Case Control Study’ in Mangai Natarajam (Ed) Domestic Violence: The 
Five Big Questions (Ashgate 2007)
Carlen P and Worrell A  (eds) Gender, Crime and Justice (Open University Press 
1987)
Carline A, ‘ Reforming Provocation: Perspectives from the Law Commission and the 
Government’ (2009) 2 Web J Current Legal Issues
144
Cascardi M and O’Leary K D, ‘Depressive Symptomology, Self Esteem, and Self-
Blame in Battered Women.’  (1992) 7(4) Journal of Family Violence 249
Casey J, ‘Self-Defence. R v Martin and Scots Law’ (2000) 25 Scots Law Times 195
Casey J, ‘Diminished Responsibility and Battered Women who Kill. Case Comment’ 
(2001) 38 Scots Law Times 311
Casey J,  ‘Legal defences and expert testimony on the battered woman syndrome: a 
focus on self defence’ (2003) Scots Law Times 247
Castel J R, ‘Discerning Justice for Battered Women Who Kill.’ (1990) 48  University 
of Toronto Faculty of Law Review 229
Cazenave N A, and Zahn M A, ‘Women, Murder and Male Domination: Police 
Reports of Domestic Violence in Chicago and Philadelphia’ in E.C. Viano (Ed) 
Intimate Violence: Interdisciplinary Perspectives ( Hemisphere Publishing Group 
1992)
Charlesworth H  and Chinkin C,  ‘Violence Against Women: A Global Issue’ in 
Stubbs, J(ed) Women, Male Violence and the Law (Institute of Criminology 
Monograph Series No 6 1994)
Chesler P,  Women and Madness (Allen Lane 1974)
Chodorow N, The Reproduction of Mothering (University of California Press 1978)
Colman A and Mackay R D, ‘Equivocal Rulings on Expert Psychological and 
Psychiatric Evidence: Turning a Muddle into a Nonsense’ (1996) Criminal Law 
Review 88
Coleman K, ‘Homicide’ in Homicides, Firearm Offences and Intimate Violence 2008-
09, Table 1.08.
Cornell D, ‘The Doubly- Prized World: Myth, Allegory and the Feminine’ (1990) 
Cornell Law Review 664
Cornell D, ‘Sexual Difference, the Feminine and Equivalency: A Critique of 
Mackinnon’s Towards a Feminist Theory of the State’’ (1991) 100 Yale Law Review 
2247
Crawford M, and Gartner R, Women Killing: Intimate Femicide in Ontario 1974-1990 
(Government of Ontario Ministry of Social Services, Women’s Directorate, Toronto, 
1992)
Creach D L,  ‘Partially Determined Imperfect Self-Defense: The Battered Wife Kills 
and Tells Why’ (1982) 34(3) Stanford Law Review 615
Crocker P L, ‘The Meaning of Equality for Battered Women who Kill Men in Self 
Defense’ (1985) 8 Harv. Women’s L.J. 121
145
Cubbon S, ‘The Dismantling of Patriarchy’ (2000) UCL Jurisprudence Review 253
Cunliffe E, ‘Without Fear or Favour? Trends and Possibilities in the Canadian 
Approach to Expert Human Behaviour Evidence.’ (2006) International Journal of 
Evidence and Proof 280
Dempsey M M,  ‘The Use of Expert Witness Testimony in the Prosecution of 
Domestic Violence’ (Crown Prosecution Service, London, 2004
Dershowitz A M,  The Abuse Excuse and other Cop Outs , Sob Stories and Evasions 
of Responsibility (Little, Brown and Co 1994)
Diamond B and Louisell D, ‘The Psychiatrist as an Expert Witness: Some 
Ruminations and Speculations’ (1965) 63 Mich. L.R. 1335
Digirolamo K M,  ‘Myths and Misconceptions about Domestic Violence’ (1995-
1996) 16 Pace L.Rev. 41
Doane J and Hodges D,  Nostalgia and Sexual Difference (Methuen 1987)
Dobash E R and Dobash R P, Women, Violence and Social Change (Routledge 1992)
Dodge M and Greene E, ‘Jurors and Expert Conceptions of Battered Women.’ (1991) 
6 Violence and Victims  271
Donovan D A and Wildman S M, ‘Is the Reasonable Man Obsolete? A Critical 
Perspective on Self Defence and Provocation?’ (1981) 14 Loy.L.A.L.Rev 436
Dowd M, ‘Dispelling the Myths about the “Battered Woman’s Defense”: Towards a 
New Understanding’ (1991-1992) Fordham Urb. L.J. 567
Dressler J,  ‘Rethinking Heat of Passion: A Defence in Search of a Rationale’ (1982) 
73 Journal of Criminal Law and Criminology 437
Dressler J, ‘Justifications and Excuses: A Brief Review of the Concepts and the 
Literature.’ (1987) 33 Wayne Law Review 1155
Dressler J, ‘Reflections on Excusing Wrongdoers: Moral Theory, New Excuses and 
the Model Penal Code’, (1988) 19 RUTGERS L.J. 671
Dressler J,  ‘Why Keep the Provocation Defense? Some Reflections on a Difficult 
Subject’ (2002) 86 Minn.L.R 959
Dressler J,  Understanding Criminal Law (4
th
Edn LexisNexis 2006)
Du Bois, ‘Passionate Scholarship: Notes on Values, Knowing and Method in Feminist 
Social Science’ in G. Bowles and R. Duelli Klein (eds) Theories of Women’s Studies 
(Routledge 1983)
146
Dutton D G and Painter S, ‘Emotional Attachments in Abusive Relationships: A Test 
of Traumatic Bonding Theory’,(1993)  8 Violence and Victims 105
Dutton D G and Painter S,  ‘The Battered Woman Syndrome: Effects of Severity and 
Intermittency of Abuse. ‘ (1993) 63 AM. J. ORTHOPSYCHIATRY 614
Dutton M A, ‘Understanding Women’s Responses to Domestic Violence: A 
Redefinition of Battered Women Syndrome’ (1993) 21 Hofstra Law Review 1191
Eber L P,  ‘The Battered Wife's Dilemma: To Kill or To Be Killed’,(1981) 32 
HASTINGS L.J. 895
Edwards S,  'Battered Women who Kill' (1990) NLJ 1380
Edwards S, Sex and Gender in the Legal Process (Blackstone, 1996)
Edwards S, ‘Abolishing Provocation and Reframing Self Defence- the Law 
Commission’s Options for Reform’ (2004) Criminal Law Review 181
Edwards, S.  ‘Descent into murder: Provocation’s Stricture-the Prognosis for Women 
who Kill the Men who Abuse them’ (2007) 71(4) Journal of Criminal Law 342
Edwards S,  ‘Justice Devlin’s Legacy: Duffy- a battered woman “caught” in time.’ 
(2009) 12 Criminal Law Review 851
Edwards S, ‘ Anger and Fear as Justifiable Preludes for Loss of Self Control’ (2010) 
74(3) Journal of Criminal Law 223
Ehrenreich B and English D, For Her Own Good: One Hundred and Fifty Years Of 
Experts Advice to Women (Anchor/Doubleday 1978)
England C, ‘The Battered Woman’s Syndrome: A History and Interpretation of the 
Law of Self-Defense as it Pertains to Battered Women who Kill their Husbands’ 
(2007) 3(1) Vanderbilt Undergraduate Research Journal 1
Ewing C, Battered Women Who Kill: Psychological Self Defence as Legal 
Justification (Lextington Books 1987)
Faigman D L and Wright A J,   ‘The Battered Woman Syndrome in the Age of 
Science’ (1997) 39 Ariz. L. Rev 67
Feinberg J,  Doing and Deserving: Essays in the Theory of Responsibility (Princeton 
University Press 1970)
Ferzan K K,  ‘Defending Imminence: From Battered Women to Iraq’ (2004) 46 
Arizona Law Review 213
Finkelstein C O,   ‘Self Defence as a Rational Excuse’ (1995-1996) 57 U.Pitt.L.Rev 
621
147
Finley L M, ‘Breaking Women’s Silence on Law: The Dilemma of the Gendered 
Nature of Legal Reasoning’ (1989) 64 Notre Dame L. Rev 886
Fletcher G, ‘The Right Deed for the Wrong Reason: A Reply to Mr. Robinson’ (1975) 
23 UCLA L. REv. 293
Fletcher G,  Rethinking Criminal Law  (Little Brown 1978)
Fletcher, G. Rethinking Criminal Law  (OUP 2000)
Fletcher G,  ‘Domination in the Theory of Justification and Excuse’ (1995-1996) 57 
U.Pitt.L.Rev 553
Follingstad D R, Neckermann A P and Vormbrock J, ‘Reactions to Victimization and 
Coping Strategies of Battered Women: The Ties that Bind.’ (1988) 8(4) Clinical 
Psychology Review 373
Freeman J, The Politics of Women’s Liberation: A Case Study of an Emerging Social 
Movement and its Relation to the Policy Process (David Mackay 1975)
Frieze I et al, Women and Sex Roles: A Social Psychological Perspective 
(W.W.Norton 1978)
Gondolf E and Fisher E, Battered Women as Survivors: An Alternative to Treating 
Learned Helplessness (Lexington Books 1988)
Gondolf E,  ‘Theoretical and Research Support for the Duluth Model: A Reply to 
Dutton and Corvo’ (2007) 12(6) Aggression and Violent Behaviour 644
Goodey J, ‘Sex Trafficking in Women from Central and Eastern European Countries: 
Promoting a ‘Victim-Centred’ and ‘Woman-Centred’ Approach to Criminal Justice 
Intervention’. (2004) 76 Feminist Review 26
Goodman H and Price J, Studies of Female Offenders (HMSO 1967)
Graham D L R, Rawlings E, and Rimini N, ‘Survivors of Terror. Battered
Women, Hostages, and the Stockholm Syndrome’, in in Yllo and Bograd (eds) 
Feminist Perspectives on Wife Abuse ( Sage Publications Limited 1998)
Greenawalt K,  ‘The Perplexing Border of Justification and Excuse’, (1984) 84 
Columbia Law Review 1903
Grisso et al, ‘A Population-Based Study of Injuries of Inner City Women’. (1991) 143 
(1) American Journal of Epidemiology 59
Grosz E,  ‘Contemporary Theories of Power and Subjectivity’ in Sneja Gunew(ed) 
Feminist Knowledge. Critique and Construct’ (Routledge 1990)
Gunew S, ‘Feminist Knowledge: Critique and Construct’ in Sneja Gunew(ed) 
Feminist Knowledge. Critique and Construct’ (Routledge 1990)
148
Hague G and Malos E, Domestic Violence: Action for Change (3
rd
Edition Cromwell 
Press 2005)
Hanmer J and Itzin C, (eds) ‘Home Truths about Domestic Violence. Feminist 
Influences on Policy and Practice- A Reader’ (Routledge 2000)
Harding S, ‘The Science Question in Feminism’ (Cornell University Press 1986)
Harraway D,   ‘Situated Knowledges: The Science Question in Feminism as a Site of 
Discourse on the Privilege of Partial Perspective’  in Donna Harraway Simians, 
Cyborgs and Women: The Reinvention of Nature  (Free Association 1991)
Hart B,  ‘National Estimates and Facts about Domestic Violence’ (1989) NCADV 
Voice 12
Hartsock N, The Feminist Standpoint Revisited and Other Essays (Westview Press 
1998)
Haste H,  The Sexual Metaphor (Harvester Wheatsheaf 1993)
Heise L, ‘Reproductive Freedom and Violence Against Women: What are the 
Intersections?’ (1993) 27 The Journal of Law, Medicine and Ethics 206
Hekman S J, Gender and Knowledge: Elements of a Post Modern Feminism (Polity 
Press 1990)
Hekman S J, ‘Truth and Method: Feminist Standpoint Theory Revisited.’ (1997) 
22(2) Signs 341
HL Committee, 7 July 2009, col. 584, per Baroness Scotland.
Herbert A P, Uncommon Law (Methuan 1935)
Hiroto D S, ‘Locus of Control and Learned Helplessness’ (1974) 102 Journal of 
Experimental Psychology 187
Hiroto D S and Seligman M E P, ‘Generality of Learned Helplessness in Man’ (1975) 
31(2) Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 311
Holton R and Shute S, ‘Self Control in the Modern Provocation Defence’ (2007) 27 
(1) O.J.L.S 49,
Horder J, ‘Sex Violence and Sentencing in Provocation Cases’ (1989) Crim LR 546
Horder J, ‘Between Provocation and Diminished Responsibility’ (1999) 10 K.C.L.J 
143
Horder J, ‘Reshaping the Subjective Element in the Provocation Defence’ (2005) 
25(1) Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 123
149
Howard C,  ‘An Australian Letter-Excessive Force’ (1964) Crim LR 448
Hurd H M,  ‘Justification and Excuse, Wrongdoing and Culpability’, (1999) 74 Notre 
Dame Law Review 1565
Hutchinson I W and Hirschel D J, ‘Abused Women: Help-Seeking Strategies and 
Police Utilization’ (1998) 4 Violence Against Women 436
Johnson M P, ‘Patriarchal Terrorism and Common Couple Violence: Two Forms of 
Violence Against Women.’ (1995) 57 Journal of Marriage and the Family 283
Kahan D M  and Nussbaum M C, ‘Two Conceptions of Emotion in Criminal Law’ 
(1996) 96 Col. L.R. 269
Kaplan G T, and Rogers L J,  ‘ The Definition of Male and Female. Biological 
Reductionism and the Sanctions of Normality’ in Sneja Gunew(ed) Feminist 
Knowledge. Critique and Construct’ (Routledge 1990)
Kaufman W R P,  ‘Self-Defense, Imminence and the Battered Woman’ (2007) 10
New Crim. L. Rev 342
Kelman M, ‘Interpretive Construction in the Substantive Criminal Law’ (1981) 33 
Standford Law Review 591
Kennedy H,  Eve Was Framed (Chatto and Windus 1992)
Kennedy H G,  ‘Limits of Psychiatric Evidence in Criminal Courts: Morals and 
Madness’ (2005) Medico Legal Journal of Ireland 13
Kenny E,  ‘Battered Women Who Kill: The Fight Against Patriarchy’ (2007) UCL 
Jurisprudence Review 17
Kochan D, ‘Beyond the Battered Woman Syndrome: An Argument for the 
Development of New Standards and the Incorporation of a Feminine Approach to 
Ethics.’ (1989) 1 Hastings Women’s Law Journal 89
Krieger L and Cooney P, ‘The Miller-Wohl Controversy: Equal Treatment, Positive 
Action and the Meaning of Women's Equality, (1983)  13 GOLDEN GATE L. REV. 
513
Lacey N, ‘Partial Defences to Murder: Questions of Power and Principle in Imperfect 
and Less Imperfect Worlds’ in  Andrew Ashworth and Barry Mitchell(ed) Rethinking 
English Homicide Law (Oxford University Press 2000)
Leigh L H,  'Murder, Manslaughter and Infanticide: Proposals for Reform of the Law' 
(2008) 172 Justice of the Peace and Local Government Law 700
Lerner M,  The Belief in a Just World: A Fundamental Delusion (Plenum 1980)
150
Leverick F, Killing in self defence (Oxford University Press 2006)
Levit N, and Verchick R R M,  Feminist Legal Theory (New York University Press 
2006)
Littleton C A, ‘Equality and Feminist Legal Theory’ (1986-1987) 48 U.Pitt. L. Rev 
1043
Littleton C A, ‘Equality Across Difference: Is There Room For Rights Discourse? 
(1987) 2 Wisc. Women’s L.J 28
Littleton C A,  ‘ Feminist Jurisprudence: The Difference Method Makes’ (1989) 41(3) 
Stanford Law Review 751
Loseke D R and Cahill S E, ‘The Social Construction of Deviance: Experts on 
Battered Women’ (1984) 31(3) Social Problems 296 
Lypkus I M,  ‘A Heuristic Model to Explain Perceptions of Unjust Events’ (1992) 5 
Social Justice Research 359
Mackay R D,  ‘The abnormality of  Mind Factor in Diminished Responsibility’ (1999) 
Criminal Law Review 117
Mackay R D, Colman A M and Thornton P, ‘ The Admissibility of Expert 
Psychological and Psychiatric Testimony’ in Heaton-Armstrong, A., Shepherd,E., and 
Wolchover, D.  (Eds), Analysing Witness Testimony: A Guide for Legal Practitioners 
and Other Professionals (Oxford University Press 1999)
Mackay R D and Mitchell B J,  ‘Provoking Diminished Responsibility: Two Pleas 
Merging into One?’ (2003) Criminal Law Review 745
Mackay R D,  ‘The Diminished Responsibility Plea in Operation--An Empirical 
Study’, in Appendix 2 of the Law Commission's Final Report, Partial Defences to 
Murder (Law Com No.290 Cm.6301 2004)
Mackay R D and Mitchell  B J,  ‘But is this provocation? Some thoughts on the Law 
Commission’s report on the partial defences to murder’ (2005) Criminal Law Review 
44
Mackay R D, Mitchell B J and Brookbanks W J,  ‘Pleading for provoked killers: in 
defence of Morgan Smith’ (2008) 124 LQR 675
Mackay R D, ‘The Coroners and Justice Act 2009-Partial Defences to Murder(2) The 
New Diminished Responsibility Plea’ (2010) Criminal Law Review 209
Mackinnon C A, ‘Feminism, Marxism, Method and the State: An Agenda for Theory’ 
(1982) 7(3) Signs 515
Mackinnon C A,  ‘Feminism, Marxism, Method and the State: Towards a Feminist 
Jurisprudence’ (1983) 8(2) Signs 635
151
Mackinnon C A, Feminism Unmodified: Discourses on Life and Law (Harvard 
University Press, 1987)
Mackinnon C A, Towards a Feminist Theory of the  State (Harvard University Press 
1989)
Mackinnon C A,  ‘Difference and Dominance: On Sex Discrimination’ in Katharine T 
Bartlett and Rosanne Kennedy (eds) Feminist Legal Theory: Readings in Law and 
Gender ( Westview Press 1991)
Magnum P F,  ‘ Note, Reconceptualising Battered Woman Syndrome Evidence: 
Prosecution Use of Expert Testimony on Battering’ (1999) 19 B.C Third World L.J 
593
Maguigan H,  ‘Battered Women and Self-Defense: Myths and Misconceptions in 
Current Reform Proposals’  (1991) 140 University of Pennsylvania Law Review 390
Mahoney M R, ‘Legal Images of Battered Women: Redefining the Issue of 
Separation’ (1991) 90(1) Michigan Law Review 1
Marcus M L, ‘Conjugal Violence: The Law of Force and the Force of Law’ (1981) 69 
Calif.L.Rev. 1657
Martinson Q C et al, ‘A forum on Lavallee v R: Women and Self-Defence’ (1991) 25 
University of British Columbia Law Review 23
Marx K and Engels F, The German Ideology (Progressive Publications 1976)
McColgan A, ‘In Defence of Battered Women who Kill’ (1993) Oxford Journal of 
Legal Studies 508
Mclaughlin J,  Feminist Social and Political Theory. Contemporary Debates and 
Dialogues. (Palgrave Macmillan 2003)
McMahan J, ‘The Basis of Moral Liability to Defensive Killing’ (2005) 15 
Philosophical Issues, 387
Mihajlovich M,  ‘Comment: Does Plight Make it Right: The Battered Woman 
Syndrome, Expert Testimony, and the Law of Self Defence’ (1987) 62 Ind.L.J 1277
Miles J,  ‘The Coroner’s and Justice Act 2009: a “dog’s breakfast” of homicide 
reform’ (2009) 10 Arch.News 9
Minow M, ‘Learning to Live with the Dilemma of Difference: Bilingual and Special 
Education’ (1984) 48(2) Law and Contemporary Problems 157
Miranda J, ‘Dysfunctional Thinking is Activated by Stressful Life Events’ (1992) 16 
Cognitive Therapy and Research 473
152
Mitchell M H,  ‘Note: Does Wife Abuse Justify Homicide?’ (1978) 24 WAYNE L. 
REV. 1705
Montague P,  ‘Self-Defence, Culpability and Distributive Justice’ (2010) Law and 
Philosophy 76
Morse S, ‘ Diminished Rationality, Diminished Responsibility’ (2003) 1 Ohio State 
Jo. of Crim. Law 289
Mossman M J,  ‘Feminism and Legal Method: The Difference in Makes’ (1987), 3 
Wisc. Women's L.J. 147
Munro V, Law and Politics at the Perimeter: Re-evaluating Key Debates in Feminist 
Theory (Hart 2007)
Nicolson D and Sanghvi R, ‘Battered Women and Provocation: The Implications of R 
v Ahluwalia’ (1993) Crim. L Rev 728
Nicolson D, ‘Telling Tales: Gender Discrimination, Gender Construction and 
Battered Women who Kill’ (1995) 3 Feminist Legal Studies 185
Norrie A,  ‘From Criminal Law to Legal Theory: The Mysterious Case of the 
Reasonable Glue Sniffer’ (2002) 65 M.L.R. 538
Novacco R W, ‘Remediating Anger and Aggression with Violent Offenders’ (1997) 2 
Legal and Criminological Psychology 77
Oakley A and Mitchell J,  (Eds) Who’s Afraid of Feminism? Seeing Through the 
Backlash (Hamish Hamilton 1997)
O’Brien N C,  ‘Excessive defence: a need for legislation’ (1982-1983) 25 Crim L.Q 
441
O’Donovon K,  Sexual Divisions in Law (Weidenfeld and Nicolson 1985)
O’ Donovan K, ‘Defences for Battered Women Who Kill’ (1991) 18(2) Journal of 
Law and Society 219
O’ Donovan K, ‘Law’s Knowledge: The Judge, The Expert, The Battered Woman and 
her Syndrome’ (1993) 20 Journal of Law and Society 427
Okin S M,  ‘Gender, the Public and the Private’ in Anne Phillips Feminism and 
Politics (Oxford University Press 1998)
Ormerod D C, ‘Expert Evidence: Where Now? Where Next? (2006) Archbold News  
5
Ormerod DC,  ‘Case Comment. Self Defence: summing up-subjective element’ 
(2009) Criminal law Review 202
153
Owens G P and Chard K M, ‘Cognitive Distortions among Women Reporting 
Childhood Sexual Abuse’(2001) 16 Journal of Interpersonal Violence 178
Owens G P and Chard K M, ‘PTSD Severity and Cognitive Reactions to Trauma 
Among a College Sample: An Exploratory Study’ (2006) 13 Journal of Aggression, 
Maltreatment and Trauma 23
Pattenden R, ‘Conflicting Approaches to Psychiatric Evidence in Criminal Trials: 
England, Canada and Australia’ (1986) Criminal Law Review
Pelegrinis T N, Kant’s Conceptions of the Categorical Imperative and the Will (Zeno 
1980)
Pendleton H A,  ‘A Critique of the Rational Excuse Defence: A Reply to Finkelstein’ 
(1995-1996) 57 U.Pitt.L.Rev  652
Phillips A, Feminism and Politics (Oxford University Press 1998)
Phillips D M  and Defleur L B,  ‘Gender Ascription and the Stereotyping of Deviants’ 
(1981) 20(3-4) Criminology 431
Pichhadze A, ‘Proposals for Reforming the Law of Self- Defence; (2008) 72 Journal 
of Criminal Law 409
Pillsbury S H,  ‘Crimes Against the Heart: Recognizing the Wrongs of Forced Sex’ 
(2002) 35 Loy.L.A.L.Rev 845
Pizzey E,  Scream Quietly or the Neighbours Will Hear (Penguin 1974)
Pollak O,  The Criminality of Women. (University of Pennsylvania Press 1950)
Popper K,  Conjecture and Refutations: The Growth of Scientific Knowledge 
(Routledge and Kegan Paul 1963)
Povey D, (Ed) (2004). Crime in England and Wales 2002/3: Supplementary Volume 1 
- Homicide and gun crime. Home Office Statistical Bulletin. Home Office: London.
Povey D, (Ed) (2005). Crime in England and Wales 2003/2004: Supplementary 
Volume 1: Homicide and Gun Crime. Home Office Statistical Bulletin, No. 02/05. 
Home Office: London.
Quick O and Wells C,  ‘ Getting tough with defences’ (2006) Criminal Law Review 
514
Quigley T, ‘Battered Women and the Defence of Provocation’ (1991) 55 Sask. L. 
Rev. 223
154
Raitt F E, ‘Expert Evidence as Context: Historical Patterns and Contemporary 
Attitudes in the Prosecution of Sexual Offences’ (2004) 12 Feminist Legal Studies 
234
Reed A,  ‘Case Comment Self-defence and motive for revenge’ (2006) Criminal 
Lawyer 2
Reilly A, ‘Loss of Self-Control in Provocation’ (1997) 21 Crim LJ 320
Rifkin J, ‘Toward a Theory of Law and Patriarchy’ (1980) 3 Harvard Women’s L.J 83
Rhode D L,  ‘The Politics of Paradigms: Gender Difference and Gender 
Disadvantage’ in Anne Phillips Feminism and Politics (Oxford University Press 
1998)
Rhode D L,  Speaking of Sex. The Denial of Gender Inequality (Harvard University 
Press 1999)
Rhodes N R and McKenzie E B, ‘Why do Battered Women Stay?: Three Decades of 
Research.’ (1998) 3(4) Aggression and Violent Behaviour 391
Ripstein A,  ‘Self Defence and Equal Protection’ (1995-1996) 57 U.Pitt.L.Rev 685
Robinson J, ‘Defense Strategies  for Battered Women who Assault their Mates: State 
v Curry’ (1981) 4 Harvard Women’s Law Journal 161
Robinson P, ‘A Theory of Justification: Societal Harm as a Pre-Requisite for Criminal 
Liability’ (1975) 23 U.C.L.A. Law Review 266
Robinson P,  ‘Criminal Law Defences: A Systematic Analysis’ (1982) 82 Columbia 
Law Review 199
Romero M,  ‘A Comparison Between Strategies Used on Prisoners of War and 
Battered Wives’ (1985) 13 Sex Roles 537
Rorty R, Philosophy and The Mirror of Nature (Blackwell 1980)
Rosen C J,  ‘The Excuse of Self-Defence: Correcting a Historical Accident on Behalf 
of Battered Women who Kill’ (1986-1987) 36 Am.U.L.Rev 21
Rosen R A, ‘On Self Defence, Imminence and Women Who Kill Their Batterers’ 
(1993) 71 N.C.L. Rev 371
Sebok A J,  ‘Does an Objective Theory of Self Defence Demand Too Much?’ (1995-
1996) 57 U.Pitt.L.Rev  689
Scales A, ‘Towards a Feminist Jurisprudence’ (1981) 56 Ind.L.J. 375
155
Scott J W, ‘Deconstructing Equality- Versus- Difference: Or, the Use of Post 
Structuralist Theory for Feminism’. Myers, D.T. (Ed) Feminist Social Thought: A 
Reader (Routledge 1997)
Schneider E and Jordan S, ‘Representations of Women who Defend Themselves in 
Response to Physical or Sexual Assault’ (1978) 4 Women’s RTS. L. REP 149
Schneider E, ‘Equal Rights to Trial for Women: Sex Bias in the Law of Self-Defense’ 
(1980) 15 Harv. C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 623
Schneider E,  ‘Describing and Changing: Women’s Self-Defense Work and the 
Problem of Expert Testimony on Battering’ (1986) 9 Women’s Rights Law Reporter 
195
Schneider E, ‘Particularity and Generality: Challenges of Feminist Theory and 
Practice in Work on Woman Abuse’ (1992) 67 N.Y.U.L. Rev 520
Schneider E, Battered Women and Feminist Law Making (Yale University Press 
2000)
Schulhofer S J,  ‘The Feminist Challenge in Criminal Law’ (1995) 143 U.PA.L.Rev 
2153
Schulhofer S J, ‘The Trouble with Trials; The Trouble with Us,’ (1995) 105 YALE 
L.J. 825
Schuller R A and Hastings P A, ‘Trials of Battered Women Who Kill: The Impact of 
Alternative Forms of Expert Evidence’ (1996) 20(2) Law and Human Behaviour 167
Seligman M E P and Maier S F,  ‘Failure to Escape Traumatic Shock.’ (1967) 74   
Journal of Experimental Psychology 1
Seligman M E P, Maier S F and Solomon R L, ‘Unpredictable and Uncontrollable 
Aversive Events’ in Brush, F.R. (Ed.), Aversive Conditioning and Learning. 
(Academic Press 1971)
Shors T J, ‘Learning During Stressful Times’ (2004) 11 Learning & Memory 137
Silver C R and Kates D B, ‘Self- Defense, Handgun Ownership, and the 
Independence of Women in Violent Sexist Society’ in D. B Kates (Ed) Restricting 
Handguns: The Liberal Sceptics Speak Out (Croton-on-the-Hudson 1979) 
Shaffer M, ‘ R v Lavallee: A Review Essay’ (1990) 22 Ottawa Law Review 607
Sharps P W and Campbell J, ‘ Health Consequences for Victims of Violence in 
Intimate Relationships’ in Arriaga X. B and Oskamp, S. (eds) ‘Violence in Intimate 
Relationships’ (Sage Publications 1999)
156
Simester A P and Sullivan G R, Criminal Law Theory and Doctrine (3
rd
edn Hart 
Publishing 2007)
Simester A P and Sullivan G R, Criminal Law Theory and Doctrine (4th Edn Hart 
Publishing 2009)
Slobogin C, ‘A Rational Approach to Responsibility’ (1975) 83 Mich.L.R. 820
Smart C, Feminism and the Power of the Law (Routledge 1989)
Smith D E, The Everyday World as Problematic: A Feminist Sociology (Northeastern 
University Press 1987)
Smith J C and Rees T,  ‘Case Comment Homicide: murder - excessive force in self-
defence’ (2002) Criminal Law Review 136
Stubbs J, ‘The (Un)Reasonable Battered Woman? A Response to Easteal’. (1992) 3 
Current Issues in Criminal Justice 359
Swatt M and He N,  ‘ Exploring the Difference Between Male and Female Intimate 
Partner Homicides: Revisting the Concept of Situated Transactions’ (2006) 10 
Homicide Studies 279
Tapper C, Cross & Tapper on Evidence (10th edn Lexis Nexis 2004)
Thompson J, ‘Self-Defense’, (1991) 20  Philosophy and Public Affairs 283
Thornton J W and Jacobs P D, ‘Learned Helplessness in Human Subjects’  (1971) 7 
Journal of Experimental Psychology 367
Toffel H,  ‘Crazy Women, Unharmed Men, and Evil Children: Confronting the Myths 
about Battered People Who Kill Their Abusers, and the Argument for Extending 
Battering Syndrome Self-Defences to All Victims of Domestic Violence’ (1996-1997) 
70 S. Cal. L. Rev. 337
Trotman J,  The Murderess: A Psychological Study of Criminal Homicide (R and E 
Research Associates, 1978)
Vera M I and Newman G, ‘Till Death Do Us Part: A Study of Spousal Murder’ 
(1982) 10 AM. ACAD. Of Psychiatry and the Law Bull. 271
Virgo G,  ‘Are the Defences of provocation, duress and self-defence consistent?’ 
(2003) Archbold News 5
Walker A, Flatley J,  Kershaw C,  and Moon D, ‘Crime in England and Wales 
2008/09: Findings from the British Crime Survey and Police Recorded Crime’ 
(Volume 1). Home Office Statistical Bulletin, No. 11/09. (Home Office, London, 
2009)
157
Walker L, The Battered Woman (Harper and Row 1979)
Walker L, The Battered Woman Syndrome (Springer 1984)
Walker L,  ‘A Response to Elizabeth M. Schneider’s Describing and Changing: 
Women’s Self Defence Work and the Problem of Expert Testimony on Battering’ 
(1986) 9 Women’s Rts L. Rep 223
Walker L,  ‘Battered Women and Self Defense’ (1992) 6 Notre Dame J.L.Ethics & 
pub.pol’y 321
Wells C, ‘ Provocation: The case for Abolition’ in Andrew Ashworth and Barry 
Mitchell (ed) Rethinking English Homicide Law (Oxford University Press 2000)
Wharton A S, The Sociology of Gender: An Introduction to Theory and Research 
(Blackwell Publishing 2005)
White S,  ‘Excessive Force in Self Defence’ (1971) 34(1) The Modern Law Review 
106
Williams W W, Equality's Riddle: Pregnancy and the Equal Treatment/Special 
Treatment Debate’, (1984-1985)  13 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. Change 325
Williams W W,  ‘The Equality Crisis; some Reflections on Culture, Courts and 
Feminism’ in Bartlett, K. T. and Kennedy, R.  Feminist Legal Theory: Readings in 
Law and Gender (Westview Press 1991)
Willoughby M, ‘Rendering Each Woman her Due: Can a Battered Woman Claim Self 
Defence When she Kills a Sleeping Batterer?’ (1989) 38 Kansas Law Review 169
Wilson M and Daly M,  ‘Till Death do us Part’ in Radord, J, and Russel D (eds) 
‘Femicide: The Politics of Woman Killing’ (Oxford University Press 1992)
Wilson M, Johnson H, and Daly M, ‘Lethal and Non Lethal Violence Against Wives; 
(1995) 37 Canadian Journal of Criminology 331
Wilson W, ‘The Structure of Criminal Defences’ (2005) Criminal Law Review 108
Withey C, ‘Loss of Control, Loss of Opportunity’ (2011) Criminal Law Review 263
Worral A,  Offending Women: Female Law Breakers and the Criminal Justice System 
(Routledge 1997)
Yeo S,  ‘ The Demise of Excessive Force in Self-Defence in Australia’ (1988) 
International and Comparative Law Quarterly 348
Yeo S, ‘The Role of Gender in the Law of Provocation’ (1997) 26 Anglo-Am L. Rev 
431
158
Yeo S, ‘English Reform of the Partial Defences to Murder: Lessons for New South 
Wales’ (2010) 22(1) Current Issues in Criminal Justice 1
Young I M,  ‘The Generality of Law and The Specifics of Cases: A comment on 
Elizabeth Schneider’  1995-1996) 57 U.Pitt.L.Rev 550
Zeedyk S and Raitt F, ‘Psychological Theory in Law: Legitimating the Male Norm’ 
(1997) 7 Feminism and Psychology 543
Unattributed Works
Department of Health, ‘Responding to domestic abuse: A handbook for health 
professionals’ (Department of Health 2005)
Ed, ‘Adjusting the boundaries of murder: partial defences and complicity’ (2008) 11 
Criminal Law Review 829
Editor’s Note, ‘Privacy or Sex Discrimination Doctrine: Must there be a choice? 
(1981) 4 Harv. Women’s L.J  10
Hansard, HL Vol.712, col.177 (June 30, 2009)
Home Office, Criminal statistics, England and Wales. (Home Office 1999)
‘Homicide-Murder-Provocation-Characteristics of the reasonable man’ (2000) 
Criminal Law Review 1004
Law Commission, A Criminal Code For England and Wales (Law Com No 177 
1989)
Law Commission, Partial Defences to Murder, (Law Com No.290 Cm.6301 2004)
Law Commission, Murder Manslaughter and Infanticide’ (Law Com No.304 HC30 
2006)
Ministry of Justice, Murder, Manslaughter and Infanticide: Proposals for Reform, 
(Consultation Paper CP19/08, 2008)
‘Murder, Manslaughter and Infanticide: Summary of Responses and Government 
Position’ (Ministry of Justice 2009)
Office For Criminal Justice Reform Convicting Rapists and Protecting Victims -
Justice for Victims of Rape :A Consultation Paper (TSO 2006)
Report of the Select Committee on Murder and Life Imprisonment, (1988-89) HL 78-
I
The Criminal Law Revision Committee. Fourteenth Report: Offences Against the Person (Cmnd 7844 
1980)
